

J. Clarke

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THE
CHRISTIAN EXAMINER
AND
GENERAL REVIEW.

THIRD SERIES—No. XI.

MAY, 1837.

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The whole number of subscribers to the Christian Examiner falls short of one thousand. This number, it must be evident to those who have any knowledge of the necessary expenses of a periodical work, for every page of the contributions to which the highest price is paid, is barely sufficient to afford it a meagre support. In view of this fact,—in view, also, of the abundant ability of the denomination, under whose auspices it is issued, to give to their principal journal an ample support,—in view, particularly, of the character which it has hitherto sustained, of its rank among the periodical publications of the day, and, especially, of the important purposes which it has served, and which it is hoped it may still continue to serve, in the cause of religious truth and religious liberty,—the publishers entertain a confidence that an appeal for a more extended patronage of this work will be met with favor.

With a view particularly to the accomplishment of this object, the publishers give notice that they have made arrangements with the REV. ALLEN PUTNAM, by which he becomes the purchaser of the whole of an *increased* edition of the several Numbers of this journal as they shall be successively issued. In this way it is hoped to secure for the Examiner an adequate support. The success of this arrangement, however, it must be obvious, depends entirely upon the zeal with which it is seconded by the friends of the work. Persons wishing to become subscribers are respectfully requested to send in their names to Mr. Putnam.

Agents, and others who have been in the habit of receiving their copies of this work from the publisher in Boston, are notified that all communications pertaining to subscriptions are to be addressed "To the REV. ALLEN PUTNAM, *Boston*, care of JAMES MUNROE & Co." Other communications are to be directed to "The Editors of the CHRISTIAN EXAMINER," care of the same.

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THE
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THIRD SERIES — Nº. XI.

MAY, 1837.

ART. I. — *The Young Man's Friend.* By A. B. MUZZEY.
Boston : James Munroe & Co. 1836. 18mo. pp. 178.

It belongs to the system of education at the present day, to pay great attention to the training of youth in preparation for its participation in the action of society. There is great wisdom in this, because much of the energy and enterprise, on which the prosperity and advancement of the world depends, is found among the younger men. The spirit, the hope, the sanguine enthusiasm, the fearlessness of consequences which are essential to great undertakings, are to be found in those whose hearts have not yet been chilled by disappointment, and to whom experience has not read lessons of doubt and caution. Some great things can only be achieved by a sort of desperate struggle, which none will venture who have lived long enough to be aware of its desperateness. Some evils never will be removed if their removal depend on those who have become accustomed to them, for they then become less burdensome than the toil of removing them. The old are naturally conservative ; they wish to keep things as they are ; they have ceased to hope any thing better ; innovations disturb them as unwise and ungraceful. The young fancy every thing might be better ; they take counsel of their imaginations and their dreams ; they think every thing to be possible, and are impatient to introduce changes which shall

bring to pass all their visions. The middle aged unite much of this caution of the elders with much of this ardor of the young; experience has given them wisdom, and years have not changed that wisdom to timidity; they love to act and desire to improve, but their action is not that of impulse, and they judge of improvement more by lessons of history and real life than by the suggestions of a sanguine imagination. For these reasons it might be best if the affairs of society could be wholly entrusted to them, if its security and peace for the present, and its steady advancement toward something better, could be committed to their mature wisdom and energetic but thoughtful experience, subject to no revolutionary violence on one side, and to no lethargic contentment on the other. But as these wise counsellors in the prime of life could never exist excepting as they arose from the ranks of the young, and as their wisdom could be acquired only by their experience in earlier years, it is impossible that the guidance of the public weal should devolve on them alone; the younger must have a share with the more mature in order to their right introduction to the cares and trusts of manhood; and the aged should be retained among the counsellors that their caution may keep the balance right, and prevent the undue preponderance of hasty impulses and ill considered projects.

There is always a tendency in the ranks of the young men to press forward and seize prematurely the active stations in society. The fire of ambition and enterprise consumes them; they are impatient of tardy action. In the great procession of society they can ill bear to be kept in the rear rank, and be obliged to school down their quick step to the deliberate movement of their elders in the van. In various ways this tendency has always exhibited itself. If there be a great political revolution, youths are among its leaders; if a career of military glory which sets the world in flames, it is a young man that commands it. Alexander was in India at thirty, and Napoleon in Italy at twenty-six. In arts also, and letters, how many have done their amazing works and gained their imperishable renown before the dawn of middle life. The fame of Raphael, the king of painters, of Byron, of Burns, of Lucan, and even of Newton in science, is the fame of early manhood.

The remarkable calmness and wisdom which marked the

conduct of the American revolution, was owing to the circumstance that its leaders were men in mature life, of sober experience and ripe wisdom. The author of the Declaration of Independence was younger, but he had seen thirty-two summers; there were few so youthful; and their undue impetuosity, if they could have been impetuous in so grave a cause, was more than balanced by the sobriety of the elder men, who, like so many Nestors, grey in years and patriotism, were joined to the councils which Chatham eulogized. The same is observable in the Army. The commander-in-chief, never a young man in the sense of being rash, was then arrived at the sober age of forty-four; the chiefs next to him had outlived the boyishness which counts war a frolic, and the young men who came forward during the struggle in the bloom of youth, like Lafayette and Hamilton, became imbued with the prevailing temper, engrafted the sobriety of years on their own ardent stock, and thus the war was saved from all predominance of folly, disorder, and caprice. It took from the first, and held to the last, the character of a grave performance of a serious duty.

During the last twenty years, in which there has been a new development of the active energies of man, and society in every direction has been extending its efforts for an increase of knowledge, wealth, power, and whatever constitutes the good of civilized man; when the moral has been as active as the political, and plans for the spiritual well-being of the race have been as enthusiastically formed and pursued as ever were expeditions for personal aggrandizement; — during this period, the universal stir has imparted a peculiar impulse to the young men. The circumstances of society in this country call them out, at an age which in other lands confines them to a state of pupilage, into the various fields of manly competition, invite them to become not only actors but leaders, and put them at once into places of responsible trust. The world was once astonished to behold the first place in the British empire bestowed upon a man of twenty-one years; but extraordinary emergencies always stand by themselves, and are exempt from the common rule; here and there arises a man who is a phenomenon among men. The tendency amongst us has been to put an end to these exceptions, and to fill the trusts of church and state with young men. This feature of our condition has been a subject of frequent animadversion by foreign observers,

and deserves attention from ourselves. We cut short the period of education and precipitate that of action, and lessen the time of preparation that we may begin that of labor; in consequence of which it is to be feared that the members of our acting community are, on an average, less completely accomplished in the desirable attributes of mind, than those of the same rank in other civilized lands. Our daughters leave school at sixteen, before they can have gained any adequate discipline of the intellect, or established a taste for profitable reading. Our sons are taken from school at fourteen or fifteen, pressed into business which allows them no time for further study, and they arrive at manhood, wealth, respectable connexions, perhaps a leading place in society, with nothing more than a school-boy's learning, and without the tastes which should adorn their station. Or if they pass through the course of education at our colleges, it is still such a course as brings them early and oftentimes but half educated into the professions, with only here and there one who can stand in fair competition with the scholars of the older countries; while many of them, who should have devoted their education to the all-important purpose of promoting the intellectual improvement of their country, shut up their books at the call of business, and, tempted by the prospect of speedy wealth, plunge into the active bustle of life. In a word, such is the opportunity for youth to appear and act as men, that they are fairly in danger of leaping at once from childhood to manhood, and by taking into their own hands the whole work of society, bring upon it something of the evil which Solomon suggests in that well known exclamation, "Woe unto thee, O land, when thy king is a child!"

In this state of things, it is no wonder that many thinking and patriotic men have addressed their counsels of political and moral wisdom to the young, for in truth never were the young so important to a country, nor so perilously situated; and he, who can succeed in impressing on their minds an adequate sense of the responsibility and dignity of their situation, so that they shall feel their place truly, be awed, but not depressed, by its responsibility, be excited, and not intoxicated, by its grandeur and promise, be made wise to seize and bold to use its vast opportunities without rashness, reverently deferring to the cautious judgment of the experienced, and yet not deficient in the energy which is requisite to go

forward as the times demand ; — that man will be their truest friend, as well as a benefactor to his country.

Mr. Muzzey has come forward to do his share in this work, and has done it well. Simple, direct, and affectionate, with a happy selection of topics and a judicious method of treating them, he has prepared a volume which may be confidently recommended, and which cannot fail of being read with strong interest by those for whom it is designed. Mr. Muzzey understands the position and wants of the young ; he has an evident sympathy in all that pertains to their period of life as a season of severe exposure, trial, and responsibility ; he comprehends, he is feelingly alive to, the importance of this period to them as moral and accountable beings whose happiness is to be found in their fidelity, and to the country which is so soon to see them the active controllers of its institutions, and to receive from them the influences which are to determine its character and fortunes. He offers his counsels to them under these two aspects, as individual men and as members of society, and sets before them the principles which shall guide them to usefulness, virtue, and fame in all the relations they may sustain. The several principal topics of his chapters are ; the importance of youth as the period when principles are to be fixed and habits formed ; the value of character to young men ; their moral dangers ; their duties to the family, to society, and the country ; the value and means of religion as the foundation of virtue and the source of happiness. In all these a high standard is set up, and throughout the whole there is a reference to religious principle as the one thing needful which imparts a sacred character to the most ordinary duties and the meanest obligations.

We select a few specimens which may give an idea of the manner in which some of these subjects are treated, and verify the remarks we have made.

“ We pass next to our last inquiry. *How may a praiseworthy character be best established?* The first requisite, I would name for this purpose, is Moral Enthusiasm. By this I mean a deep, unquenchable love of moral excellence. How has the distinguished Poet, Orator, Artist, the man indeed who excels in any pursuit, attained his eminence ? By an all-absorbing love of it, by being first fired with a thirst for that one species of excellence. So let our young man gaze on a perfect character, meditate on inward purity and solid merit, until his bosom shall burn with a

fervent desire to possess it. And if it be worth no more than this chapter has imperfectly described, does it not deserve this elevated rank? Can we indeed exaggerate its value? Revolve then in your mind, during your most secret and retired hours, the charms of virtue. Dwell on the beauty of holiness by day and by night, and you will soon have entered her sacred temple.

“Determine next to acquire the prize that has kindled your soul. There is nothing in man so mighty for weal or for woe, as firmness of purpose. Resolution is almost omnipotence. To this the noblest achievements owe their accomplishment. Sheridan, one of the ablest men in English Parliamentary history, — though unhappily ruined by vice, — was at first timid, and obliged often to sit down in the midst of a speech. Convinced of, and mortified at the cause of his failures, he said one day to a friend, ‘It is in me, and it shall come out.’ From that moment he rose, and shone, and triumphed in a consummate eloquence. Here was true moral courage. And it was well observed by a heathen moralist, that ‘it is not because things are difficult, that we dare not undertake them; but they appear difficult, because we dare not undertake them.’ Be then bold in spirit. Indulge no doubts, for doubts are traitors. Believe that you can be eminently virtuous, as correct in your principles, and as pure in your conduct and conversation, as any man living. If you do this, circumstances will favor you; temptation will be awed before you; and present honor and eternal glory will await you. He who is thoroughly in earnest, and who has set to his seal, that rich or poor, through good and through evil report, let it cost what it will, he will form a good character, that young man will not, he cannot fail of his end. He may not be rich; he may suffer from envy, and from the tongue of calumny; but sure as he lives, he will reach the mark which he placed before him. He will acquire what he would not exchange for mines of wealth, nor for the Hosannas of a world. * * *

“In the practical pursuit of our high aim, let us never lose sight of it in the slightest instance. For it is more by a disregard of small things, than by open and flagrant offences, that so many come short of Christian excellence. How has he, who entered the city as a poor waiting boy, become now a man of immense wealth? Because he laid up at first small sums, and let no opportunity escape to gain even a trifle. Be you, a child of light, aspiring to be inwardly rich, profited by his example. Lay up the least circumstances that will enrich your character. Where principle, duty, improvement are concerned, never should you say, ‘it is of little consequence how I shall act.’ Feel rather that all goodness is pure gold. Think not lightly of the smallest

particle of it. There is always a right and a wrong; if you ever doubt, be sure you take not the wrong. Observe this rule, and every experience will be to you a new means of moral advancement. Retirement and society, observation, business and recreation, reading, conversation, outward success and adversity, all things will converge toward the one high aim of your soul." — pp. 36 – 40.

"Having said thus much of the pleasures and advantages of Religion, I am now to speak of *the Conditions on which you may hope to enjoy them*. These correspond to its value. Piety renders one truly happy. But who may enjoy that happiness? Is it right to expect the full rewards of obedience in the commencement of the Christian course? Certainly not. A young man may tell us that he has tried the ways of Religion, and they do not furnish that delight, which the pious ascribe to them. But how did he make this experiment? By meditating, perhaps, a few hours upon serious things; by spending one Sabbath with more strictness than usual; by forcing himself to read his Bible, or reflect on some particular personal fault for a short period. Call you this a fair trial? How do we bring the uninterested scholar to love his studies? Do we compel him to fix his eyes for one, two, or three hours on his books, and then, if he is not charmed with his task, confess to him that study is always unpleasant? No, we tell him to persevere; and that the longer he applies himself, the better will he be convinced, that the acquisition of knowledge and the improvement of his mind will afford him true happiness.

"So must it be in your pursuit of Religion. Consider, in the outset, that it is a vast subject; and that it requires much time, and much patient, self-denying devotion. And believe it to be a great prize, worth the sacrifice it demands. Doubt not that the farther you proceed in the love of God, and in keeping his commands, the more will you understand, and partake of its pleasures. Habit often renders the most irksome employment at length welcome. How then must it augment our affection for moral and spiritual employments, for those services which awaken the noblest sentiments of our nature; which possess an intrinsic and eternal interest; which need not, like our daily avocations, that we go and come to accomplish them, but are performed at home, in the solemn quiet of our own souls, and are an ever-present privilege, a part of our divine, inalienable, and glorious birth-right. The path of a young man thus occupied cannot lead to unhappiness. He may be called to toil, resist, and struggle; but man was made for action. He may be visited by trials, and sorrows; but his faith will not be consumed, it will be kindled and glow in the fiery ordeal; and his path shall be 'as the rising

sun, which shineth more and more unto the perfect day.'"—pp. 161 – 163.

We have been particularly impressed, while reading our author's remarks on the public duties of young men, with the exceeding importance of spreading right notions on this subject. The political, moral, and religious destinies of this country are all dependent on the practical opinions which the coming generations shall carry with them into the action of life; and there are certain hazards to which our prosperity and character are exposed, concerning which they ought earnestly to be put on their guard, and solemnly instructed to provide a seasonable resistance. These are hinted at, more or less minutely, in the book before us; and on one or two of them we would take the present opportunity to enlarge.

It has often been remarked, and the remark is doubtless founded in truth, that the principle of personal and political equality, in being acted out, operates to produce undue familiarity in intercourse, and a disregard of those outward forms of courtesy which render the intercourse of society pleasant and agreeable. The ancient air of deference with which gentlemen met each other, the decorous uncovering of the head, and the tone of respectful regard which marked the address of the younger to their seniors, these have departed; and young men scarcely out of their teens speak of their elders and to them, with the same familiar tone and colloquial freedom of good fellowship, with which they meet their own companions. We may well rejoice, that what was irksome and frivolous in the artificial forms of other days, has been banished; but it is lamentable that it should ever be allowed to carry with it the natural expression of respect, and still more so, to erase from the heart the disposition to give honor where it is due. Yet one cannot altogether avoid the apprehension, that to this extent the age has gone in far too many instances. It is to be admonished and recalled. Respect for age is a natural sentiment, implanted in the human soul for wholesome purposes, in all ages and nations esteemed and inculcated. Respect for superior virtue, for high station, for eminent services, is also a natural sentiment, which can be dispensed with only by so far unhumanizing the community which abrogates it. All nations have found it necessary in all ages to cherish it; the human being demands it, and cannot live

happily in society without it. Hence the promptings of nature have been followed in the establishment of chiefs and kings, standing apart from the people. Hence the gradation of ranks among the ancient Egyptians, among the Eastern nations in all ages, among the European nations even the most civilized and free down to the present time. Let it be allowed that in all these the institution has been false and mischievous; that man has been thus debased, and deprived of many of his noblest rights; still it remains true, that they were founded in an original suggestion of human nature. Those who gained the ascendancy may have abused it, but the original sentiment was a noble one, and the multitude exercised a state of mind virtuous in itself, though the objects on which it rested might be unworthy, and the forms of its exhibition degrading. To look up with awe to real greatness, to express deference for true wisdom, to bend in reverence to that which is high and is appointed to administer the essential functions of society, so far from being a weakness is a virtue, so far from a debasing is an elevating trait of character. The child stands thus in the presence of his father, or we brand him as a monster. The man stands thus in the presence of his Creator, or we shudder at his insane daring. He that honors his parent and worships his God with the deepest devotion, is always accounted as doing what is most becoming MAN to do. He thus manifests that he knows his place, and that he may be trusted. And just in proportion as any other beings or institutions stand toward him in relations similar to those of his parent or his God, something of the same honor is exercised toward them. The old man, the good man, the public benefactor, the magistrate, the law, the state, each is an object of respect. Nay, he recognises in every individual, a brother of the parent whom he reveres, a son and image of the God whom he adores, an equal subject of the law he honors; and therefore he honors all men. He feels that none are to be treated with disrespect; if equal, then equally entitled to consideration with himself; if in each a portion of the national sovereignty resides, then that sovereignty is to be honored in the person of each; and he can no more be guilty of, than be willing to receive, that indecorum of speech or of manners which implies that a man has a right to be rude.

This deserves to be seriously considered. If it were, men would perceive it to be altogether base, worthy only of a

grovelling mind, to thrust the principle of political equality into the face of every man he meets, and thus abolish the courtesies of life. Yet it has been strangely permitted, even where it would be least expected; men forget their moral duty in the selfish application of a civil right. As we once heard it well described, the interpretation of the republican principle seems too often to be, "I am as good as you;" hence disrespect and rudeness; whereas the true interpretation is, "You are as good as I,"—which would lead to universal deference and politeness.

It is not too much to say of the tendency we refer to, that it leads to unfaithfulness toward the institutions of the country, and puts in jeopardy the high expectations which have been founded on them. We have here nothing which is venerable for its antiquity, no sacred relics of former days, no ancient institutions of government or religion, which bear on their front the hallowed impress of departed ages, and are inseparably mingled with the earliest recollections and associations of our souls. All is new. All has been created as it were by ourselves, within the memory of the present generation. Our constitution, our government, our whole political organization, are the work of our own hands, and the work of our own hands we will not worship. We eulogize and flatter them as fond parents do their children, but as for reverence—no, they are our creatures; we are the sovereigns, not they; they can be changed at our pleasure, and shall be whenever we see fit. We therefore hold them in as little respect as we please. And with this habit of viewing the constitution, the law, and the law-makers, what are we to anticipate? Is it strange that we have seen what we have seen? Even the most sacred thing among us,—that which attaches to itself more nearly than any thing else that deep feeling of inviolable devotion which is termed *LOYALTY*,—even the Constitution of our Government, the subject of so much verbal panegyric, overladen with so much violent and fulsome eulogy,—yet how easily, in more than one instance both in the national and the state governments, has party spirit been able to set it at defiance, and erect itself into a power above it? How have men sworn to defend it, yet laughed it to scorn, when it stood in their way! How have even Legislators been bold enough to contradict it by their enactments! Then the Law,—which if it be not supreme in the land, alas for our liberty and security;

which if it be not king, then is nothing to be looked for but anarchy and chaos — have we not seen this sacred guardian set at defiance by the people in violent assemblies ; and that, not only, as might sometimes be expected to occur, in seasons of sudden exasperation and passionate excitement, but deliberately, systematically, under the guidance of men of high name, large influence, reputed patriotism, confessedly appealing to a power above the law, and in place of the law, as something better than the law ; while meantime the over-awed press held an ominous and dreadful silence, not daring to rebuke the vile conspiracy against the people and their rights.

When such things can be, there is occasion for serious alarm. If the Law can be despised, if the Constitution can be crushed, if men of influence can be found capable of asserting, and acting on the assertion, that there is an authority in the land higher than these, the country is undone. Now is the season to look to it while this fearful development is yet new, before the disorder has spread and corrupted the whole people. And it is the Young Men of America who are especially interested, it is for them to recover and restore the respect for law and right. Let them see to it that they early cherish in themselves and in all around them a heartfelt, unwavering, all-submissive respect for the Law ; neither by word nor by act, let them cast a breath of ill will upon it, or raise in themselves or others, a willingness that it should be evaded. If there be a bad law, (as unhappily the rage for legislation, and the insufficient reverence for law have but too often caused evil enactments,) seek its repeal ; submit implicitly while it exists, at any inconvenience, at any loss ; it will be to your honor to suffer for the general good ; but seek its repeal by righteous means, and always in such wise as shall prove your profound respect for Law itself, and your deep sorrow that so great a wrong should have been done to its majestic name, by the usurpation into its place of an unrighteous statute. Do thus the utmost in your power to maintain the inviolable sacredness of that authority without which there is no security to the nation, and to enshrine the image of it in the hearts of all the people.

These remarks may be extended to another point : the manner in which the men who hold office in the government shall be regarded and treated. It is true, that very unworthy men may be thrust into places of high dignity ; but it greatly

concerns the well-being of the community, that the *place* should at all events be honored, and the man in it for the sake of the place. Like a bad law, he should be displaced by the regular forms as soon as possible, but like the law, should be honored until displaced, not for his own sake, but for the sake of the institutions and the people. Dishonor him, and you wound the general good, by casting contempt on an office essential to be honored. The incumbent cannot dishonor the office ; it is unsoiled by his baseness, it is uncontaminated by his corruption ; he leaves the seat as he found it, pure and revered, unless the offensive missiles, hurled at him while he filled it, may have desecrated it in the thoughts of the bystanders, and the office thus become an object of contempt, because associated with the contempt cast on the man. Who, therefore, can regard with unconcern, or with any feelings but those of mortification and alarm, the reckless tone of so large a portion of the political press in all that relates to public men and their public life ! Let them be exposed to free observation and severe judgment ; it is right. Never let a base man usurp the place of a public functionary, or prove himself untrue to his trust, without being exposed. But let this be done with the calm and grave tone with which the judge on the bench pronounces sentence after the process of impeachment, so as to save the dignity of the office, and the honor of the mistaken men who raised him to it, while it unmasks the falsehood of the man. Then good might be done, the press would exercise a wholesome and needful moral control. How is it now ? We are obliged to say, that to too great an extent it is a mere instrument of party. It is a mouth-piece to spread unfounded calumnies, without regard to character, truth, or consequences ; it catches up and propagates any report which may prove injurious to an obnoxious statesman, or welcome to the mass of gossiping readers ; it imposes with the most enormous and untiring impudence on the credulity of the people, and throws the facts and opinions of the times into such confusion, that a sober inquirer can hardly hope to arrive at the truth. And this press is nearly the governor of the community ! The journals which are less violent, less false, more principled, calm and fair, are so much more tame, that they have comparatively a small circulation, and the mass of the people is left to the mercy of a large body of self-constituted, irresponsible editors, whose whole care it is to make such journals as

will attract the readers of their party, and secure a good livelihood to themselves. Is there not thus a perpetual warfare waged against the spirit of patriotism in the people? Can our institutions fail to fall into disrespect? We call on the ingenuous and fair-minded Young Men, who are coming up into life, as yet unsoiled by the low contests of party, and still glowing with their native love of the pure and the true, to discountenance and rebuke this unholy brood. It is for them to set a higher example; to make it dishonorable, either to edit or receive a gazette which is indifferent to truth, good morals, and the fair reputation of public men. Let them unite with one voice, and declare that the profanation we complain of shall go no farther; that the good name of every son of the common Mother is sacred, until forfeited by crime, and shall not lie at the mercy of political writers, whose trade is defamation. We call on them to give to their country a generation of fair-minded and generous politicians, and thus secure to her that respect and love, which cannot live in the bosom of her children, if her image be forever associated in their minds with what is low and selfish.

A part of the duty of the rising generation to their age and country, relates to the cultivation of the mind, the advancement of knowledge, and the spread of those elegant tastes which refine and exalt. "Onward" is the watchword of the times, and it should be applied to this as well as to other subjects. Onward the nation is going with astonishing rapidity, in population and wealth, and consequently in the means of promoting any object which shall seem desirable. It is infinitely desirable, that this wonderful external progress should be accompanied by a corresponding progress in education and refinement, so that when we shall equal the older nations in wealth, and exceed them in numbers, we may not be mortified by inferiority in science, literature, and the civilizing arts. Now the danger is, that the progress of the mind will lag tardily behind the growth of the outward prosperity; it certainly will do so, if effects correspond to causes, unless our youth are trained in a supreme regard to the higher objects of man, and sedulously cultivate in themselves the love of letters and refinement. Thirty years ago, Mr. Buckminster, filled with the generous spirit that belonged to him, and with an apprehensive regard to the tendency we are adverting to, wrote home from Europe, as an apology for purchasing so ex-

tensive a collection of books, when his own life was so uncertain, "I consider that, by every book I send out, I do something for my dear country, which the love of money seems to be depressing almost into unlettered barbarism." This is the spirit that should animate our young men. When they see how the whole people is abandoned to this idolatry, how many gifted minds are decoyed by the glittering temptation from the quiet pursuit of letters and the cultivation of knowledge, they should awake to a sense of the peril that threatens. They should understand how the true greatness of a people does not consist in its external prosperity; that it never can be secure or happy without knowledge. Let them give their most strenuous effort to maintain the truth on this point. Let those, especially, who have had the benefit of the highest education, know, that to them is committed a solemn charge in this respect. They are constituted by Providence guardians of this portion of the public weal. They are made watchmen over the intellectual interests of the people. They are to be overseers of the instruction of the land, and in no small part its educators and guides. Let them know that they descend from their lofty position, when they forsake this honorable vocation, and go out from the temple of science and the halls of instruction to join the throng that is toiling for mere wealth and power. They are not wanted in the counting-room or the market-place. There are enough without them to do the active work, and carry on the commerce of the world, and fill the offices of state. But they are wanted in the seats of education. More teachers in all departments; more sober, enlightened, judicious educators of the people alike in the humbler schools and in the higher seminaries of science, morals, and art, are pressingly needed; and he does more service as a patriot who puts his books in a knapsack, and walks away with it to some frontier settlement, and lays the foundation of a solid education in that infant town, than he who by enterprise, adventure, or speculation, becomes the nabob of a city. A thousand men have the education and the talent for the latter, for one that is fitted for the former, or has the character requisite to accomplish it.

We address a similar train of remark to all. For the sake of their own happiness and dignity, for the sake of their country and fellow-men, let all cultivate the love of letters, and intellectual accomplishments, and a spirited interest in the

cause of education. It often happens to men of active vocations, that they cultivate no taste for reading beyond that of the newspapers; they therefore never arrive at any enlargement of mind, or systematic and extensive knowledge; they have no resources if health and fortune fail them; in sickness and in age they are forlorn and desolate; the mind and its treasures are nothing to them; even the book of life fails to command their lethargic attention; nay, in instances not a few, it has been known that when a sudden reverse of fortune has left such men without resource, they have cast themselves into the arms of death. Such instances should plead trumpet-tongued for a juster treatment of the immortal mind, which demands to be fortified against evil, by tastes, resources, and habits corresponding to its nature and destiny.

But let them be warned against being led astray by the temptations presented by the present condition of literature. The multiplication of books offers equal facilities at the present time for the cultivation of the most beneficial, and the most injurious taste in reading; and while the land is deluged with worthless publications at inconceivably low prices, the exposure of unwary minds to corruption and waste is very much like the temptation to intemperance, which lies at the corners of the streets. One may read continually without being benefited. A large proportion of the popular works which lie in every body's way, lauded in the newspapers like patent drugs, and offered at every corner like cheap spirits, are little else than poisonous stimulants, exciting the appetite, creating a craving for indulgence, and debilitating instead of nourishing the mind which resorts to them. We could as soon recommend our young men to feed at the confectioner's, and drink at the bar of a second-rate tavern, in order to ruddy health and manly vigor of body, as send them to the circulating libraries in order to a clear and strong mind. We warn them against the effeminacy of soul to which this feeding on the popular literature of the day will inevitably lead. The resources of classic English literature, both of former times and of the present day, are abundant in books of solid merit, and equally interesting with the trivial volumes just referred to; and it is pitiable to find so many resorting to the society of the foolish and corrupting, in preference to that of the strong and elevating. However we may lament the vast proportion of worthless trash published and republished by the American press, we cannot deny that

a large mass of valuable works also are continually brought before the public. So that no one need complain that wholesome nutriment is not at hand; it is his own fault if he select the deleterious. And let the rising generation but use a wise and discriminating judgment; let them reject whatever a pure moral and literary taste disapproves; let them take advice of men competent to give it; let them be guided in the selection of books, not by the purchased panegyric of flippant editors, or the advertising puffs of interested booksellers, but by the deliberate recommendation of some judicious friend, or the impartial testimony of some trustworthy literary journal; and the evil so much complained of will cease to exist.

We do not mean to repeat here what is so often and so urgently said of the importance of intellectual cultivation and taste to the character and prosperity of this nation. It has become a proverb, that popular institutions can rest securely only on the intelligence and virtue of the people, and that to these universal education is essential. But proverbs are words; and it is wonderful how superficially, after all, the great truth herein expressed has taken hold of the actual convictions of the people, or, at any rate, how exceedingly low is the estimate of the requisite intelligence and virtue. Our governments and our politicians seem as yet to have hardly caught a glimpse of the truth, or to have suspected the responsibility which it devolves on them. They go forward as if the great duty of public men were still, as in the barbarous ages, to provide for external defence, as if the depredations of robbers were the only thing to be feared, and as if all wealth were wasted which is diverted to any other object. And, therefore, when they hold in their hands the public wealth, beyond what this object requires, they know not what to do with it. Short-sighted beyond other men, they do not perceive that Providence has given them this unheard of boon, just at the present age of the world and in this precise state of society, that they might perform a duty for their country, which no other country ever had such an opportunity or such a need of performing, namely, the establishing that universal thorough EDUCATION which all the wise and good see to be the one thing essential to the national prosperity. One might suppose it to be the great charge of a government so situated, to secure that one essential thing on which the hope of the nation rests. And yet, instead of thus acting up to the spirit of the age, they limit themselves by the narrow

views of former and ignorant ages, and dissipate for temporary objects those means which might have been made to rear institutions that would bless the country to the end of time. Perhaps nothing different could be reasonably expected of the government of the nation ; but we blush that Massachusetts should have proved so false to her former reputation as to throw away the splendid opportunity. We are ashamed that the magnificent sum of nearly two million dollars should be divided and subdivided, and scattered over the surface of this State, like so much water spilt upon the ground, on the poor pretence of lightening the burdens of the people. Have the sons of the Puritans come to regard this petty relief as the summum bonum ? Is this the legislation which they ask at the hands of their representatives ? We are slow to believe it, though it has been asserted. Or if, for the present, they are willing, like improvident children, to take a temporary gratification in place of a solid and lasting good, the time must come when they will count themselves wronged by the parsimonious indulgence.

While these things are so, it is the more necessary that individuals should devote themselves to this all-important concern. What has been done amongst us hitherto, has been done principally by private beneficence ; and the signs of the times indicate, that government is determined to throw the future yet more upon the munificence and forethought of private men. However this may be, it is clear that the further progress of education depends on the interest which shall be taken in it by the men who are coming forward to fill the future places in society. They must, therefore, be early aware of their responsibility. However absorbed in their own affairs, they must allow themselves leisure to devote a portion of their care and thought to this general good. Public spirit must be a pervading and universal virtue ; not displaying itself merely in those works of general convenience, by which intercourse is promoted, trade facilitated, and our cities adorned ; — in regard to these, neglect is little to be apprehended, because they lie in the very path of men, and are palpably instrumental in the growth of population, wealth, and luxury. The public spirit which the times demand must go deeper ; it must act as if the minds and character of the people were the chief concern, and therefore be anxious to enlarge the means of education and virtue, watch over the schools, encourage the institutions of philanthropy, and labor for whatever advances society

by advancing the minds of its individual members. What might not be the progress and glory of this land, if our Young Men would devotedly address themselves to this great enterprise !

To all this, there is yet a higher principle to be added. It is not for patriotism only, that we speak ; it is not merely the prosperity, order, and peace of the community, that we would promote ; nor can it be hoped that the highest form of civilization will be attained, if man be regarded as the creature of society only. There are no principles adequate to this end, but those of the Christian Faith. All others stop short of the requisite thoroughness and consistency. The laws of the Commercial world uphold honesty because it is the best policy, and connive at breaches of morality when they are good policy also. Politicians and governments make wealth and power the supreme good, and have little care whether individuals be ignorant or informed, virtuous or vicious, happy or miserable, so long as the state prospers. The law of Honor establishes an external decorum of deportment, and obliges the base to appear like gentlemen ; but it cares not for any thing deeper than the appearance ; it leaves character unimproved, affixes no stigma to the grossest debauchery of life, permits the seducer to walk unmarked amongst men, and applauds him who lives with the cherished purpose of revenging with murder any insult to his own person. The mere pursuit of Science or Letters, refining and strengthening as it may the intellect, yet allows the corruption of the heart to remain, frowns ambiguously on the irregularities of life, and admits the profligacy of Byron and Voltaire to the same honors with the purity of Cowper and Milton. It is not here, then, that we must have our young men schooled. It is not a punctilious personal honor, nor a mere devotion to country, nor a zeal for knowledge, that can satisfy. We must see them concerned for **PRINCIPLE** ; — patriots and scholars, for the reason, not that it is public spirited and good policy, but from a sense of moral obligation, because it is immoral to be otherwise. They must regard Virtue as the chief concern, the interests of the religious nature the chief interests, and whatever is done for themselves and for society, must be done in obedience to the will of God, and with a view to the highest welfare of his moral children.

We have not room to press this great topic. We can only

implore our Young Men to give it their faithful consideration. Let them ask themselves, what there is worth living for except virtue, and how virtue can exist without principle, and what principle can be trusted excepting that of Religion. Let them take counsel of their moral nature, let them listen to the spirit's voice within, which they cannot fail sometimes to hear, however overborne by the noise of the world and the tumult of earthly desires. Let them set their mark high, and press steadily forward to reach it. What other lesson are they to learn from the hallowed history of their own land? Who made New England what it is? What laid the foundations of strength, virtue, knowledge, which have been and still are, blessed be God, our just boast? Men, with whom religious considerations were the first question; who did their duty to the state, because it was their duty to God; who thought that no real good existed for the human family, but that which grew up from Christian faith, and a stern devotedness to conscience and truth. Herein we discern the spirit that makes a commonwealth, and it is the only spirit that can keep it. So far as New England has gone forward, it is in the power and by the guidance of this spirit; and if it has gone backward,—if,—in the love of liberty, in devotion to knowledge and human rights, in high moral independence, she has gone backward,—it is because she has been unfaithful to this spirit of the Forefathers, and recreant to their example. If in any honorable thing the Commonwealth has deteriorated, it is because it is less a Christian Commonwealth, and because inferior views have turned aside the hearts of the rulers, and corrupted the tastes of the people.

It is a narrow and short-sighted policy which excludes private principle from public actions; as if God were not the sovereign of the nation as well as of the man, as if he were not Lord of society as well as Father of its individual members, as if the whole history of the world did not show how he has exacted heavy retribution from the nations whenever they allowed selfishness and luxury to usurp the place of integrity and virtue. One would suppose, from the manner in which some men talk, that the ballot-box and the press were infallible talismans, breathing into the people undying vigor and everlasting youth; forgetting that they are both of them but the tools of the people, and sure to become corrupt and corrupting the moment that public and private principle are held cheap.

And so of all our political institutions. They are at the beck and will of individual men ; and they are the readiest instruments of the nation's ruin, if those men are allowed to become unprincipled. They may be unprincipled in spite of constitutions, free elections, and newspapers ; in spite of a general education which should confine itself to human learning and the mere art of getting along in the world. Oh, that our brave and goodly armies of youth just coming into life, eager, resolute, and with the destiny of forty millions in their hands, could be made to see this ; that they could be roused to understand, and to act on the understanding of this infallible truth ; that they could see how there are other institutions, those of moral instruction and Christian faith, on which the happiness and weal of themselves and all they love depend, infinitely more than on what the politicians and schemers about them contrive and enact. Let them observe, that there is no ground to fear lest the exchange and the senate-house be deserted, but there is fear lest the house of God be forsaken, and the institutions of Religion cast away ; lest the generations, that are rapidly filling up our extensive borders, should spread their tents upon the hill-sides and in the valleys without the Tabernacle of the Lord among the tribes ; lest worldly-mindedness and earthliness should possess and deprave the inheritance of our posterity.

Let our YOUNG MEN come to the rescue, and resolve to prevent the evil before it is too late. Beautiful it is to observe how many of them are already on the alert, and doing with their might what the times and their religion demand. How much does the cause of temperance, of education, of philanthropy in all its various branches, owe to their hearty aid and affectionate zeal. We look with admiration and devout gratitude on the examples we have seen of the cultivated and accomplished bringing the treasures of their intelligence, their refinement, and their wealth, and laying them at the feet of the altar, in the service of the poor and the church. We say to them, God speed ! They are doing for themselves and for society a work that can never pass away, the most important work now to be done for mankind. If their spirit could pervade the land, if in all our cities and villages this youthful energy could be excited, and the united force of our ten thousand beating and growing hearts be directed to this object, what a revolution should we not behold, and how like

Paradise would be our land, before the current century shall close. We put it to the conscience of every young reader, whether he will not do his part. It may seem little he can do; but let him think it would be criminal in him to withhold this little; let him know, that if he do it in simplicity and faith, it will be far more than he imagines. There is no infallible sign that the world is to be despaired of, until individual men think there is nothing for them to do toward its salvation.

H. W., jr.

ART. II. — *Notices of the Rev. Bezaleel Howard, D. D., of Springfield; being the Substance of the Rev. Mr. Peabody's Discourse at his Interment, February 22, 1837.*

I. CORINTHIANS, XV. 26. The last enemy that shall be destroyed is death.

IF any of you have enemies, you will find that there is but one way to disarm and subdue them. If you have power to crush them and trample upon them, they will still be your enemies, — more hostile and determined than ever. By power, you may silence and overawe them, but they will cherish their hatred in the silence of their souls. The only way effectually to remove an enemy is to change him into a friend. This is the way in which the Savior of the world has destroyed the enemies of his religion. Ever since he was lifted up on the cross he has been drawing the human race to himself; their aversion to his spiritual religion is overcome by the power of his dying love.

And this is the way in which the Savior of the world has subdued the last enemy of man. He has changed death into a friend, and taught men to regard him as a friend; he has changed the whole aspect of death and the grave. Once the voice from Heaven said to erring man, "Dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return." Heavily that sentence fell upon the human heart. But He says, — "He that liveth and believeth in me shall never die." And now he expects us to regard the visitation of mortality as friendly to our welfare; he expects us to alter all our views of the subject; he expects us to give way as little as possible to our natural feelings; and to open our hearts as much as possible to the hopes and prom-

ises which he hath brought us from above. It makes an immense difference, how we look upon these things, and we can determine for ourselves how we will look upon them. If we look upon them in the faint light of human science and imagination, it shows us nothing but dust returning to the earth as it was; but if we see these things in the light of his religion, it makes all things new. There is no more death; the departed are passed from death unto life; the shadow of death, — it is but a shadow, — gives way before the dayspring from on high. The grave is the entrance of the shining path in which the just shall continually ascend from glory to glory in heaven.

I can urge you now, with more confidence than ever, to look upon death as the friend and not the enemy of man; for I can offer you the example of our father, whose loss we now deplore. For years he has been drawing near the grave, with the prospect of death full before him. He has thought upon it all the day; he has thought upon it in the watches of the night. All the closing years of his life have been spent in preparation for its coming. While it was yet afar off, he regarded it as a happy change; when it came near, he saw it with a calm and even cheerful-eye; and those who stood near the death-bed can bear witness, that no friend, returning after the absence of years, was ever more welcome than the coming of death was to him. He felt that it came to release him; his whole feeling was, "Now lettest thou thy servant depart in peace."

I am speaking to those who enjoy the light of Christianity. The Red Sea was life to those who were permitted to pass through it, but death to those who perished in its waters. So death is death to those who hope for nothing beyond it; but it is life to those who look forward to rest in heaven. Life and immortality have been brought to light by Jesus Christ. Before Christianity, there were hopes of a future existence, — there were imaginations of a future existence; but it never was confirmed, — never appeared like a reality, till the grave had actually given up its dead, — till the Son of God was seen returning from its deserted caverns, and declaring that it never again should have power to imprison the just.

And now let me ask you to look upon death in the light of Christianity, and see whether it is, or is not, a friend to the race of man.

First. Death is the friend of the world. Improvement is the great law of existence, and the improvement of the world is secured by that order of Providence which sweeps successive generations away. As each generation passes, some of its prejudices, errors, and sins are buried with it, while its improvement remains and is preserved in the great treasures of the human mind and heart. Death is the great reformer; it is continually removing those obstacles which prevent the world from advancing. There was a time when the wickedness of man was great, and God removed it by a sudden and universal flood. And he is now doing the same thing, not suddenly, but in the daily order of nature; all are carried away as with a flood; and sure it is easier to direct the young mind than to reform the old,—since those evil habits which become so strong in fifty years would become invincible in five hundred, it is well that one generation passeth away and another cometh. Without this succession, there would be no improvement,—no advance,—no hope for the race of man.

But you say it is not so with the good; the world loses something when they die. It does indeed; but it does not lose the effect of their services; it does not lose the benefit of their example. On the contrary, the dying can make an impression on many whom the living cannot reach. There is no eloquence like that of the dying tongue; it commands attention and teaches lessons which even the thoughtless cannot forget. And when the righteous are gone from the living, they do not lose their power: though dead, they yet speak; their instructions affectionately remembered have more power than in the day when they were given. Consider, then, that were it not for death there could be no such relations of life as now give life its charm. The relation of parent and child, and many others, which now give room for the best discipline of the human heart, and the best displays of human virtue, could not exist were it not for death. Also the beautiful contrast between the young and the hoary head would be unknown; the happy influence which age exerts on childhood would be lost; and what is more than all, we should lose the power,—the awful power which resides in the memory of the dead. Without death, the world would be like a vast forest with all its leaves fallen and all its branches dry. Death is the friend and not the enemy of the collective race of man.

Secondly. If death is thus friendly to our race in general,

is it so to the individual? When we bring home the subject as a matter of direct personal interest, is death the friend or enemy of man?

Consider what our earthly tabernacle is. It is a material construction; it is made of earthly substance, and therefore it can last but for a certain time. The hour must come, when, from its very nature, it must decay and fall. Man could not exist long on earth unless the body were renewed. And then the question comes, — Is it better for this corruptible to put on some new corruptible form? Is it not better for this corruptible to put on incorruption, and this mortal immortality? Is it better to renew the mansion of clay with its infirmities and pains? Is it not better to lay it down, — to leave it for a world where infirmity, pain, and sorrow can never come? Is it better to remain “dying daily” on the earth, or to pass through the change of death at once, and place ourselves forever beyond his power?

But that death releases from the mortal frame is not the greatest of its blessings; it puts us in possession of enjoyments, privileges, and powers, which living we could never reach. A seed cannot be quickened without first dying; unless it is cast into the ground, it cannot become a new existence, — cannot reappear in verdure, covering the earth with its living green. So it is with the mortal man. Except he die, — except his body perish in the dust, he cannot reach that high state for which his God designed him; but when he has passed through it he may become as the angels of God. New powers of action may be given to his mind, — new warmth and glow to his heart. Surely the soul of the just must rejoice in a change like this; when it goes like a Siberian exile, returning from the region of cold and storms to the sunny hills and valleys of his native land.

But though the change of death is gain to the Christian, men fear its coming. This is true; and yet death may be a friend to man. There are friends who find no welcome from those whom they serve. Our feeling with respect to death shows, perhaps, that we are not contemplating it and preparing for it as Christians should. Our Savior shuddered at the thought of what death he should die; but not at the thought of dying. When he announced to his disciples that he must suffer, he remarked to them, “Sorrow hath filled your heart; if ye loved me, ye would rejoice, because I go unto my

Father." He himself rejoiced in the hope of meeting with his God.

We are to determine in what aspect death shall appear to us. It depends upon ourselves, whether to receive him as an enemy or a friend. Our lives are now determining what the change of death shall do for our souls. We are floating upon the tide of time ; whether we are bearing onward to a harbor of rest, God only knows. I see some, who are drifting, without keeping any purpose of existence in view. I see others, who are standing away, — far away from the course which leadeth unto life. Their destiny is in their own hands. Death will be a friend to all who will suffer him to serve them. What more can the warmest friendship do ?

Thirdly. When death calls others away, — when he takes from us those whom we venerate and love, is he our enemy or our friend ?

We must distinguish between our welfare and our feelings. There are many things which are good for our welfare, but distressing to our feelings. We think not of pain which we undergo, in order to secure a blessing ; we can submit to short privation to secure a distant good. And this is all that death requires us to do. It only asks us to give up the excellent and faithful, that they may go to a better world. Who would detain them, if he had the power ? Who would dare detain them from their home ? from the friends who are waiting to receive them ? from the Savior who claims them as his own ? from the Father who is ready to welcome them to the skies ?

If, when our friends are taken from us, we say, " An enemy hath done this," we charge death unjustly. He has not taken our friends away, any more than he has taken our God away. They are present with us still as God is present with us ; not seen by the eyes indeed, but present and visible to the soul. They are not lost ; we may meet them again if we will. We may recover our lost treasures if we will. Why then should we ever say of death, " He hath stripped me of my glory and taken the crown from my head ? " He takes nothing from us except for a moment ; and what he has taken he will restore in new brightness and glory.

But the Savior's purpose is not answered while we persist in treating death as the great enemy of man. We must learn to see these things in a different light, — in the light of the gos-

pel of Jesus Christ. We must feel that if death is sometimes severe, he is severely kind, — severely true. It is time that the old imaginations were done away, which for ages have covered the grave with gloom. Once it was supposed that the light of the dog-star shed heat and pestilence on the earth whenever it shone; and yet you may see that star in each winter night shining in icy brightness. So death never had the power to injure which human fancy ascribed to it; it never had power over the souls of the just. Let the scales fall from our eyes; let us see these things as they are; let us look on death, not as the close of existence, but as the day-spring of immortal life; not as the everlasting door that shuts us out from the living, — but as the gate of mercy, on golden hinges turning, which admits the blessed to glory and joy on high.

Such were the views of death which were taken by him whose loss we now deplore. For years he has been teaching us how to live, and now he has taught us how to die. He regarded this life as the beginning of existence; he kept the purposes of existence steadily in view. He resolved that when his Master came he should find him watching. Knowing that he might at any moment be called to take the voyage of death, he would not be far from the shore. He looked on death as a happy change, not because he trusted in any thing which he had done; for never was the sense of human unworthiness more deeply felt by any man. It was because he trusted in the Savior of the world, — because he had confidence in the Redeemer's dying love; it was because the great and precious promises were always before him, that he was able to look forward, with so much calmness, to the grave.

Since the example of our departed friend was one of religious faith, hope, and charity, I may be permitted to indulge my feeling in spreading out a few of its traits before you. It is indeed a departure from my usual course; but there are reasons to justify the exception, which will suggest themselves to every mind. I would propose him to you as an example, — an example of one whose endeavor it was to walk with God. We never again shall behold his venerable form; we never again shall hear his impressive and earnest tones. Suffer him then to instruct you by his memory and example, since it is all that he now can do.

The Rev. Dr. Howard was a native of Bridgewater in this State, where he was born in the year 1754. His youth

was passed, not in study, but in active employment of various kinds, by which he gained a great practical sagacity and large acquaintance with mankind. He had arrived at maturity before he determined to embrace a learned profession; but having a clear, manly understanding and strong intellectual tastes, he easily overcame the disadvantages of his earlier years in respect to education; while the chief qualification for his profession, piety, was never wanting; from his childhood he grew up in the fear of God.

He became pastor of the church in Springfield in the year 1785; and for many years discharged the duties of his profession with exemplary fidelity and conscientious self-devotion. In his preaching he was direct and familiar. Without the least ambition to be eloquent, and without imitating the artificial manner of preaching, which was then so common, he addressed his audience from the desk as if he were conversing with them; telling them with perfect freedom what were their transgressions and dangers, and representing to them the beauty of holiness with simplicity and power, like one who spoke from the inspiration of his own soul. Faithfulness was, in his eyes, the chief grace of his profession, and he was distinguished through life by his exact and unshrinking performance of his duty.

In the year 1805 his health failed in such a manner that he was obliged to retire from his public labors. When the exclusive system was first put in force he resisted it; and finding that there was no peace but in separation, he, with others of the same liberal views, formed themselves into a new religious society. He was at the time a firm believer in the Trinity; but he believed also in the excellence and piety of many who rejected the doctrine; and he would not lend his aid, nor even the silent authority of his name, to a system which treated them as enemies of righteousness, and cast them out as unworthy to come to the table of his Master. But I shall not dwell upon his history. My object is to present him to you as a religious example, for I never knew one more uniformly excellent, or one in which less was wanting.

And first; let me say that his duties to himself were always matters of principle, and rigidly and faithfully discharged. To him the duties of common life were so many duties of religion. In his social and domestic relations he acted as if in the presence of God, and counted nothing trifling which concerned the

welfare of his soul. In all his dealings with others he was exact and punctual ; prudence was with him a familiar virtue. In all his habits he was rigid and self-denying ; but his object was not to be rich, — not to secure comforts and pleasures for himself ; perhaps there never lived a man who cared less for self-indulgence, or more for the wants and happiness of other men.

But, the cares of this world, though they were faithfully regarded, were not near his heart. He thought it his first duty to himself to ascertain what he was created for ; why he was sent into this world ; and how he might become what the religion of Jesus Christ was meant to make him. In order to fulfil the purposes of existence, he kept the word of God always near him ; it was his counsellor, his guide, his most familiar friend. He went to it for enjoyment, — he went to it for consolations ; it was before him every morning ; it was the subject of his meditations every night. And thus he drank deeply into the spirit of the gospel ; thus he kept near the throne of grace ; his soul was always ready to rise in prayer, and to pour itself out in praise. His religion was not worn like a sabbath garment and put aside on other days ; it was closely blended with all the concerns of every day. Feeling that the duties which God required of him were for his own good, it was never a hardship, but always a pleasure to do them.

His chief object was to make himself spiritual in preparation for a spiritual state. Not that he thought lightly of religious forms, for he well knew that religion has no hold upon the man by whom its forms are not sacredly regarded. But his constant endeavor was to turn his attention from the things which are seen and temporal to those which are unseen and eternal. And thus he was able to see what others do not see ; God and eternity were realities to him ; he spoke and thought and acted like an immortal being ; like one whose prospects were not bounded by the grave. This spiritualmindedness had its natural and happy effect ; his piety was not gloomy and frowning ; it was cheerful, animating ; it spread a persuading light around him ; it inspired others to glorify their heavenly Father, for his example always seemed to say, “Ye know these things, happy are ye if ye do them.”

Whenever he meditated, as he did often meditate upon his duties to himself, he set his standard high ; he was not one of those who think that a common, unspiritual morality would

answer the demands of God. He believed that man, as born into this world, begins a worldly life only ; he believed that man must be born again ; that he must begin a spiritual life, — a life with purposes and pursuits not depending on this world, but reaching forward to the other. And when the powers of the mind and the affections of the heart found objects above and beyond this world, when God was more regarded than man, and eternity more thought of than the passing day, he thought it sufficient evidence that this spiritual change was passed through. He walked in newness of life ; and by constant communion with God, by unceasing watchfulness, meditation, and prayer, he kept alive the fire which was kindled in his soul.

Again ; in his discharge of his duty to others, our departed friend may be offered as our example.

He was naturally of a bold and independent spirit ; impatient of contradiction, and not ready to submit to wrongs. He felt these natural tendencies, and endeavored to put a guard upon himself ; if ever he wounded the feelings of another, he would humble himself to make reparation. No one could doubt the genuineness of his regard for others. He was one of those to whom the supplicating eye was never raised in vain. He considered his property as a trust, as means which God had placed in his hands in trust for his fellow men. Wholly indifferent to the opinion of men concerning him, he was anxious to prepare the account of his stewardship for the eye of God ; and acting under this high and holy principle, he dispensed his charities with a liberality almost without example. He was not afraid of encouraging vice in others by relieving distress ; the vice which he feared to encourage was that of selfishness in his own breast. I have seen generous men, — charitable men, — men who were followed with eloquent thanks and grateful tears ; they are lights shining in this dark world, and from my soul I bless them. But I must say, that I never saw generosity that equalled his. Alas ! that the open hand is now cold in death ; never again to be extended to relieve the sufferer, or to raise the bowed down ! Yes ! the poor have lost a friend indeed. Well may they lament him ; well may they fear that his place will not be filled !

But while he was anxious to supply the temporal wants of others, he was still more earnest to secure the salvation of their souls. He had a deep sense of the value of the soul ; the

humblest being, — most degraded being was in his eyes, the possessor of an immortal soul. He could not bear to see this pearl of great price defaced by sensuality and sin ; nor would he look on and see a soul in danger without an effort to save it from death. When he saw how many around him seemed wrapped up in worldliness, — and as careless of all spiritual things, as if there were no God above us and no life to come, it filled him with apprehension and dismay ; he felt bound to call their attention to the subjects which they were fatally disregarding. It is not strange that he should have been moved to energetic remonstrance ; the wonder is that men, having hearts and souls, can live on year after year, without the least preparation for that eternity to which they all must go. Sometimes his advice was received and remembered ; and was the means, under God, of saving endangered souls. Sometimes it was rejected and scorned. But if there are any who have resented his freedom, let me ask them, — do you not in heart believe that when you lie on the death-bed, you will lament that you have not followed the advice he gave you ? Do you believe that any thing less than a fervent love of his race would have induced him to offer you his counsel and warning ?

In forming and maintaining his religious opinions, he manifested the same generous regard to the rights and claims of others, though he was firm as a rock in defence of his own. One of the severest trials of conscience is to form new convictions, in direct opposition to those which a man has preached and defended for years. This was the case with him. Though he was on friendly terms with divines who rejected the Trinity, he believed it to be a true and important doctrine, and endeavored to impress the evidence in its favor upon the minds of his people. It was not till a comparatively late period that he suspected the soundness of his opinions. Finding that the believers in that doctrine were advocates of what he deemed unchristian exclusion, while those who rejected it were advocates of that freedom which was always so dear to his soul, he resolved to examine the Scriptures thoroughly in reference to the subject. He did so, and the result was a clear conviction that the Bible taught nothing in opposition to the truth that God is one. It was no small effort to confess that he had been mistaken for years ; it was painful to have his offered hand of fellowship cast away ; but he openly avowed his change of sentiment, and remained a decided Uni-

tarian to the last. Still, he had an unaltered friendship for those who had but little charity for him. Do you say that he sometimes grew warm in defence of his own views of truth? If so, it shows the strong, single-hearted conviction with which he held them. Then I claim the more honor for his liberality, for he gave substantial proof that he was ready to aid other sects as well as his own, that every one might serve God in the way which his conscience enjoined. But on this point I need not dwell; for no one ever charged him with being a slave to religious party.

Once more; I would direct your attention to the manner in which he discharged his duties to God. The feeling that seemed always uppermost in his heart,—the feeling that sprang readiest to his lips, was gratitude for divine goodness; every thing in the wide world inspired that feeling in him; and most of all did he treasure those daily mercies which most men do not regard, because they are common and universal,—the very reason that should fill their hearts with praise. He had a profound conviction that every thing, which happened to him beyond his own control, was brought upon him by Divine Providence. While circumstances which men choose and order for themselves often result in evil, he knew that the arrangements of Providence, if men do not resist them, will always end in good. Having this inspiring faith deeply engraven on his heart, he counted it no hardship,—no sacrifice to submit to the dispensations of heaven. He was not free from changes and sorrows,—he saw his friends going before him; he saw his children going before him,—those on whom he depended much for the comfort of his closing years; but after he had prayed, “Father! if it be possible let this cup pass from me,” he bowed his head to the chastening, and said firmly and with all his heart, “Father, thy will be done.”

It was, however, by constant care, that he cherished and kept alive in his heart this feeling of the divine goodness. Every thing in nature spoke to him of God,—from the early day-break to the red sunset and the evening star,—all the beauty and grandeur, all the order and changes of the visible world, reminded him of the hand that made it. The meanest flower which others carelessly tread upon had language to him; in truth, every thing which he saw carried his thoughts upward to Him, whose power created, whose wisdom sustains, whose goodness crowns them all. Nor did he content himself with

such evidence as stood open before his eyes ; he made it his daily study to search out the proofs of divine mercy ; in all the works of nature, in all the events of life, he sought for and was sure that he should find traces of heavenly love. Even in the suffering of his last hours, the fire burned within him as he mused on the goodness of his heavenly Father, and he breathed out his overflowing gratitude with his dying as well as his living voice.

Verily I say unto you, he had his reward. This constant engagement of mind and heart, — this deep devotion to an absorbing study saved him from all the dreariness and vacancy, which so often bring misery to old age. You did not hear him sighing over the past ; you did not hear him lamenting, that the summer was past and the cold autumn of his life was come. Being thus interested, always interested in a pursuit which kept the mind and heart in perpetual and exalted action, he did not mourn for what time takes away ; he was always cheerful, — always happy ; because he was looking forward with high hope to what eternity would bring. Thus his path was upward to the very last ; though his eye was dim and his natural strength abated, there was no decline, — no old age to his soul. In truth, there is no winter in the year of a life spent in the service of God.

His death was the natural close of such a life. Knowing that the Son of Man might come at an unexpected hour, he endeavored to be always ready ; and when the Master came and called for him, he arose willingly, cheerfully to depart. In that hour when the bravest tremble, he kept the firmness of his soul ; he leaned with unshaken confidence upon the Rock of Ages ; with delightful serenity he expressed his faith in the religion of Jesus ; he felt that his work was done ; when he thought of heaven he was impatient to be there ; but he was willing to linger here as long as it pleased his God. Would to God that all who hear me this day, could have been present at his closing hours ; the chamber of death was not a place of darkness and gloom ; the sun shone in bright at its windows, and the light of the Sun of Righteousness shone upon his dying bed. When he fell asleep, there was not a word of sorrow ; for we felt that he was gone where the wicked cease from troubling and the weary are at rest. The feeling of every heart was, "Let me die the death of the righteous !" What has this life half so desirable as such a death ? Who would

not say, "Let me die in the lowest wretchedness,—let me die in poverty and sorrow,—let me die on the pavement of the dungeon, if my last end may be holy and happy as this!"

We have before us a solemn lesson of mortality and of life; we see the need of preparation; we know that our souls may be required this night; why will we not apply our hearts unto wisdom? O, that he could break the sleep of death! O that he could start up from his slumber to give us one more warning! But it may not be! his form is forever motionless! his voice forever still! He has done his part, to remind us of our duty, and well and faithfully was it done. What greater blessing can we ask of God, than that our lives may be equally faithful, and that we may finish our course with equal joy?

And now I should address myself to the mourners;—but I forbear; they know that we mourn with them; for their loss is ours.

To the associates of the departed,—to those who are going down the vale of years, I would say, another of your number is gone, and you are following fast; the circle of your acquaintance is lessening, and very little is left to remind you of your early days. All vestiges of the past are sinking under the change of improvement and the change of decay. And now let him say to you, as when living he has often said to you, "Set your affections on things above. Do not cling to the dust. Unclench your grasp from earthly possessions; you must lose them at the grave; for the entrance of eternity is so narrow, that only the naked soul can pass through. Bless God that there is yet time to redeem. Live so, that you can welcome death when he comes. Live so that the end of life may be the birth-day of a better existence,—that you may be welcomed in heaven by the friends of former days, by your fathers and the prophets, by the Mediator of the new covenant, and God the Judge of all."

And let the coming generations tell me, who shall fill the places where the wise and the just have fallen? who shall step forth to uphold the institutions of religion? Now it is as when a standard-bearer fainteth; for well do you know, that the departed stood forward without fear to plead the forsaken cause of God. I entreat you to come forward,—to do as he hath done. Thousands on earth will rise up to bless you, and God will give you the immortal crown.

And now, for the grave! nothing remains but to give the

dust to dust. Bear him to his narrow mansion ; but as the clods of the valley are cast upon him, remember that we shall meet him yet once more at the judgment-seat of God. And then, my people, enter into your chambers, and shut the doors about you. Pray that you may have that love which is stronger than death ; pray that you may have that faith in Him that liveth and was dead, which shall enable you to overcome the grave.

ART. III. — *Ἡ ΚΑΙΝΗ ΔΙΑΘΗΚΗ*. *The Greek Testament, with English Notes, Critical, Philological, and Exegetical, partly selected and arranged from the best Commentators, ancient and modern, but chiefly original. The whole being especially adapted to the use of Academical Students, Candidates for the Sacred Office, and Ministers ; though also intended as a Manual Edition for the use of Theological readers in general.* By the Rev. S. T. BLOOMFIELD, D. D., F. S. A., Vicar of Bisbrooke, Rutland. First American, from the second London edition. In two volumes. Boston : Perkins & Marvin. Philadelphia : Henry Perkins. 1837.

THIS is the last of three editions of the Greek Testament, with a critical apparatus, the almost simultaneous publication of which would imply that the English theologians intend to vindicate themselves against the charge of slumbering upon the labors of their predecessors. Mr. Valpy, Dr. Burton, and Dr. Bloomfield, the editors of the three works, now claim to be enrolled on the list which bears the respected names of Hammond, Whitby, Locke, Lowth, Pearce, Benson, Kenicott, Geddes, Newcome, Priestley, Wakefield, Campbell, and Macknight. The *Eclectic Review*, in a notice of the three works, gives the preference to that of Dr. Bloomfield, pronouncing it to be the most valuable that has yet been issued from the English press.* The reviewer, however, more than

* *Eclectic Review*, Third Series, Vol. VIII, p. 473.

hints that both Dr. Burton and Dr. Bloomfield were provoked to their good works by the example of Mr. Valpy, concerning whose publication, though it was the first, the two Doctors maintain "a contemptuous silence." That the work of a clergyman of the Established Church should be held in unqualified esteem by the Dissenters, is not to be expected, though we think there are sufficient reasons, independent of this, for the judgment added by the Reviewer, in the following words; — "Dr. Bloomfield's Exegetical Notes are for the most part very inferior to his Critical and Philological ones, proving that an accomplished scholar and biblical critic, may be at the same time a very ill-furnished divine." And again, the Review qualifies its praise by impeaching the fidelity of Dr. Bloomfield as a theological commentator, and his judgment as a critic. The Doctor saw this Review, and in his second edition speaks of it as an "able critique" on his work.

In our country, Dr. Bloomfield's Greek Testament is commended to the religious public, as it was to the publishers, by Professor Stuart, who states that Dr. Bloomfield had expressed great solicitude in his letters to him, that American scholars might possess the work in a neat and accurate form. The books before us, in their correct and beautiful, though most difficult, typographical execution, bear witness that the request has been complied with. Of course it is not to be supposed that Professor Stuart agrees with all the opinions of the English editor. He enters his dissent from Dr. Bloomfield's opinion, expressed in his note on Titus iii. 5, "that regeneration accompanies the external rite of baptism." Probably the same dissent is implied in relation to the Anticalvinistic opinions advanced by Dr. Bloomfield. It is pleasant, however, to see so much good feeling manifested by the parties. We must make allowance for the common overstrainings of courtesy, in Dr. Bloomfield's complimenting the Professor in return as "the Father of Exegetical Science in the New World."

We learn from the Prefaces to the work before us, that Dr. Bloomfield possesses "an inconsiderable benefice, in an obscure situation," and resides at Tugby, in Leicestershire, where he has had the care of two parishes. He says, —

"As a faithfully attached son of the Church of England, he has the highest satisfaction in reflecting that his works are so strongly confirmatory of her doctrines, discipline, and principles.

May she derive that accession of *support* from the contents of the present work, which it is calculated to supply! *Then* indeed, unsparing as have been the sacrifices of *health, fortune, comfort, and whatever renders life desirable*, — which he has so long made in her service, — he will not, under any circumstances, think that he has labored in vain, and spent his strength for nought." — p. xx.

The other works, by which Dr. Bloomfield is known to us, are a fourth English translation of the History of Thucydides, with Annotations, and his "Recensio Synoptica Annotationes Sacrae." From the latter work we have often derived considerable aid in the critical study and exposition of the New Testament. It is a digest of the other commentators, intended to assist the Student in making up his opinion among the various interpretations thus collected together.

Dr. Bloomfield now comes before the public again, with a confidence inspired by the approbation which his former works have received. Anticipating the question which he knew would be asked touching the necessity of another critical edition of the New Testament, he undertakes in his Preface to justify his present labors.

He admits that as regards the Text of the New Testament, the various editions already existing afford sufficient evidence to enable those who are competent, in learning and criticism, to ascertain the true reading. But the standard texts differ considerably, when compared with the *textus receptus*. He wishes, therefore, to supply a Text so constructed, that readers who have not all the standard editions at hand, may, as far as is practicable, have the *variations* from the *textus receptus*, marked in the Text itself, and not be left to seek them in the notes; and further, that the *evidence* in all important cases, and the *reasons* of any variations adopted by the editor, might be submitted to the judgment of the student. A *new recension*, formed on such a plan, and based on sound principles of criticism, the author says, nowhere existed.

"The Texts for Academical and general use on the Continent, being little more than reprints of that of Griesbach; of which the imperfections (as will appear from what is said in these pages [Dr. Bloomfield's Preface] and in the course of the following work,) are very considerable."

So much for the ground of necessity for a new Text. "The want of a consistent and suitable *body of Annotation* was much

greater." The earliest modern Commentaries of the New Testament being modelled after the Scholia on the classical writers, were little more than unconnected criticisms on difficult passages. This was a convenient method to the earlier commentators, who did not intend to form what is called a *perpetual Commentary*. They chose mostly those passages where they might exhibit their own learning or reading, rather than explain the sense of their author. This system continued to a late period, and may be traced in most of the Commentators of the seventeenth century, even in Grotius. Those whose works were exceptions, as in the case of Calvin, Luther, and Crellius, extended their discussions to an immoderate length, so that instead of being read, they are used exclusively for reference. The English Commentaries of the seventeenth and a part of the eighteenth centuries partake of the same fault, as that of Grotius, being too prolix and desultory in some parts, and unsatisfactorily brief in others; no approach being made to any thing like a connected Commentary.

Koppe was the first who attempted to remedy this defect, by commencing in 1778 an "Edition of the New Testament, with a corrected Text, short critical Notes, and rather copious philological and exegetical Annotations, serving to establish the literal and grammatical sense; all doctrinal discussions being excluded." The editor lived to publish only two volumes of the work, containing Romans, Galatians, Ephesians, and Thessalonians. It was continued by Heinrichs and Pott, who, by altering the plan, defeated the purpose of the work, and besides were of so heterodox principles,

"That whatever may be the learning and ability occasionally displayed, their interpretations ought to be received with the greatest distrust and caution. Koppe himself, indeed, was not wholly free from that leaven of heterodoxy, which has worked so extensively and perniciously in the greater part of the German Commentators, for the last half century, from Semler downwards. To omit such decidedly heterodox works as are better passed over in silence, the Commentaries of Rosenmueller and Kuinoel have (especially the latter) much valuable matter. The work of the former, however, (besides that its principles are very objectionable,) is almost wholly a *compilation*. Far more valuable is that of the latter; its principles, too, are better; though what are called Neologian views not unfrequently discover themselves; and the work, being too often interlarded with some of the most pestilent dogmas of Semler, Paulus, and others, though accompa-

nied with refutations by the editor, is very unfit to come into the hands of students." — p. ix.

Dr. Bloomfield adduces the other principal Commentators, whose failings, either in judgment or learning, in principle or doctrine, in superficiality or redundancy, show that an edition of the New Testament, adapted as a manual for Academical and general use, is still a *desideratum*. This want it was his intention to supply. He then proceeds "to unfold the plan of the present work, to state the principles of Criticism and Interpretation, by which he has been guided, and the purposes which it is especially intended to answer."

The last edition of Robert Stephens, adopted by Mill, differing slightly from our common Text, which is founded upon the Elzevir of 1624, and is supposed to be preferable to it, is selected by Dr. Bloomfield as the basis of his Text. He professes to exclude critical conjecture entirely, and to make only such alterations as are supported by decidedly preponderating evidence. He avows his total dissent from the *system of Recensions*, first promulgated by Griesbach, and founded, as he apprehends, upon a misapplication of the *Canons of Criticism*, which the German editors professedly acted upon. He charges Griesbach with temerity and irreverence for his "perpetual, and, for the most part, needless cancellings and alterations of all kinds."

The reader has before him both the Stephanic and the corrected Text. Nothing of the former has been omitted. Interpolations, alterations, insertions, and omissions are designated by stenographic marks in the Text, or specified in the notes. In the Critical Notes, which, Dr. Bloomfield says, are almost entirely original, he gives his reasons for the course which he adopts in the Text. The Text, having the verses marked in the margin, is, in accordance with the most apparent reasons, divided into paragraphs. These are shorter than those of Griesbach. The punctuation is revised, and the parallel references, quotations, and interlocutions are appropriately designated. The Exegetical Notes are modelled after those in the critical editions of the Greek classical writers, being intended to comprise all that relates to the interpretation and to the grammatical sense, regard being had to the connexion and the scope of the passage. Illustrations are sought for in parallel passages in sense or diction of Scripture itself, from the Septuagint and the Apocrypha, and from the works of Josephus and

Philo, from the Apostolical Fathers, from early Apocryphal and Rabbinical writings, from the Latin and Greek Fathers, and from the Greek Commentators and classical writers. From the last source the editor's private studies have enabled him to offer much that is original.

In opposition to the notion of Doddridge and of some other theologians, founded on the canon of Cocceius, "that the words of Scripture mean all that they *may* mean," Dr. Bloomfield very sensibly contends that there is only *one* true sense,—*that in the mind of the sacred writer*. In his interpretation he has endeavored to unite a zealous respect for antiquity with a cautious admission of novelty.

As respects the style of the New Testament, Dr. Bloomfield is alike opposed to the opinions of its being in pure and elegant Greek, and on the other hand to its being barbarous and ungrammatical. He accounts for the use of unusual words and phrases, consistently with purity, by alleging that the classical authors which we possess do not contain a tenth part of the Greek language, and also from the lawful introduction of the popular or provincial colloquial and domestic phraseology. The instances which have been specified, where the writers of the New Testament have not observed the common rules of grammar, he answers by quoting the distinction of Tittmann,—*"that the sacred writers have observed the rules of grammar, though not the rules of the grammarians."*

The first edition of the work was flatteringly received by the English public, and in three years the author betook himself with much satisfaction to preparing a second. In this he introduced some improvements, especially in his Introductions to all the books of the New Testament, and in the Punctuation, with added wisdom, drawn from consulting the Reformers and the great masters in English Theology. He again enters his dissent from the principles of Griesbach.

Perhaps we can best aid our readers to form an idea of the character of Dr. Bloomfield's work, by indicating his course in regard to some of the questions which have been most contested.

It appears to be one of Dr. Bloomfield's most striking characteristics as a critic, that he endeavors to hold the two opinions, on many of those points on which his predecessors have differed. Thus on the great question of the origin of the first three Gospels, he professes to set aside the three theories, that

the three Gospels were derived from some original document, or from detached narratives of parts of the history of Christ, or from oral tradition; and he endeavors to support a modification of the other theory, that one or two of the three Gospels were taken from the third. He thus states his view of the case.

“1. That the Gospels of Matthew and Luke were original and independent narratives (except that Luke probably made some use of the Hebrew original of St. Matthew). 2. That Mark's Gospel appeared after those two; and that the Evangelist freely used the matter contained in one or the other, according as it suited his purpose, and was agreeable to his plan. 3. That such parts as are not found in Matthew or Luke, were either derived from St. Peter, (under whose sanction and direction he wrote,) or at least from the testimony of “eye witnesses and ministers of the word.”

With what propriety Dr. Bloomfield can disclaim the three former theories, while he takes the essential part of each and all, we are at a loss to see. His own theory wants the very qualifications, the absence of which furnishes him with the best arguments against the others, namely, simplicity and historical support; while, in our opinion, it gives a death-blow to the most important end which it is the chief object of all the theories to establish, namely, the fact that the Evangelists are independent historians.

Again; Dr. Bloomfield seeks to hold both opinions on the question whether Matthew wrote his Gospel in Greek or Hebrew, by agreeing with Whitby, Benson, and Hales, in the most unsupported supposition, that Matthew wrote a copy of the same Gospel in both languages. He supposes that the Hebrew was published A. D. 37 or 38, and the Greek A. D. 41. We must differ from him in the whole matter. The best ancient authority favors the belief that Matthew wrote his Gospel only in Hebrew, and circumstantial evidence fixes its date about A. D. 63.

Dr. Bloomfield supports the authenticity of the first two chapters of Matthew and Luke on good grounds. As regards the very difficult subject of Matthew's genealogy, he reconciles it with the Old Testament by alleging errors in the *transcription*, and with Luke by supposing that he gives the genealogy of Mary, and Matthew that of Joseph.

Dr. Bloomfield favors the literal interpretation of “the Temptation,” which he calls “a most awful and mysterious

transaction," by supposing that it was a *real event*, and not a *visionary scene*. To say nothing of the entire absence of all Scripture testimony that such a *being* as the Devil really exists, there is nothing in the account of the Evangelists to call for so many fearful and unnatural assumptions as a literal interpretation involves. An overwhelming objection to it is offered in the fact, that the frightful appearance of such a being would defeat the very object of his visit.

In his Note on Matthew iv. 24, Dr. Bloomfield gives us his opinion on demoniacal possession. The hypothesis of Dr. Mede, that the demoniacs were merely persons affected with lunacy, he conceives to be utterly untenable. He adopts the belief of the existence of evil spirits, and endeavors to answer the objections raised against it. To the question which is asked by those who adopt Dr. Mede's opinion, why there should have been demoniacal possession at the time of our Savior, and not at the present day, he answers ;

"That these possessions might then be permitted to be far more frequent than at any other period, in order that the power of Christ over the world of spirits might be more evidently shown, and that he, who came to destroy the works of the devil, might obtain a manifest triumph over him."

We had hoped that this notion was consigned to oblivion by all, as it certainly is by most critics. As we read the Scriptures and study the history of our race, we think we discover evil enough for the Savior to root out, without the creation of any new sources or agents of it, for the express, but most unprofitable purpose of being destroyed. If our examination is correct, the New Testament mentions seven cases of the cure of those called demoniacs ; John does not mention one. The Evangelists have enumerated various disorders which Jesus cured by his miraculous power, and as we know that the several forms of mental disease were prevalent in Judea, it is highly probable that Jesus cured some of them. We believe that he did, and that they are the ones intended by "the demoniacs."

From our examination of several passages, where Dr. Bloomfield would necessarily give his opinion in relation to the Quotations from the Old Testament in the New, we find that he allows the principle of *accommodation*, though he is very fond

of the doctrine of types and literal prophecies. We have been accustomed to look upon the passage, where John (xix. 36,) quotes the injunction relative to the Paschal Lamb, and applies it to Christ, ("neither shall ye break a bone thereof," Exodus xix. 46,) as one of the plainest instances of a most natural application of language, which was in every body's lips, to a similar case. Dr. Bloomfield, however, in his note on the passage, thinks otherwise. He says;

"That the Evangelist *did* mean to represent the Paschal Lamb as a *type* of Christ, and consequently that such must be the only true view, no person who fairly considers the words can doubt. What can offer so probable a reason for the otherwise unaccountable injunction, that not a bone of the Paschal Lamb should be broken, as that it might point to the sacrifice of that Lamb, as a type of the sacrifice of Christ?"

We would ask if there is anything more unaccountable in the injunction that the bones of the lamb at the celebration of the Passover should not be broken, than in the other injunctions attending the yearly ceremony? It was to keep in the memory of the Jews their safe and sudden deliverance from Egypt; therefore they were to eat while standing, prepared with scrip and sandals, as if ready for a journey. Every thing was to be expressive of haste, consequently they were not to carry the flesh of the lamb from house to house, nor to break its bones to extract the sweet marrow.

In conformity with the fundamentals of his Church, Dr. Bloomfield would prove that the seven deacons, who were chosen (Acts vi.) to take from the Apostles the burden of distributing the necessities of life to the poor among the early Christians, were invested with ecclesiastical as well as with secular authority. He bases his argument upon these three points;—that the Apostles directed the brethren to select seven men, who, as our Translation expresses the original, were "full of the Holy Ghost;" that the functionaries were ordained by the laying on of hands; and that some of them did in fact exercise spiritual functions. These arguments have often been satisfactorily answered. We leave it to be decided by every attentive reader of Scripture, whether the *term* and the *office of deacon* do not better apply to those officers in the Congregational Churches who distribute the elements at

the Lord's Supper, and attend to the secular concerns of the body, its registers and its charities, than to the ordained candidate for the ministry in the Church of England.

Dr. Bloomfield is most zealous in the support of two out of the three interpolated texts, which, in spite of all the disclaimers of Trinitarians, are most relied upon for the support of their peculiar doctrine. In Acts xx. 28, he retains the reading $\Theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$ in preference to $\kappa\upsilon\gamma\iota\omicron\upsilon$. Let any one, however, examine the argument even in his own statement of it, and we think he will deny that the evidence preponderates in favor of Dr. Bloomfield's reading.

Dr. Bloomfield likewise in I. Timothy iii. 16, retains $\Theta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$ in preference to $\omicron\varsigma$ or \omicron , and says that "Griesbach edited $\omicron\varsigma$ without any sufficient reason; for the *external* evidence in favor of it is next to nothing." This assertion is certainly most unwarrantable. Against Dr. Bloomfield, by his own confession, are arrayed three Manuscripts of Griesbach's most valued Recension, namely, the Occidental, besides most of the Versions, all the Latin, and a fair proportion of the Greek Fathers. Is this "next to nothing?" The matter rests in no small measure upon the lawful or unlawful position of a little stroke in the \omicron of $\omicron\varsigma$ of the Codex Alexandrinus. It is well known that the stroke has been retouched by a modern hand; but it is contended that there was one there before. Messrs. Berriman, Hewitt, and Pilkington, armed with a spy-glass and assisted by a bright sun ray shining upon the book, thought that they could detect the old transverse line. Mill, too, who in a first inspection failed to discover it, in a second thought he succeeded; but Wetstein, accompanied by a friend, could not find it, and supposed that Mill was deceived by the line of an Epsilon shining through the transparent vellum. But Woide testifies that the position of the Epsilon will not justify this dodging of the argument.

Finally, of the celebrated passage I. John v. 7, Dr. Bloomfield had said, in his "Recensio Synoptica," "To me it appears *probable* that the verses are genuine; but I am inclined to agree with the learned Bishops Horsley and Middleton, that they will, if genuine, not *decidedly* prove the doctrine of the Trinity, and therefore by far too much anxiety about the determination of the critical question, as to their authenticity, has been felt and expressed by the Orthodox in general." Mr. Valpy marks the text with "possible spuriousness and ex-

punction," though he inclines in favor of its genuineness. He likewise says,—"It has been a question with many, whether a too pertinacious, at least too warm a zeal, has not been shown by some, to secure the authenticity of this text, as if the doctrine it contained rested solely on its authority. For, as Dr. Bentley observes, if the fourth century knew that text, let it come in, in God's name; but if that age did not know it, then Arianism at its height, was beat down without the help of that verse; and let the *fact* prove as it will, the *doctrine* is unshaken." Dr. Burton in his edition inclines against the genuineness of the verse.

Dr. Bloomfield is remarkably concise in his remarks upon the passage in his present work. We would ask his purpose when he refers the reader to eight of the best authorities in support of the authenticity of the verse, and to only four of the writers against it, and they too of the least weight. Again; we think there is some unfairness in what follows;—"I must content myself with laying before the reader *two paraphrases* of the whole passage, one *without*, and the other *with*, the disputed portion." Sir Isaac Newton is selected as the champion against the verse, and he is arrayed against Bishop Burgess for it! Dr. Bloomfield's conclusion is ominous of future volumes on the question;—"we are neither authorized to receive the passage as indubitably genuine, nor, on the other hand, to reject it as indubitably spurious; but to wait for further evidence." From what quarter he expects it, he does not say. Is this a proper conclusion to such a discussion?

We admire the candor which is displayed by the organ of a body of the English Dissenters, famed for its Orthodoxy, in reference to this Text. "From the very commencement of its existence, the *Eclectic Review* has opposed itself to the intrusion of a passage into the Greek Text of the New Testament, the admission of which would require the surrender of the soundest principles of criticism, and leave us no longer in the possession of those rules of evidence which enable us to determine the genuine readings of ancient writings. We have not seen any reason in our latest examination of the arguments and representations urged by the advocates of the verse, to alter our judgment in respect to its character. But while they have left us to retain, without change or abatement, our view of the whole subject, some of the publications put forth in defence of the rejected passage have furnished us with very

sufficient ground for remarking, *that other arguments have been used in its support than those which could be derived from the application of critical learning.*" *

G. E. E.

ART. IV. — *Cours de Droit Naturel, professé à la Faculté des Lettres de Paris*, par M. TH. JOUFFROY. *Première partie. Prolégomènes au Droit Naturel.* 2 Tomes; 8vo. Paris: 1834 et 1835.

BEFORE proceeding to a special examination of these very interesting and valuable volumes on the ground of Moral Obligation, we propose to offer a few remarks on philosophy in general, and on French Eclecticism in particular. We do this because both, in our estimation, are somewhat misapprehended, and, as a consequence of being misapprehended, they receive far too little or else a wrong kind of consideration.

We almost every day meet people by no means deficient in good sense and general information, who entertain strong prejudices against philosophy, and manifest no slight contempt for all philosophical pursuits. These people, in general, profess a great attachment to common sense, and count it a great piece of folly to look for anything superior to that. In their estimation, philosophy is mere speculation, and to philosophize is merely to construct, out of the phantasies of one's own brain, various and ever-varying hypotheses on God, the human soul, and human duty and destiny; hypotheses which disdain the aid of fact and experience, and which, however pleasing they may be to the professed metaphysician, can answer no good purpose in practical life, and must ever vanish away before the first breath of common sense. They therefore regard philosophy as a vain pretence, as a worthless pursuit, and not only as worthless but mischievous, inasmuch as it consumes that time and thought which we need for other purposes. If they be right, we are most certainly wrong in filling up any portion of our pages with notices of philosophical works; and did we be-

* *Eclectic Review*, Third Series, Vol. III., p. 169.

lieve them right, we should by no means take the trouble to review philosophical works, or even to read them.

But, with all becoming modesty be it said, we do not believe that they are right. Their conclusions appear to us to be drawn from false premises. Their objections to philosophy are founded on mistaken views of what philosophy really is, of what is its legitimate province, and of what, in point of fact, it professes to be able to accomplish. Unless we have ourselves greatly misapprehended it, philosophy is something widely different from mere speculation. The true philosopher eschews all hypothesis as scrupulously as the good man eschews evil. He is far from doing business on credit, from speculating on merely fictitious capital; he must have facts, good substantial facts; and when his stock of facts is exhausted and he feels unable to increase it, he retires from business, and counts his work achieved. He does not undertake to manufacture the truth, nor does he profess to have any means of discovering it, which are not equally within the reach of every one who will but use the faculties which God has given him. Philosophy originates and can originate none of our ideas. It works and must work with materials which have been furnished without its aid, and which are furnished to the simplest ploughboy in equal quantity and variety as to the profoundest philosopher. The difference between the philosopher and the mere common sense man does not consist in the fact, that the one has any means of knowing or any ideas which the other has not, but in the fact, that the one does and the other does not know, does not comprehend what he knows. The common sense man knows as much of the nature of things, of God, the soul, man and man's destinies as the philosopher; but his knowledge is vague, obscure, confused, and independent of his control; whereas the philosopher's knowledge is clear, definite, precise, and entirely subject to his will.

This distinction is intelligible, and in our estimation very important. Men who find, when they want them, all the great truths needed for the chief practical purposes of life, and who, nevertheless, are not conscious of having ever philosophized at all, are not a little puzzled to discover the very great worth which the philosopher ascribes to his favorite pursuit; but we think their difficulties would be in a great measure removed, if they would observe the distinction we have here indicated, distinguish between knowing and comprehending, and learn

that the province of philosophy is not to know, but to comprehend; not to give us knowledge, but to enable us to comprehend what we already know; to explain and verify what we have already received as true on the faith of common sense. We all believe that we exist. For this belief we are not indebted to philosophy. Philosophy can neither give it nor take it away. What then is the use of philosophy, in relation to this particular belief? Simply to enable us to comprehend what we do when we believe that we exist; what is involved in the fact that we believe in our existence. All the world, or nearly all the world, believe in God, in Immortality, and Duty, and believe too without the aid of philosophy. The first man who philosophized found the world believing in these, and these were the facts on which he first philosophized. What then in relation to these is the value of philosophy? Not to give us the idea of God, the idea of Immortality, and that of Duty, but to explain these ideas to the understanding, and to determine their worth. Common sense, if that be the term preferred, gives these ideas, places them in the consciousness; philosophy detects, explains, and verifies them.

To detect, explain, and verify our ideas, is no mean service. Under common sense we believe, and believe the truth; but we believe blindly, without knowing why or wherefore; without being able to justify our belief to ourselves. We take every thing on trust. But as soon as our intellect is awakened, and we begin to think with some degree of earnestness, we can no longer be satisfied with taking things on trust; we can no longer repose in blind belief; a new want, an imperious want is developed within us, and we ask ourselves, why we have believed? wherefore we have trusted? and what authority we have for believing what we find we have believed? All men may not, we admit, ask themselves these questions, for there are not a few who die children, though they die in old age; but many more ask them than we commonly imagine. There are thousands, who pass along apparently unthinking, with unperturbed looks and careless speech, in whom these questions lie fermenting, or who call upon all nature, upon the seen and the unseen, upon the living and the dead, to answer them. There is more passing beneath those leathern bosoms which men seem to wear, in those secret chambers of thought, into which no stranger enters, than we can easily divine. All who attain to self-consciousness, ask

themselves these questions ; and when these questions have once been asked, when they have once been raised, they "will not down at the bidding." Pleasure may distract, business may divert, authority may frighten us awhile from their consideration ; but at the first moment of release, at the first moment of calmness and self-collectedness, they return with all their primitive force, and importune us for an answer. Is it a mean service to answer them ? Worthless are his labors who helps us to silence their importunate clamor, and to restore peace to the soul ? Let him who has been tormented by this everlasting Why, and this ever-recurring Wherefore, which one of the most urgent wants of our nature never ceases, from the first awakening of reason, to ask, — let him answer. But to ask why ? wherefore ? and to seek for an answer, is to philosophize. Philosophy is nothing more nor less than the answer which we obtain by reflection, to the Why and the Wherefore. Why then speak slightly of it ? Why condemn the philosopher ? Wherefore attempt to dissuade from philosophizing ? Would we doom our race to perpetual infancy, and forbid the sleep of the cradle ever to be broken ? Would we place an interdict upon reflection, and oblige men forever to forego conviction, to know without comprehending, to believe without knowing why or wherefore ? If not, we must have and cannot but have philosophy.

To answer the questions of the Why ? and the Wherefore ? philosophers in their infancy framed hypotheses ; and, ignorant as yet of the legitimate province of philosophy and of the true method of philosophizing, they answered merely by guesses. They were unwilling to wait, to inquire. Their wants were too troublesome ; their need of dogmatizing was too urgent to allow them to seek an answer by slow and scrupulous analysis. They wanted the patience to untie the knot, to unravel the mysteries of our being ; and hence the failures of philosophy, and the reproaches with which she has been visited. But her real friends have profited by experience. They have grown wiser, and prefer research to dogma. They are willing to wait. They have learned that it is in vain to give hypothetical answers ; in vain to create answers ; and that their only proper method of proceeding is to seek by patient and accurate observation of the facts of consciousness, the answer which God himself has written with his own finger on the tablets of our being. They now know that their business

is not to construct, but to reflect ; and so long as they pursue the path of reflection, we are unable to perceive why the gravest common sense man should wish to impede their march. They do but bear the torch of reflection over the dark field of consciousness, and labor to enable us to see and comprehend the mysteries of our spiritual nature. They do only that which every one does to a greater or less extent who turns his mind in upon itself, communes with his own heart, and seeks to solve the problem of his being and destiny. Who is there that is willing to admit that he never does this, or at least that he never attempts to do this? No one, we will take it upon us to answer ; that is, no one who has ever become conscious that he is an intellectual being. Let philosophy and philosophers then be acquitted ; let philosophy no longer be confounded with mere speculation ; and, above all, let the philosopher no longer be counted the synonyme of the mere builder of castles in the air.

Similar objections to some of those we have been considering, we have occasionally heard alleged against French Eclecticism. We do not take notice of this fact because we would give in our adherence to that philosophy. To us all truth is sacred and desirable, and we are ready to own and obey it, let it come from what quarter and under what name it may ; but we choose to see it for ourselves, and to accept and obey it because we ourselves are convinced by our own examination that it is the truth, not because it is the dogma, or the theory of a school. We do not hold ourselves responsible for the doctrines of the French Eclectics, nor do we propose them for the adoption of our countrymen. But we do place a high value on the labors of the French Eclectics, and we believe an acquaintance with their philosophical researches a very important acquisition in the work of elaborating a better philosophy than any which has hitherto obtained among us. We would, therefore, see their works studied, and studied without prejudice, for what they are, and not for what they are not. And this is our apology,—if an apology be needed,—for taxing the time and attention of our readers with some remarks, designed to place French Eclecticism in its true light.

Many among us confound French Eclecticism with German Transcendentalism ; and German Transcendentalism they suppose to be the very “fifth essence” of extravagance and absurdity. They who thus confound the two philosophies seem

to take it for granted that German Transcendentalism names a particular school, designates a special metaphysical doctrine. But this is a mistake. German Transcendentalism is a phrase of uncertain import. It may include systems which have hardly any thing in common. As used by the Germans themselves it is nearly synonymous with the term metaphysics, and metaphysics, among the Germans, vary with almost every individual devoted to their pursuit. German philosophy has, in point of fact, no unity which authorizes us to predicate any thing of it, as a whole, unless it be its freedom and independence, and the fact that the reason, instead of the sensibility, is in all cases its point of departure. It is not just to condemn the whole because a part may be unsound; one man's views, because another's, which are different, are judged to be erroneous. For their freedom, for their bold and uniform assertion and maintenance of the independence of the reason, we respect the whole body of German metaphysicians, whatever the systems they may have severally arrived at, or supported; in this particular they cannot be praised too warmly; but we are not aware that any of them, nor that all of them, have as yet given us a true philosophy of man. They have contributed valuable materials for the construction of that philosophy; but that philosophy, or what we deem such, we have not found in any of their systems which have fallen under our notice. Kant, the ablest and soberest of them all, has unquestionably done much. He has explored the human understanding, and determined the conditions of all experience, or what must be the nature of the understanding to render experience possible. In doing this, he has created a new era in the history of metaphysical science; but he has not given us a philosophy; he has merely fixed the starting point, and opened the route for future philosophers. Fichte was a bold speculator, an ardent friend of freedom and Humanity. For this last we honor him, and cherish his memory; but we have yet to learn the important service he has rendered to philosophy. Had he lived, he might have done something worth remembering, as he had before his death hit upon the path, which, if followed, conducts to true philosophy; but cut off as he was in the prime of his life, philosophy has gained little by his talents, genius, and labors. Jacobi had some dim visions, some vague presentiments of a superior philosophy, but he wanted the intellectual vigor to obtain results

truly scientific. He did something, however, to open the way for Fries, from whom philosophy is receiving valuable contributions. Fries adopts the true psychological method of philosophizing, and upholds the experimental against the hypothetical or constructive philosophy. Schelling, whose reputation as a philosopher will diminish with time, attempted a philosophy of Man, and of Nature; but both he and Hegel, who in respect to method agrees with him, have vitiated their labors by adopting the hypothetical or constructive instead of the psychological or experimental method of philosophizing; and notwithstanding they have, as we believe, divined the truth to a great extent, in consequence of the original sin of their method, they have been unable to give it any scientific value. It is their vicious method which constitutes the real objection which may be urged against those German metaphysicians, who are, we suppose, generally understood by the Transcendentalists, and it is the only objection which we deem it necessary to bring against them. They build on hypothesis, and construct a theory with which to explain facts, instead of observing facts as the only basis of all just theory. A theory, which is anything else than the true statement of what there is of the general in facts, as distinguished from the particular, has no value in our eyes. The facts should elicit the theory, and not the theory the facts. Some of the Germans reverse this maxim, and if they who do it are the ones, as we presume they are, intended by the Transcendentalists, we most certainly have no disposition to appear in their defence. But these are not the only ones who bear the name of Transcendentalist, for the term, instead of being restricted to these, is used in a much broader sense, so as to include those who adopt the psychological as well as those who adopt the hypothetical or constructive method, the philosophizers as well as the systematizers. Whenever, then, we speak of German Transcendentalists, we should be careful to discriminate, and let it be known of whom we intend to speak; and whenever we judge it to be our duty to condemn Transcendentalism, we should state distinctly whether we mean to condemn metaphysics in general, or only some special system of metaphysics; and, if this last be the case, as is most likely, what special system we mean.

It is desirable also, that this same discrimination should be made, when speaking of Transcendentalism as it is beginning to be manifested among ourselves, and some injustice has

already been done in consequence of neglecting it. Men are classed together under the general term, Transcendentalist, who have scarcely anything in common but their fondness for philosophical pursuits. There are men among us who have a most hearty dislike for observation, who disregard experience, ask no aid of facts, and who deem themselves competent to construct a true philosophy of man and the universe by means of speculation alone. If they who condemn the Transcendentalists mean these; they are bound to say so; for there are others among us also called Transcendentalists, who adopt the psychological method, and pursue it with the most rigid fidelity, who will attach no scientific value to any metaphysical system, whatever its pretensions, which is not a legitimate induction from facts patiently collected, scrupulously analyzed, and accurately classed. These last are no more to be confounded with the first, than a modern chemist is to be confounded with an old alchemist, or a Bacon with a Paracelsus.

If it be meant that the French Eclectics are Transcendentalists in the sense these last are, we have no objection to offer. But this is not the case. They, who call them Transcendentalists with the feeling that Transcendentalism is an accusation, mean to identify them with the other class, with the speculators, the systematizers, with those who profess to be able to arrive at truth by logic, by mere reasoning without observation or scientific data to reason from. But in this sense the Eclectics are not Transcendentalists. M. Cousin, their acknowledged chief, so far as they acknowledge any chief, bases his whole system, as we have shown when reviewing his philosophy,* on psychology. He does not, like Schelling and Hegel, commence by a construction. He tolerates no hypothesis, no divination, no guessing at truth, but iterates and reiterates that the only legitimate starting-point for the philosopher is the observation of facts. According to him, there is and there can be no sound philosophy which does not begin with the observation or analysis of the facts of consciousness. He does not begin by inquiring what ought to be in the consciousness, how what may be supposed to be in the consciousness entered there, but simply what is there, what are we conscious of in ourselves. The first question with him is always, What is? If from the question of what is, if from the observation of

* See *Christian Examiner* for September, 1836.

facts he passes to the induction of principles, of laws, it is because observation itself forces induction upon us, and we cannot avoid it, even if we would. We cannot remain in the observation of facts. We do never content ourselves with saying two and two, two and two, but always find ourselves obliged to say two and two are four. Facts taken singly never satisfy us; we are always compelled to add them together and find their sum total. Our right to do this may be questioned; it may be said that we have no authority for passing from the observation of facts to the induction of principles, of laws; but he who should say so would in the very act of saying so do that which he says we have no right to do. His assertion would be an induction, not a fact. One may have observed the extravagances and absurdities into which men have fallen in their inductions, and therefore *infer* that we ought never to attempt an induction; another may, from what he has observed of the power of the reason to rectify its own mistakes, to recover itself from its own aberrations, and of the miracles wrought by induction in the physical sciences, infer directly the opposite, and assert the legitimacy of induction; another still may assert that we are too ignorant to assert anything about the matter; but all alike make an induction, and the last not less than the other two, his induction being that we are too ignorant to know whether we have or have not the right to make an induction. Whoever will regard the facts of his own consciousness cannot fail to discover that, whether induction be or be not a legitimate exercise of the reason, be or be not warranted, we do always make an induction, and we cannot help doing it. It is a necessary mode of the activity of the reason, and altogether independent of our control. It is forced upon us by a power which we are not. We can make no assertion, whether of affirmation or denial, without making an induction. This necessity, under which we labor in regard to induction, is sufficient to justify induction in the minds of all who comprehend anything of the matter, and exonerates us from all blame in not struggling in vain to resist it. If this be admitted, as nobody questions the legitimacy of observation, we may assert that both observation and induction are legitimate. These two modes of activity of the reason, observation and induction, constitute M. Cousin's method. His method, then, is legitimate, and if legitimate, if faithfully followed, it must conduct to scientific results.

The method of philosophizing, which we adopt, is that which determines the character and value of the system of philosophy to which we arrive. All philosophers and all systems of philosophy are to be classed, in the first instance, according to their method. If their method be scientific, they cannot be without value; if their method be vicious, no matter how much talent and genius they display, they are worth nothing for science. It is their vicious or unscientific method, which prevents us from attaching any importance to the systems of philosophy of many who are called Transcendentalists both at home and abroad, notwithstanding they embosom no small share of truth. The truth they have has not been obtained on scientific principles. They have obtained it by a sort of divination or guess, as when a schoolboy we sometimes from sheer indolence used to guess out the answers to the questions given us in arithmetic. Our old schoolmaster always sent us back to first principles, and made us solve the problems scientifically, even when we had chanced to guess aright. But with the French Eclectics there is none of this guessing at truth. Their method of solving all philosophical problems is, as we have seen, strictly scientific. It is the experimental method, that of observation and induction. This method, though virtually the method of Descartes, is called the Baconian method. Bacon introduced it into modern philosophy, at least defended it, and applied it to the physical sciences. Locke applied it to the study of the Human Understanding, and applied it too with greater fidelity than any of his predecessors, and herein lies his merit as a philosopher. But his fidelity was not strict enough; almost at the first step he departed from his method, and hence the defects of his system as a system of philosophy. He was too eager to construct a system, and rushed into dogmatism before he had completed his observation, or psychological analysis. He did not remain long enough in the sphere of consciousness to become thoroughly acquainted with its phenomena. He spent too little time in ascertaining and describing the facts of consciousness as they actually appear in the consciousness, and passed too soon to the question of the origin of our knowledge, of our ideas. This was his fatal error, the rock on which he stranded. What reasonable hope could he have of giving a correct account of the origin of our ideas before he had determined what ideas we have? By going to the question of the origin of our ideas before he had

settled the question of the number and character of our ideas, he departed from the path of science and fell into that of hypothesis, and dogmatized instead of philosophizing. This has destroyed the scientific value of his *Essay on the Human Understanding*, but it has not destroyed his merits as a man. Great as were his metaphysical errors, he deserves, and had they been ten times as great as they were, he would still have deserved the gratitude of posterity for his ardent love of Humanity, his labors in the cause of civil liberty and Christian charity, and the much he has unquestionably done to simplify metaphysical science, and to abridge the labor of comprehending ourselves.

The French School of the last century adopted the same method, and was really, though but partially, experimental. So far forth as it was experimental, it was powerful, and deserves our respect. But it fell into the same fundamental error, which we have pointed out in its master, Locke. We say its master, Locke, for we suppose everybody, who knows anything about the matter, knows that the French philosophy, as expounded by Condillac and his disciples, was borrowed from Locke, and introduced into France by Voltaire. Condillac and his disciples drew conclusions from Locke's philosophy, which Locke himself did not draw, and which he would very likely have rejected; but they were all warranted by his premises, were but the legitimate consequences of the principles he laid down. Like him, the French School, instead of studying the facts of consciousness, and ascertaining what we know, ran against the question of *How we know*; and deciding after his example, *a priori*, that we know only by means of our five senses, it overlooked or denied in its subsequent psychological analysis all the facts of consciousness which it could not succeed in transforming into sensations. We say not this in a spirit of hostility to that school, nor out of any want of respect for its English master. It was a great school, it did some service to Humanity; more, perhaps, than many who depart less from it than we do are willing to admit; but its early departure from the strictly psychological method proved its ruin, compelled it to be exclusive, and it has died as must die all exclusive systems, whether in philosophy or in theology.

Now nobody, we presume, ever dreams of calling this school or its founders, Locke and Condillac, Transcendental in the

odious sense in which some are pleased to use that term ; but why not ? Why not call the old French School, Locke and Condillac, Transcendental, as well as M. Cousin ? He bears a much closer affinity to them in a scientific relationship, than he does to those commonly understood by the Transcendentalists. His method is the same as theirs ; and if he obtains different results it is because he applies it differently, because, as he would say, he follows it with more fidelity and severity, because he is more strictly experimental, a more rigid psychologist. They, by ascribing the origin of all our ideas to sensation, and allowing the understanding no materials on which to work but such as could come through the senses, necessarily condemned themselves to a mutilated psychology. They were restricted in their analysis to the facts of the sensibility ; but M. Cousin, postponing the question of the origin of our ideas till he has ascertained what are our ideas, analyzes the whole consciousness, whether its elements be the sensibility, the activity, or the reason, and is thus enabled to form a psychology as broad as the human soul itself. This is what he professes to have done. Whether he has or has not done it, makes no part of our present inquiry. We do not undertake the defence of the results he professes to have obtained. We are concerned now only with his method, and that method we do contend is scientific, the only method which can lead to scientific results. Locke and the French School adopted it, but they applied it with systematic views, with the design to maintain a system previously adopted ; he applies it without any reference to a system, before he forms his theory, and, therefore, is able to apply it without prejudice. This is his method, this is his profession. He indeed may not be true to his method, he may not practise what he professes, but that is a question which every one may and can decide for himself. By giving us his method he has enabled us to correct him where he errs, and to verify him where he is right. All we have to offer on this point is, that not every one who speculates a little on metaphysical subjects should feel himself qualified to sit in judgment on M. Cousin. Whoever would do him justice should take up his method and bring to its test all the results he professes to have obtained. They who will do this will, we do not say, adopt all those results, but at least acquit him of being a bold theorizer, a fanciful constructor of hypotheses, a Transcendentalist in the sense in which they use the term who deem

Transcendentalism an accusation. They will find him an eloquent, an enthusiastic preacher of philosophy, but at the same time a sober psychologist, a clear and able experimental philosopher. He has not, we own, this reputation among some of our friends; but we are at no loss to discover the reason why he has not. The eloquence and poetry of his style mislead many, who have imbibed the notion that whatever is warm and glowing, whatever is pleasing and inspiring, must be wanting in soberness and depth. His merits are also estimated among us principally by his *Introduction to the History of Philosophy*, and of that work not by its general spirit and method, but by some few of its generalizations or inductions, as the one on war, for instance. The method by which those generalizations or inductions are obtained, and by which their legitimacy may be determined, is, it is true, in the same volume; but to master that method and its application, and to bring the generalizations to its decision, requires some trouble, some hard thinking, some introspection, all of which are things an author must be very much out of his wits to ask of readers in this age of superficial writing and light reading.

It should also be borne in mind, that French Eclecticism is not, as they who declaim against Transcendentalism would seem to infer, of German origin. Germany has indeed made many important contributions to it, but the movement of which it is a result was produced by the introduction and study in France of the works of Dr. Richard Price, and of the Scotch philosophers, Dr. Reid and Dugald Stewart. French Eclecticism received its impulse, its method, and its direction from M. Royer Collard, who was, as everybody knows, a disciple of Dr. Reid, the founder of the Scotch School. M. Cousin was made Professor of philosophy through the influence of M. Royer Collard, and his first year's instruction in the Normal School was confined to the defence and development of the Scotch philosophy. Up to this day he has continued in the path marked out by the Scotch School. He is the continuator of Dugald Stewart. He has gone beyond Stewart, but it has been in the same direction. It is true he has followed in that direction with a freer and a bolder step than comports with Scotch timidity and caution; but he has followed with a step as firm and secure as Dugald Stewart himself. This fact is often overlooked. We have not unfrequently been amused to hear M. Cousin condemned by the very eulogists of Reid

and Stewart, when he is, in point of fact, only their complement, and can claim to have done little else than to complete what they commenced, and to have furnished the means of verifying what they took for granted.* It is worth while, also, to notice that those old English writers, whom it is just now the fashion to praise, and we believe in some instances to read, had some anticipations of what the Eclectics have done, and relied for the worth of their conclusions on the very philosophy, more or less clearly seen by them, which we now call French Eclecticism.

We have spoken of M. Cousin ; we have done this, because he is at the head of French Eclecticism, and because his

* Dugald Stewart, in the Preface to his "Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man," and in the very last paragraphs, we believe, which he wrote for publication, speaks as follows of the French philosophers mentioned above. "I cannot conclude this Preface without expressing the satisfaction I have felt in observing, among the more liberal writers in France, a reviving taste for the Philosophy of the Human Mind. To this no one has contributed more than M. Victor Cousin, so well known and so honorably distinguished, as the object of Jesuitical persecution ; a persecution which appears to have followed him beyond the limits of his own country. To him the learned world is indebted, not only for his own very valuable writings, but for a French translation, accompanied with notes, of the whole works of Plato ; for an edition of the works of Proclus, the Platonic philosopher, from a manuscript in the Royal Library of Paris, and, last of all, for a complete edition of the works of Descartes, — a most important publication in the present state of science in France. M. Royer Collard, whose great talents have long been zealously devoted to the same pursuits, has, if I am not misinformed, already made considerable progress in a translation of Dr. Reid's Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, — a report to which I give the more credit, from the account of his previous studies given by a most respectable writer, M. Jouffroy, in a work which appeared at Paris in 1826. * * And here I may be pardoned for gratifying a personal feeling, by mentioning the pleasure which I have lately received from a perusal of the very elegant translation, by M. Jouffroy, of my Outlines of Moral Philosophy, preceded by a long introduction, full of original and important matter. This publication, together with the space occupied in the *Fragmens Philosophiques* of M. Cousin, by large extracts from the same work, comprising nearly the whole of its contents, encourage me in the hope, that the volumes I now publish, which may be considered as a Comment on the Ethical part of my outlines, may, perhaps, find a few who will not only read, but study them with attention, (for a cursory perusal is altogether useless,) in some other countries, as well as my own. — *Kinneil House, April 16, 1828.*"

method is that of all his disciples. We have spoken too of the Eclectics as a School; but in this we are not sure that we have done them justice. They seem to us to have too little of the spirit of system to be able to form a school. They are not exclusive enough for that. They cast free and impartial looks over all systems and schools, and expect and seem to themselves to find truth in them all, and truth they are ready and willing to receive, let it come whence it may, and whatever be the name or character it may bear; and this not because it makes for their theory, but because it is the truth. They are very indifferent as to theory, and their indifference in this respect, their subordination of theory to truth, to facts, or rather their habit of deducing their theory from facts, instead of constructing a theory with which to explain facts, has exposed them to a charge the very opposite of the one we have been considering. They are accused of having no theory, no system, no systematic unity; of jumbling together all systems and theories, according to their own caprice, without rule or measure. We have neither the time nor the room to answer this objection. All we can say is, that though we have studied French Eclecticism with some attention, we have never felt it, and cannot conceive how any fair-minded man could have ever entertained it. In our judgment, French Eclecticism is not, as some allege, mere Syncretism, but genuine Eclecticism. It recognises a truth in all systems, and it selects from all, but not by caprice or at hazard. It has certain principles, according to which it does it. It is true, its friends do not seek for a systematic, a theoretic unity in philosophy, which is not to be found in human nature itself. They recognise more than one element in human nature, and they look for as many elements in philosophy as they find in human nature. Their method of proceeding is, in the first place, to form their psychology, that is, by observation and induction in the bosom of consciousness itself, to ascertain the number and character of the elements of human nature; these elements being ascertained, their second step is to bring to their test all the systems or schools furnished by the history of philosophy. Their psychology becomes, therefore, their measure of the true and the false in the systems and schools which they examine. Nobody can object to this method of proceeding. Philosophy, we all know, is a human creation, a manifestation of the human reason. It can then contain nothing which is not in the human consciousness. All systems

and schools, then, must contain one element or more of the human consciousness. A study of systems of philosophy, a knowledge of their real elements becomes, therefore, a means of determining the elements of the human consciousness, and of course of verifying our psychology. This last method, the historical method, is also pursued by the Eclectics, and it is a scientific method; but the other, or the psychological method, holds the highest rank, and is always to precede the historical.

We trust we need make no apology for having detained our readers so long from the main object of this article. The work we have introduced to their notice is a philosophical work, and the production of one of the most distinguished of the French Eclectics, and we could not in good conscience have proceeded to review it, without having first said something to vindicate the general subject with which it is connected, and the particular philosophy to which it belongs. We have also wished to throw out a few hints, which might be of some service to those young men among us, who are beginning to have a taste for philosophizing. The number of these young men is already far from being small, and it is every day increasing. It is of the very highest importance, that they at first adopt a truly scientific method. Method is to the philosopher what Demosthenes declared action to be to the orator. Before one enters upon the broad field of speculation, he should have some tolerable notions of what it is, of its outlines, and some clear and definite directions as to the route he ought to pursue. Thousands have entered it, and thousands have been lost in it, and thousands too of the very elect of mankind, because they fell at first into a wrong path, into one which compelled them to traverse it in perpetual circles, without ever being able to make the least advance. After having gone round and round a few times, their heads have grown dizzy, and they have found themselves unable to see anything distinctly, or any longer to recognise their point of departure. We have wished to do something to save others from their fate. If our remarks contribute anything to this end, they will not have been made in vain. With the educated among us blind belief is passing away, and it is even so with the uneducated, and everywhere is the young heart tormented with the questions of the *Why*, and the *Wherefore*. The young mind craves no longer au-

thority, but conviction, and around, with eager eyes and anxious thoughts, does it look to find it. To the young man craving conviction we say, obtain a truly scientific method ; understand that the field of its application is your own consciousness ; the facts to be known and classed are the facts which every man carries about in himself, and if you have but a mind of tolerable sobriety and patience, and some little logical sequence of thought, you shall not fail to arrive at results consoling and nourishing to yourself and beneficial to Humanity.

The work before us, as we have said, is the production of one of the most distinguished of the French Eclectics ; and, we may add, of one of the ablest men of the age. Its author, M. Jouffroy, was first a pupil, then an assistant of M. Cousin, in the Normal School, and is now his successor in the chair of Modern Philosophy at the *Faculté des Lettres of Paris*. He is about forty years of age, and has already attained to a high reputation, both as a lecturer and as a philosophical writer. In 1826, he gave the French public a translation of Dugald Stewart's *Outlines of Moral Philosophy*, preceded by a very interesting and valuable Preface, in which he demonstrates the possibility of psychology, or of a science of the facts of consciousness, and makes an unanswerable plea for the moral sciences. He collected and published in 1833 his *Mélanges Philosophiques*, an octavo volume of philosophical miscellanies, for the most part consisting of articles previously inserted in the *Globe*, and other French periodicals, but of very great value to the student of philosophy, and even to the general reader. He is remarkable for his soberness and little anxiety as to the systematic results to which he may be conducted. His object seems everywhere to be simply the interpretation of Human Nature. He seeks to analyze the facts of consciousness, not to obtain a system, but to obtain the truth. His style is not so animated, nor so poetical as that of M. Cousin, but it is strong, elevated, transparent, and is in fact one of the best specimens of style for philosophical disquisition, with which it has been our lot to be acquainted. While reading him, he strikes us as less peculiarly French than most French writers, with whom we meet ; and the cast of his mind, and his combinations of thought, seem to us to have something of the Scotch character, (though without anything of the Scotch timidity and shallowness,) a fact, if it be one, which may, perhaps, be attributed to his long and profound study of the Scotch philosophy.

The two volumes before us comprise the first part of his Course of Lectures on Natural Right, which he commenced in 1833, and which is not yet completed. The whole Course is to be divided into *five* parts, the second of which, under the title of *Morale Personelle*, is to include the system of duties which man owes to himself; the third part, under the title of *Droit Réel*, is to expose the principles of the conduct which man should observe towards things, or towards irrational creation; the fourth part, or *Morale Sociale*, will embrace the science of the rights and duties which result from men's relations to one another; and as these relations are various, it will be subdivided into several distinct parts; the fifth and last part, or *Religion Naturelle*, is to have for its object man's relations to his God, and the duties which spring from those relations. From this statement, it will at once be seen that M. Jouffroy takes the term Natural Right in its broadest acceptation, so as to include the whole range of man's duties; whether they be duties to himself, to things, to his like, or to God; and it will also be seen that his plan is so comprehensive, that it must take several years to complete his course. When his course is completed, his plan filled up, judging from the specimen before us, we think we hazard nothing in saying, it will be one of the most valuable contributions ever made to Moral Science, to the Philosophy of Natural Right.

But before proceeding to discuss our rights and duties, to ascertain the special enactments of natural legislation, there is a preliminary question of some importance to be disposed of; a question of no less magnitude than that of determining whether there be a natural right, any natural legislation at all. The idea of law, of rule, of duty, of right, implies that of obligation. To seek the laws, the rules of human conduct, man's rights and duties, is to seek what man ought and what he ought not to do; what it is his duty to do and to respect, and what he has the right to cause to be respected and done. But if there be for him nothing obligatory, if he be bound to nothing, and if others are bound to nothing in regard to him, then there are no rights and duties, no laws, no rules of human conduct to seek, no science of natural rights and duties to construct; the object of the science, the science itself escapes, disappears. Several philosophical systems, not without reputation in the world, have denied that there is anything binding upon man, that he is placed by nature under obligation to

pursue one course of conduct rather than another. If these systems be correct, then it is perfectly idle to talk of natural right, of moral science, for morality must dwindle down to a few counsels or considerations of prudence. It is evident, therefore, that the first step for the moral philosopher is to determine whether there be anything obligatory upon man, anything he is naturally bound to do or not to do, the right to do or cause to be done. To this question the volumes before us are devoted, and they contain the solution which M. Jouffroy himself gives to it, and a critical Review of the principal solutions which it has received from others.

Since we know the school to which M. Jouffroy belongs, since we know the method of that school, we know the method he will take to solve this momentous question. He will not begin by assuming that there is or that there is not something obligatory for man, and then seek for proofs of the position assumed; he will neither praise nor declaim against those who deny moral obligation; he will waste no time in appealing to our prejudices, in depicting the consequences which must inevitably follow from the position that man is not a moral being, and in deploring the wretched condition to which society would be sunk without morality; he will do nothing of all this; he will mingle with the question no considerations of what is desirable or undesirable, of what is useful or what is harmful; but proceeding on the conviction that truth is to be sought for its own sake, that it is alike truth, whether it meet men's wishes or cross them, and without offering any reasons why we should or why we should not believe there is something obligatory, he will enter into the consciousness, ascertain the moral facts of our nature, and thus determine whether moral obligation be or be not one of those facts. This is his method. He does not speculate, he does not reason; he inquires, he observes. He answers the question, not by balancing opposite arguments, and determining which are the weightiest, but by ascertaining what is the psychological fact. If moral obligation be a psychological fact, a fact of human nature, that is enough. Then there is moral obligation for man, there is a law which man is bound to obey, and the only question is, what is that law, and what are its enactments? In accordance with this method, he begins by giving us a brief statement of what he calls the *Moral Facts of Human Nature*. In making this statement of the moral facts, he gives us a

summary of what may be considered his system on the point in question. To do him full justice with those of our readers who are unacquainted with the volumes under review, we ought to give this statement without any abbreviation ; for as he himself has given it, it is as condensed as it well can be. But we are obliged, out of regard to the patience of our readers, to condense it still more ; and if, in doing this, we render his system somewhat obscure, the obscurity must be charged to our account, and not to his ; to the necessity we are under of giving indications of what his system is, rather than a development of it, and not to the system itself, which is perfectly intelligible to every man who can look steadily at the moral phenomena of his own nature. With these remarks we proceed to lay his system before our readers, with as much distinctness and detail as the space which remains to us will admit.

The idea of Law implies that of Duty ; the idea of Duty implies that of Obligation ; several systems of philosophy have said there is no obligation, and several other systems, though they have admitted moral obligation, have given such an account of it as greatly to impair its force. Before we can proceed to determine what is enjoined by natural law, or natural right, what is our duty, and what is the value of these philosophical systems, we must ascertain whether Moral Obligation be a fact of our nature, and if it be, what it is. Both questions, it must be obvious, are matters of fact and not of speculation, and are to be answered by simply observing or ascertaining what are the moral facts of human nature. We must, then, sit down and patiently examine these facts.

In his account of these facts, M. Jouffroy distinguishes the end for which man is made, the instinctive tendencies by which he aspires to that end, the faculties given him with which to attain it, the liberty or voluntary power by which he may govern his faculties, and the reason which furnishes him the motives of his conduct. He also distinguishes three different moral states in the development of human life, characterized by three different modes of determination. In the first, or primitive state, our actions are determined by our instinctive tendencies, passion ; in the second, by regard to our own personal good, selfishness ; in the third, by respect to the universal, absolute good, the good in itself.

The End of a being is determined by its nature. Every being has a nature peculiar to itself, and consequently a special

end, to which its nature predetermines it. Did we know thoroughly the nature of a being we could deduce from it the destination or end of that being. The end of a being is what is meant by its good. The good of a being is to fulfil its destiny, to go to the end for which it has been organized. As each being has a special nature, and by virtue of that a special end, so has each one necessarily the faculties required for accomplishing it. It would be a contradiction to condemn a being by its very constitution to a certain end, and not to give it the faculties which are indispensable in attaining it; and an examination of the end imposed, and the faculties provided, will show that this is never the case. In being predetermined by its constitution to make honey, the bee has the instruments with which to make it.

It follows from these principles, that man, having a special nature, has a special end, the accomplishment of which is his good, and that being organized, fitted expressly for this end, he necessarily has the faculties which are requisite for accomplishing it.

As soon as man exists, and it is the same with all organized beings, and even with unorganized beings, though this is less apparent, — as soon as man exists there take place within him certain movements, which, without any reflection or calculation on his part, bear him towards a certain number of particular ends, which, taken together, make up his total end. These instinctive movements, which occur in him as soon as he comes into the world, and which grow in intensity with his growth, M. Jouffroy calls the *primitive and instinctive Tendencies of Human Nature*. It is these tendencies, what they have in common in all men and particular in each individual, that Gall and the Phrenologists have sought to determine and to enumerate, in an exact manner, by showing what variations they undergo in different individuals and in the same individual, and of which, we venture to say, they have given a tolerable account, though they have, improperly enough, called them faculties, and made them the sole determining mode of our actions through life. These tendencies have attracted the attention of a small number of philosophers, and although they have had some influence on their systems, they have not yet received the distinct consideration they deserve.

Simultaneously with the development of the instinctive tendencies which impel man to his end, his good, the faculties,

which God has given him so that he may attain it, are also set in motion under the influence of these tendencies, and seek to seize the objects towards which they bear him. As soon, then, as man exists, there are awakened within him on one part the tendencies which are the expression of his nature, and on the other, the faculties which have been given him in order that these tendencies may obtain satisfaction. This is not merely the beginning of human life, it is its very ground, and on this ground, which never changes, must be traced all the phenomena humanity presents.

M. Jouffroy believes that he has demonstrated in a previous Course, that when these faculties are first developed it is in an indeterminate manner, and without any precise direction. What gives them a determinate and precise direction, is the fact, that they everywhere find obstacles, meet resistance in the pursuit of their objects, which compels them to concentrate their forces upon one point. Whenever they meet resistance, they bring together spontaneously all the forces which had before radiated in all directions, and make an effort to overcome it. If this world were the harmony of the forces of all the beings which compose it, and were the forces of all these beings, instead of contradicting, opposing one another, developed as harmonious and parallel forces, this would never occur. But the world is a vast assemblage of contradictions, where all destinations and the forces of all the beings of which it is composed are placed in opposition. Our faculties, therefore, cannot seize at once upon their objects. Their spontaneous, instinctive development does not suffice to obtain satisfaction for the tendencies of our nature. Man attains not his end without an effort, a conflict with hostile and opposing forces. And even with it, with all the concentration of his forces and his mightiest effort, he never more than partially realizes it in this life. He never fulfils on earth the destiny appointed him by his nature, his organization. Hence the idea and the promise of another life, a life beyond this life.

When our faculties, by concentration, by an effort, succeed in obtaining satisfaction for our tendencies, in conquering for us a portion of the good to which our nature aspires, there is produced in us a phenomenon called *pleasure*, and when they fail, there is produced another phenomenon called *pain*. We must not confound these with good and evil. Good and evil are success or failure in the pursuit of the ends to which we are

determined by the constitution of our being. Conceive man as having been made capable of acting, but not of feeling ; he would, nevertheless, have had an end to accomplish, the accomplishment of which would be his good, and the non-accomplishment of which would be his evil ; he would have tendencies aspiring to his end, faculties with which to obtain it, but he would feel no pleasure when he succeeded, no pain when he failed. We enjoy when we obtain satisfaction for our tendencies, and suffer when we fail, because we are not merely active beings, but also sensitive beings. Pleasure is a consequence, a sign of the realization of some portion of our good ; pain the consequence, the sign of the privation of good ; but pleasure is not the good, nor is pain the evil.

Inasmuch as we aspire to our good, enjoy when we obtain it, suffer when deprived of it, we love and seek all that which, though it be not itself our good, can aid us in procuring it, and dislike, entertain an aversion for whatever interposes an obstacle to its acquisition. When, therefore, our faculties, on being developed, meet objects which second or oppose their efforts, we experience for the first sentiments of affection and love, and aversion and hatred for the other. This makes the tendencies, that is, the great, the real passions of our nature, to branch out and subdivide themselves, in going to the accomplishment of their end, into a multitude of particular tendencies, which may also be called passions, but only in a secondary sense. We must be careful to distinguish them from the others, the primitive passions, which are developed spontaneously, independently of all external objects, and which aspire to their end, even before reason has disclosed it. These secondary passions are produced only on the occasion of some external object, which aids or opposes the development of our primitive passions. Those objects, which second our primitive tendencies or passions, we qualify as *useful* ; those which oppose them we qualify as *harmful*. Hence the origin of the secondary passions, and the ideas of useful and harmful.

Some of our primitive tendencies, as sympathy, are benevolent for others ; some of them are not, as curiosity, or the desire to know, ambition, or the love of power. Consequently, even in childhood, while as yet all our tendencies are developed without any conscious reference to our own interest, there are some of our tendencies which have no other result than our own personal good. This, however, is not the case

with sympathy ; for that has for its result both our own good and that of others. It is always by our tendencies, never by virtue of reason, — by sympathy, which, independently of all idea of Duty, of all the calculations of interest, impels us to seek the good of others as its proper and ultimate end, — that we are benevolent. The principle is personal, but the object to which it aspires is out of ourselves, the good of others. Man is, therefore, benevolent for others, even when he is governed solely by his instinctive movements.

The facts we have indicated constitute the primitive state of man, — childhood, the period which elapses before the appearance of the reason. The reason, when it appears, effects two important changes in this state, from which result two other states, distinct from it and from each other. The characteristic of this primitive state, that which distinguishes it from every other, is the domination of passion. There is, undoubtedly, in the fact of the concentration of our faculties, induced by the resistance they find, the beginning of self-government, and of the direction of his faculties by the personal power or the will of the man himself ; but this power, the will, is as yet blind, and wholly subject to the passions, which determine necessarily both the action and the direction of our faculties. It remains in this condition till reason appears. It is the reason alone that withdraws the will from the exclusive dominion of the passions. Till it appears, then, the present passion, and among present passions the strongest, bears away the will in its own direction, because the will can as yet have no foresight of evil. Hence the law of human determination, in this state, is the triumph of the present passion over the future passion, and among the present passions the triumph of the strongest passion. We pass now to examine the changes the presence of the reason produces in this state, which, be it remembered, is the state of childhood.

The reason, in its most simple definition, is the faculty of comprehending. We must distinguish this faculty from that of knowing. Animals know, but they do not appear to comprehend, and it is this which distinguishes them from man. If they could comprehend they would be like us, and instead of remaining all their life as they do in the state we have just described, they would rise successively, like man, to the two other states which the intervention of reason produces in us.

The reason, when first awakened in man, finds human na-

ture in full development, all the tendencies in full play, and all the faculties in action. By virtue of its own nature, its power of comprehending it very soon penetrates the meaning of the spectacle it beholds. In the first place, it comprehends that all these tendencies, that all these faculties, aspire and go to one and the same end. This end is the satisfaction of human nature. The satisfaction of human nature is the sum, and, as it were, the resultant of all its tendencies. It is, then, its true end, its real good. It is this good to which it aspires by all its tendencies, and which it strives to gain by all the faculties it exerts. From this, the reason forms the general idea of *good*, and, though it be as yet only the idea of our individual good, it nevertheless marks no slight advance from that primitive state in which it did not and could not exist.

Observation and experience of what is perpetually passing within us show the reason that the complete satisfaction of human nature is impossible, that it is vain to pretend to anything more than a partial good, and, therefore, that we should aim only at the realization of our greatest possible good. By this the reason rises from the idea of our good to that of our greatest possible good, the greatest possible satisfaction of our nature. It very soon conceives that whatever contributes to this satisfaction is good on that account alone, and that whatever hinders it is evil. But it never confounds this double property, which it finds in objects with good and evil themselves; that is to say, with the satisfaction or non-satisfaction of human nature. It makes a fundamental distinction between good in itself, and the things proper to produce it, and generalizing the common property of things to produce good, it rises to the idea of *utility*. It distinguishes also this satisfaction or this non-satisfaction of human nature from the agreeable or disagreeable sensations which accompany it. Pleasure is never in its eyes the same thing as good or utility, nor is pain the same thing as evil, or as that which is harmful. As it had created the general idea of good and that of utility, it sums up whatever is common to all agreeable sensations, and creates the general idea of *happiness*. These three ideas, *good*, *utility*, *happiness*, the reason very soon deduces from the spectacle of human nature, and they are distinct in all languages, for all languages have been made by common sense, the most faithful expositor of the reason. As soon as the reason has conceived these ideas, man has the secret of what is passing

within him. Before, he had it not. He had lived without comprehending it; now he understands it. These passions, he sees whence they come and whither they would go; these faculties, he knows how they are determined, and what purpose they serve; what he loves, what he hates, he knows why he loves, why he hates it; what of pleasure and pain he experiences, he knows wherefore he experiences it. All this is now clear to his understanding, and it is the reason that has made it so.

But the reason does not stop here. It comprehends also, that in the actual condition in which man is placed, dominion over oneself, the government of his faculties, or forces, by the man himself is the only means by which he can obtain the greatest possible satisfaction of his nature. So long as our faculties are under the dominion of the passions, they always obey the one, which, for the time being, is the dominant one. This has a double inconvenience. Nothing is more variable than passion. The domination of one passion is rapidly displaced by that of another, and one passion may reign this moment, another passion the next. Under the dominion of the passions, then, our faculties can have no sequence in their action, and must, therefore, be hindered from producing anything of value. The good, too, which results from the satisfaction of an actually dominant passion, may be the cause of a great evil, and the evil which would result from its non-satisfaction the principle of a great good. Consequently, nothing is less adapted to the production of our greatest possible good, than the subjection of our faculties to the passions. The reason is not slow in discovering this, and it concludes from it, that in order to obtain our greatest possible good, it would be better that the human force, the will, should not remain a prey to the mechanical impulse of the passions, that instead of being driven by that impulse to satisfy, at each instant, the actually dominant passion, it would be better to rescue it from that impulse, and direct it to the realization of a calculated interest, the interest of all our passions; that is, the greatest good of human nature. The reason, in conceiving this as something better, conceives it also as possible. It depends on us to calculate our interest. To do it, we have only to employ our reason. It depends on us also to gain possession of our faculties, and to employ them in the service of the idea which the reason has conceived. We have the power to do it.

This has been revealed to us,—at least, we have had a presentiment of it,—in the spontaneous effort by which we concentrated all our forces upon a single point, in order to satisfy the demand of passion. What we have done heretofore spontaneously, we have only to do voluntarily now, and the power, the will, is created. This important revolution is no sooner conceived, than it is accomplished. A new principle of action springs up within us, interest well understood, a principle which is not a passion, but an idea, which does not proceed blind and instinctive from the tendencies of our nature, but descends clear and intelligent from the reflections of our reason,—a principle, which is not a moving force, (*mobile*,) but a *motive*. The natural power, which we have of controlling our faculties, finding in this motive a point of support, becomes developed and strengthened. The will escapes from the inconsequent, variable, and stormy reign of the passions, and submits only to a law of the reason, which calculates the greatest possible satisfaction of our nature, our greatest good. Interest well understood, instead of those partial ends towards which our passions impelled us, is now the end to be sought; self-control is the means. The immediate dominion of the passions over our faculties, the characteristic of the primitive state, is broken. Between the power of the passions, and that of the faculties, now intervenes a third power, that of the reason and the will, the reason holding out an object to our conduct, and the will directing the faculties to its acquisition.

But we must not suppose that the will henceforth finds no support in the passions. Our nature, as we have seen, sends out its secondary passions for whatever seems capable of affording it satisfaction. It is *passionate* for utility. It believes this system of conduct, which the reason presents it under the character of interest well understood, is a useful system; it, therefore, approves it, loves it, and deviates from it only with regret. Through interest well understood passion is, therefore, led to support the will. Consequently, in this second state, there is a harmony between the instinctive and rational elements of human nature. But this harmony is far from being perfect. The idea of our greatest good, conceived by the reason, does by no means suppress our instinctive tendencies. They subsist, for they are imperishable. They develop themselves, they act, demand immediate satisfaction, the same as they did before the idea was conceived. They continue to

strive, as in the primitive state, to carry away the faculties in pursuit of their immediate satisfaction, and they not unfrequently succeed. If interest well understood finds sympathy in passion, it finds in it also a multitude of obstacles to be overcome. In this second state, then, the will is far from being wholly withdrawn from the immediate dominion of the passions. They are very often able, especially in weak minds, to disturb not a little the calculations of interest. In short, when the reason has appeared, when it has risen to the idea of interest rightly interpreted, a new moral state, a new mode of determination, is created; but it does not destroy the primitive mode, nor so completely supplant it, that a return to it becomes impossible. Man floats between the two states, now going to the one and now to the other, now resisting the impulses of the passions and conforming himself to the counsels of interest, and now succumbing to those impulses, and leaving them to bear him whither they will; nevertheless, a new mode of determination is created within us, and introduced into human life.

This new mode is the selfish mode. Selfishness consists in our knowingly and intentionally acting with sole reference to our own personal good. Our own good is the end we have distinctly in view, and we regard it as our ultimate end. Selfishness cannot occur in the primitive state. The child, in the beginning, is not selfish. In him the instinctive tendencies reign without a rival. These tendencies aspire, each to its end, as to its ultimate end. The child sees these ends, loves them, strives to attain them, but sees nothing beyond them. At bottom it is the satisfaction of his nature to which all his passions aspire, but he is not their accomplice. He is not therefore selfish, in the true acceptation of the word. He is as innocent as Psyche, who loves without knowing love. Reason is in man the torch of Psyche. That alone reveals to him the ultimate end of his passions, and by revealing it substitutes a rational motive to his conduct for the varying impulses of passion, which he had previously obeyed. Reason is then the sole creator of selfishness.

But we have not yet reached the state which properly deserves to be called moral. We have proceeded as far as the selfish moralities ever proceed, but we have not proceeded far enough. We have not yet found an obligatory law, without which, as we have seen, there can be no morality. We have risen to the idea of good, but we are immeasurably below that

of duty, of right, of obligation. The idea of good obtained is only that of our own personal good. With this the reason is not satisfied. The selfish mode of determination conceals a vicious circle. Selfishness calls the satisfaction of the tendencies of our nature good ; but when asked why this is good, it gravely replies. that it is good because it is the satisfaction of the tendencies of our nature. In vain is it that, in order to come out of this vicious circle, it seeks, in the pleasure which follows the satisfaction of the tendencies of our nature, the proofs of the equation it attempts to establish between this satisfaction and our good ; the reason finds no more evidence in the equation of pleasure and good, than in the equation of the satisfaction of our nature and good, and the wherefore of this last equation is always a mystery to it. If we ask the selfish philosophers, why we are bound to perform a given action, they answer, because it will contribute to the satisfying of our nature ; if we ask them why we are bound to contribute to the satisfying of our nature, they may answer, because that will yield us happiness ; but if we proceed to ask, why are we bound to seek our own happiness, they have nothing to answer. We all feel that we are bound to consult the good, to obey the right ; but how can we prove that the satisfaction of our nature is really a good, that to consult our own good is right ? This is the problem which tortures the reason, and which it solves by revealing to us an absolute good, and our good as an element of it.

Escaping from the exclusive consideration of individual phenomena, the reason conceives that what passes in us, passes also in all possible creatures ; that all, having their special nature by virtue of that, aspire to a special end, which is also their good ; and that each one of these different ends is an element of a total ultimate end, which embraces them all. This end is that of creation itself, an end which is identical with universal order. The realization of this end, of universal order alone, in the eyes of reason, merits the title of good, alone answers to its idea of good, and alone forms with that idea a self-evident equation, which we have no need to prove. When the reason has risen to this conception, then, but only then, we have the idea of good. We had it not before. We had, by a confused sentiment, applied the term good to the satisfaction of our nature ; but we were unable to give any account of that application, or to justify

it. By the light of this discovery, that application becomes clear and legitimate. We perceive good, veritable good, good in itself, absolute good, to be the realization of the absolute end of creation; that is, universal order. The end of each element of creation, that is, the end of each being, is an element of this absolute end. Each being then aspires to this absolute end in aspiring to its individual end, and this universal aspiration is the universal life of creation. The good of each being is then a fragment of the absolute good, and it is by virtue of this fact that it is a good. It is from this source alone that it can derive this character. If the absolute good be honorable and sacred for the reason, the good of each being, the realization of the end of each being, the fulfilment of the destiny of each being, the development of the nature of each being, the satisfying of the tendencies of each being, all meaning one and the same thing, must also be sacred and venerable for the reason.

Now no sooner does the reason conceive this idea of order, of the ultimate end of creation itself, than there is between it and this idea a sympathy so profound, so true, so immediate, that it prostrates itself before it, acknowledges it sacred and obligatory, reverences it as its legitimate sovereign, honors and submits to it as to its natural and eternal law. To violate order is ever an indignity in the eyes of reason; to realize order, as far as it is given to our weakness, this is good, this is beautiful. A new motive of acting has now appeared, a new rule really a rule, a new law truly a law, a motive, rule, law, which bears in itself the warrant of its legitimacy, which obliges immediately, and which has no need of calling in anything foreign, anterior, or superior to itself to make itself revered and acknowledged.

To deny there is for us, beings endowed with reason, something holy, sacred, obligatory, is to deny either that the reason rises to the idea of the good in itself, the absolute good, universal order; or that, after having conceived this idea we do not bow down before it, and feel immediately and intimately that we have encountered our true law, a law which we had not encountered before, two things which it is impossible to mistake or to call in question.

This idea, this law, is luminous and fruitful. By showing us the end of each creature as an element of universal order, it clothes the end of each being, and the instinctive tendencies

by which each being aspires to its end, with the same sacred and venerable character with which order itself is clothed. Before we had discovered this law we were determined to satisfy the tendencies of our nature by the very impulse of those tendencies themselves, or by the attraction of the pleasure which followed their satisfaction. The reason might judge that satisfaction convenient, useful, or agreeable, it might calculate the best means of obtaining it; but it could not decide that it was legitimate, an intrinsic good, whether it was or was not our duty to pursue it, our right to obtain it. Our right and duty to seek our own good begin only when our end is presented to us as an element of the absolute end of creation, our good as a fragment of the absolute good. That moment our good is clothed with legitimacy and absolute goodness. But not ours only. The good of each creature is at the same time and by the same title clothed with the same characters as our own. Before we had conceived that other creatures had tendencies to satisfy, that there was a good for them as well as for us, we might indeed, impelled by sympathy, instinctively desire their good, find pleasure in promoting it, and consequently make its production enter into the calculations of interest; but that it was legitimate in itself, that it should be sought for anything but for our own sake, that it ought to be as sacred and honorable in our eyes as our own, this our reason could neither discover nor even conceive. But the idea of the absolute good once conceived, what was not visible becomes apparent; the good of others being then shown to be an element of the absolute good, is shown to be a good by the same title as our own. To deny henceforth that we are bound to consult it, will be the same as to deny that we have any right to pursue ours. All difference between our right to pursue our own good and our duty to respect and contribute to the good of others loses itself, and is confounded in the bosom of the absolute good, which, being legitimate by itself, necessarily imparts legitimacy to all its elements.

All duty, all right, all morality flows from one and the same source, the idea of good in itself, the idea of universal order. Suppress this idea and there is nothing sacred for the reason, nothing obligatory, no moral difference in the ends to be pursued, in the actions to be performed, creation is unintelligible, and all notion of destiny an enigma. Reestablish this idea, and all in the universe and in man becomes transparent; there

is an end for all and for each ; there is a sacred order, which every being gifted with reason is bound to respect and labor to accomplish, both in himself and out of himself ; there are duties and rights, there is a morality, consequently a natural legislation for human conduct.

The conception of the idea of order, of absolute good, of obligation as we have described it, introduces us into the third state, to a mode of determination altogether different from the two previous ones. The mode of determination in this state is not the impulse of passion, as in the primitive state, nor reference to our own personal welfare, as in the selfish state, but reference to order, to the intrinsically good. It is fundamentally distinct from the instinctive and selfish modes. It agrees with the selfish mode in this, that it is possible only in a being endowed with reason ; but the lines by which it is separated from that mode are so broad and so characteristic, that they can hardly escape the observation of any one. As passion and selfishness may urge the performance of the same action, so indeed selfishness and the moral motive may prescribe in a multitude of cases the same conduct ; but it is precisely in this coincidence that is most clearly seen the difference which distinguishes them. The selfish motive counsels, the moral motive obliges. The first sees only the greatest possible satisfaction of our nature, and is selfish even when it counsels the good of others ; the second considers only what is intrinsically good, and remains disinterested even in prescribing our own good. In yielding to the counsels of selfishness, it is ourselves that we obey ; in yielding to the moral motive, we submit to something which is not ourselves, and we submit to it simply because in our own eyes it is good. In this last case there is a devotedness to something besides ourselves ; in the first there is not and cannot be. Now for a being to be devoted to that which he is not, and which he believes to be good, is precisely what is meant by virtue, by moral goodness. Virtue, moral goodness, can appear in us only in this third state, and is a phenomenon peculiar to the third mode of determination. We have moral goodness whenever we knowingly and with intention obey the law which is the rule of our conduct ; moral evil whenever we knowingly and with design disobey it. This is the true definition of moral good and evil. But moral good and evil are wholly distinct from absolute good and evil themselves. Absolute good and evil are order and disor-

der. They are distinct too from that portion of absolute good and evil which we call the good and evil of man, and which consist in the satisfaction and non-satisfaction of the tendencies of his nature.

The difference between the moral mode of determination and the two other modes may be seen also in the phenomena which result from it. Among these phenomena there is one which is peculiar to the moral law. When we have voluntarily fulfilled the moral law, independently of the special pleasure received by our sensibility, we judge ourselves worthy of esteem and recompense; and in the opposite case we consider ourselves deserving blame and chastisement. This is what is called the pleasure of well-doing, and the pain or remorse of evil-doing. This judgment of merit or of demerit is necessarily a consequence of every moral action, and it can be a consequence of no other. When we have acted contrary to our interest, we may be out of humor with ourselves, may accuse our weakness or want of address; in the contrary case, we may laud our prudence, our wisdom, or our ability; but these phenomena are altogether distinct from moral approbation and disapprobation. We do not feel remorse for failing to be true to our interest; the most we feel is regret. Imprudence never excites our remorse, unless our interest has been identified with the absolute good, and then only when we believe that in neglecting our interest we have compromised the good. In this case it is the last consideration, not the first, that produces our remorse. It may be seen from this that M. Jouffroy does not condemn enlightened self-interest, but on the contrary that he legitimates it, and makes a duty of it. But it is not as our interest that he makes a duty of it, but simply as an element of universal order, as a fragment of the absolute good.

To complete the picture of the Moral Facts of Human Nature, so far as we can complete it in the space to which we are limited, two observations are wanting, which we proceed to adduce, and which we pray our readers, in justice to M. Jouffroy, not to overlook.

To what do the primitive tendencies of our nature aspire? the true end, the real good of our nature. To what tends our conduct, when directed by enlightened self-interest? the highest realization possible of our tendencies, the fullest possible accomplishment of our destiny, our end, our good. And

what, when it makes its appearance, does the moral law prescribe? respect for and the greatest possible realization of absolute good, or of order. But our good is an element of absolute good, of absolute order; the law of order then legitimates and imperatively prescribes the accomplishment of the very good, to which we are impelled by our nature and counselled by selfishness. It is true that it prescribes it without any reference to us, with a view to order, to the good in itself; it is true that it prescribes not our good only, but also that of all other beings; but our nature on the one side instinctively aspires to the good of others, and on the other side selfishness shows us that the pleasures which flow from beauty and benevolence are two of the greatest elements of our happiness, and that order in our conduct and respect for the rights and well-being of others are among the very best calculations of interest. There is then no contradiction, but a harmony between the primitive tendencies of our nature, interest properly understood and the moral law. They all point in the same direction, to the same end. The moral motive does not then come for the purpose of destroying the other two, but to explain and control them. Indeed, how could man conduct himself aright, if he were condemned to those absolute struggles imagined by philosophers, if it were necessary in the name of the obligatory principle conceived by our reason to sacrifice continually in order to be virtuous both the impulses of instinct, by which our nature is driven, and the counsels of prudence, by which it is engaged, to pursue its good? Nobody would be virtuous if virtue were possible only on such conditions. Certainly the ends of passion and selfishness differ from that of virtue; but so far from being contradictory or opposed to it, they coincide with it; and hence is it that there is not a virtue which does not find an auxiliary in passion and in interest properly understood. Hence is it also that in a great variety of cases we conduct ourselves by instinct, or by selfishness, precisely as we should were we to obey the moral law. Thus does the child, thus do the greater part of mankind, and it is by virtue of this agreement that society subsists. If all acts which are not done in view of duty were on that account alone contrary to the moral law and hostile to order, society could not merely not subsist, but it could not even be formed. It is necessary then to renounce these false notions, and see things as they are. Struggles we undoubtedly have and must have. Passion will

sometimes oppose prudence, and prudence will sometimes counsel disobedience to Right; but it will only be because passion is blind, and prudence not clear-sighted. For at the bottom of things it is ordinarily the greatest interest of passion to be sacrificed to prudence, and the greatest interest of prudence to be sacrificed to order.

We have spoken thus far of the three states which we have distinguished in man, as though they appertained to three wholly distinct epochs in human life. This is not exactly true. Neither of the three modes of determination we have pointed out in making its appearance abolishes the one which preceded it; it merely adds to it; so that when once produced the three modes henceforth coexist in human life. As to the order of their appearance, it is certain that the instinctive mode chronologically precedes the two others; but it would be difficult to affirm a similar succession from the selfish to the moral state. Although the reason appears very early, nobody will maintain that it rises at once to the sublime conception of order which is the moral law. Moreover,—and everybody knows it,—in a large portion of mankind the sublime conception of the moral law never receives a precise formula. Is it necessary to conclude from this that there is no morality till a certain age, and that there is never any in the majority of men? Not at all. We must distinguish two things, the confused view and the clear view of the moral law. A confused view of the moral law is contemporaneous with the first appearance of the reason; it is one of the reason's first conceptions; and with the majority of men this obscure conception remains through life, and is never transformed into a clear idea. What is called conscience is nothing else than this confused or obscure idea of order, and hence it is that its effects resemble less those of a conception of the reason than those of an *instinct* or a *sense*. Its judgments do not seem to be derived from general principles, which it applies to particular cases; they seem rather to result from a sort of tact, which in each particular case enables it to feel what is good and what is evil. But the obligatory character of good and evil is not affected by this dimness of perception. However confusedly conscience may perceive it, it always presents the good as that which we ought to do, and the evil as that which we ought to avoid; and we feel for obeying or disobeying it as lively approbation or remorse, as we should had we obeyed or disobeyed a more elevated and clear

conception of the moral law. Thus conscience, or this confused view of order, is sufficient to make men virtuous and vicious, criminals and heroes. And still he who conceives clearly this moral law, and the sacred obligation it imposes, is much more culpable for violating it, than he who has only a confused conception of it, for he violates it with a clearer understanding of what he does, he sins against greater light. It is not without reason then that human laws make distinctions among the guilty, and mete out severer or less severe punishments, according as they judge their understandings to have been more or less developed, and consequently as they are supposed to have a more or less clear knowledge of good and evil.

These details show us, that as soon as the reason appears it introduces at once the moral motive and the selfish motive, and that therefore these two modes of determination, which have been separated in the description, are very nearly, if not quite contemporaneous. The development of the reason does not abolish the instinctive mode which reigns exclusively in childhood ; thus after its development man's life is a perpetual alternation between the three states, a perpetual passage from one to the other, as passion, interest, or the moral law by turns controls the will and presides over its determinations. No life is exempt from this alternation. What distinguishes men is the nature of the motive which most frequently triumphs. Some habitually obey passion, they are *passionate* men ; others interest, they are selfish men ; others in fine the moral motive, they are virtuous. As one or the other of these modes of determinations predominate, such or such is the character of the man. No one obeys exclusively and constantly either of the three ; however powerful and habitual the predominance of the one, the other two always preside over some of our determinations. Moreover in the majority of cases the three, by virtue of the harmony which at bottom unites them, concur and act together, and probably there are few human actions which can be referred exclusively to either alone. Thus man is never wholly virtuous, wholly selfish, or wholly a creature of passion. With that one of these moving forces, which seems to determine him, there is always mingled more or less of the secret impulse of the two others.

Such is the picture of the Moral Facts of Human Nature according to M. Jouffroy, as faithfully as we have been able in

the space allotted us to present it. We may not have seized his exact meaning in all cases, and in some cases where we have ourselves seized it, we may have failed to impart it to our readers. Discussions of this nature are always attended with difficulty. Not that the moral facts of our nature cannot be seized as well as any other, are not, if we may so speak, as tangible as those of physiology ; but they are less studied, and the faculties requisite for observing them are less exercised than those requisite for observing the facts of the body. Our psychological language too is vague, and not yet settled. We are obliged to use popular terms ; but in using them we give them a definite and precise sense which they have not in popular usage, and which to the general reader will often seem unwarranted. But enough of this. We have no wish to exalt our merit by magnifying the difficulty of our task. Everybody, who has attempted to discourse metaphysics to those who are not somewhat acquainted with metaphysical thought, will censure us but lightly, even if we seem to many of our readers dark and unintelligible.

We might offer very easily some reflections on the system of Morality of which we have here given the outlines, and reflections which might not be without interest to our readers, but we have trespassed too long already upon their patience. They will find, if we mistake not, though in some instances he may appear to be open to criticism, that M. Jouffroy throws a clear and cheering light on many dark passages of moral philosophy, and enables us to settle to our satisfaction several important questions, on which philosophers have long disputed, and divided and subdivided into schools and sections of schools, much to the grief of the friends of philosophic truth, and to the amusement of the eulogizers of common sense.

We hope in a future number to be able to recur to these volumes, and give our readers some account of the criticisms on different ethical doctrines which they furnish us, and which, if not of the highest value, are at least intensely interesting to the moral philosopher.

O. A. B.

- ART. V.—1. *Mammon; or, Covetousness the Sin of the Christian Church.* By REV. JOHN HARRIS, Author of the "Great Teacher." Boston: 1836. 12mo. pp. 230.
2. *An Essay on the Sin and the Evils of Covetousness; and the Happy Effects which would flow from a Spirit of Christian Beneficence. Illustrated by a Variety of Facts, selected from Sacred and Civil History, and other Documents.* By THOMAS DICK, LL. D., Author of the "Christian Philosopher," "Philosophy of Religion," "Philosophy of a Future State," "Improvement of Society by the Diffusion of Knowledge," "The Mental Illumination and Moral Improvement of Mankind," &c. &c. New York: 1836. 12mo. pp. 318.
3. *The Philosophy of Benevolence.* By PARACELSUS CHURCH, A. M., Rochester, N. Y. New York: 1836. 12mo. pp. 355.

THE three works, the titles of which are above given, though of a different order of merit, belong to one class, and if they may be considered as indicating the direction which thoughtful minds are taking, their appearance augurs well for the cause of benevolence and human improvement. We rejoice that the manifestation of the selfish principle, especially in the form of a passion for wealth and display, is beginning to attract notice, and excite alarm. We rejoice that attention is awake to the subject, and we hope that the inquiries and thoughts of philanthropists and Christians will be brought more and more to bear on it. It is one on which there has hitherto been too much apathy. The tendencies of modern society have need to undergo a searching analysis, and require to be pointed out with a skilful hand; and he who effects this, who shall so hold up the mirror to the age that it shall see its true form and likeness, will render good service to his fellow beings. We are not weak and visionary enough to anticipate, from any efforts of this sort, a great and speedy revolution in men's estimate of worldly pursuits, and particularly in their disposition to do homage to wealth, for we know what deep passions are at work, and what strong holds of selfishness are to be sapped or shaken before the principles of the gospel shall triumph in the lives of Christians. Yet we despair not of the issue, for we have some faith in man, and more in God. We see some

things to encourage us in the history of the past ; the progress of society, though not without occasional pauses and relapses, has, we would fain believe, been onward ; new light has been gradually breaking forth from God's word, and the cause of humanity has been gaining ground. And the end is not yet.

Of the Treatise on "Mammon, or, Covetousness the Sin of the Christian Church," by the Rev. John Harris, the book first named at the head of the present article, we can speak in terms of the highest commendation. To say that the perusal of it has afforded us peculiar gratification, would but feebly convey our impressions of its merit. It is written with great earnestness and force, and occasionally with a near approach to eloquence. It traces selfishness, particularly the love of gain, through its various modes and windings, lays open its subterfuges and disguises, points out its inconsistency with the principles of the gospel, and presses the argument home on the conscience with a power which one would think it not easy to resist.

The history of the publication is briefly this. Early in the year 1835, J. T. Conquest, M. D., of London, offered the liberal prize of one hundred guineas with the profits of publication, to be adjudged to the author of the best Essay on the "Love of Money," or "Avaricious Hoarding," and "Unchristian-like Expenditure." "The work wanted," says the original advertisement, "is one that will bear on *selfishness*, as it leads us to live to ourselves, and not for God, and our fellow-men." Out of one hundred and forty pieces, which were sent in, that of Mr. Harris was selected as the one entitled to the prize. It treats of selfishness as the "antagonist of the gospel ;" of "covetousness, the principal form of selfishness ;" its "nature, forms, and prevalence, especially in Britain, — disguises, tests, evils, doom, and pleas ;" and concludes with some observations illustrating and enforcing "Christian liberality."

There is so much that is good in the book, which we should be glad to transfer to our pages, that we hardly know how to make a selection. We give the following paragraphs, taken almost at random. They relate to the craving, avaricious spirit of the times.

"In the eyes of the world, a man may acquire, and through a long life maintain, a character for liberality and spirit, while his heart all the time goeth after his covetousness. His hand, like a channel, may be ever open ; and because his income is perpet-

ually flowing through it, the unreflecting world, taken with appearances, hold him up as a pattern of generosity; but the entire current is absorbed by his own selfishness. That others are indirectly benefited by his profusion, does not enter into his calculations; he thinks only of his own gratification. It is true his mode of living may employ others; but he is the idol of the temple, — they are only priests in his service; and the prodigality they are empowered to indulge in, is only intended to decorate and do honor to his altar. To maintain an extensive establishment, to carry it high before the world, to settle his children *respectably* in life, to maintain a system of costly self-indulgence, — these are the objects which swallow up all his gains, and keep him in a constant fever of ill-concealed anxiety; filling his heart with envy and covetousness at the sight of others' prosperity; rendering him loath to part with a fraction of his property to benevolent purposes; making him feel as if every farthing of his money so employed were a diversion of that farthing from the great ends of life; and causing him even to begrudge the hallowed hours of the Sabbath as so much time lost (if, indeed, he allows it to be lost) to the cause of gain." — pp. 49, 50.

Again;

"But, though a man may not merit to be denominated avaricious, he may yet be parsimonious. He may not be a Dead Sea, ever receiving, and never imparting; but yet he may be as unlike the Nile when, overflowing its banks, it leaves a rich deposit on the neighboring lands. His domestic economy is a system of penuriousness, hateful to servants, visitors, and friends; from which every thing generous has fled; and in which even every thing necessary comes with the air of being begrudged, of existing only by sufferance. In his dealing with others, he seems to act under the impression that mankind have conspired to defraud him, and the consequence is, that his conduct often amounts to a constructive fraud on mankind. He is delighted at the idea of saving; and exults at the acquisition of a little pelf with a joy strikingly disproportionate to its worth. He looks on every thing given to charity, as so much lost, thrown away, and for which there will never be any return. If a benevolent appeal surprise him into an act of unusual liberality, he takes ample revenge by keen self-reproaches, and a determination to steel himself against all such assaults in future. Or else, in his relenting moments, and happier moods, he plumes himself, and looks as complacently on himself for having bestowed a benevolent mite, as if he had performed an act of piety for which nothing less than heaven would be an adequate reward. His soul not only never expands to the warmth of benevolence, but contracts at the bare proposal,

the most distant prospect, of sacrifice. His presence in any society met for a charitable purpose would be felt like the vicinity of an iceberg, freezing the atmosphere, and repressing the warm and flowing current of benevolence. The eloquent think it a triumph to have pleaded the cause of mercy before him unabashed; and the benevolent are satisfied if they can only bring away their sacred fire undamped from his presence. He scowls at every benevolent project as romantic, as suited to the meridian of Utopia, to a very different state of things from what is known in this world. He hears of the time when the church will make, and will be necessitated to make, far greater sacrifices than at present, with conscious uneasiness, or resolved incredulity. His life is an economy of petty avarice, constructed on the principle of parting with as little as possible, and getting as much, — a constant warfare against benevolence.

“ But a person may be free from the charge of parsimony, and yet open to the accusation of worldliness. His covetousness may not be so determined as to distinguish him from the multitude, but yet sufficiently marked to show that his treasure is *not* in heaven. He was born with the world in his heart, and nothing has yet expelled it. He may regularly receive the seed of the gospel, but the soil is pre-occupied; ‘ the cares of this world, and the deceitfulness of riches, choke the word, and render it unfruitful.’ He will listen to an ordinary exposition of the vanity of wealth as a matter of course, and will appear to give it his entire assent; and yet, immediately after, he resumes his pursuit of that *vanity* with an avidity which seems increased by the temporary interruption. But let the exposition be more than usually vivid, let it aim at awakening his conviction of the dangers attending wealth, let it set forth the general preferableness of competence to affluence, and it will be found to be disturbing the settled order of his sentiments. A representation of the snares of wealth is regarded by him as the empty declamation of a man who has been made splenetic by disappointments, or who has been soured by losses; who has never known the sweets of wealth, or, having known, has lost them, and would gladly recover them again if he could. He never listens to such representations as — that unsanctified riches are only the means of purchasing disappointment; that the possessor suffers rather than enjoys them; that his wants multiply faster than his means, — without an inward smile of skepticism, a conscious feeling of incredulity; a feeling which, if put into words, would express itself thus, ‘ O, if I might be but made rich, I would make myself happy. Tell me not of dangers; cheerfully would I risk them all, only bless me with wealth.’ And his life is arranged, and spent, in strict accordance with this confession. In his vocabulary, wealth means

happiness,—the chief good. And in his reading of the holy Scriptures, the declaration of our Lord is reversed, as if he had said, — A man's life consisteth in the abundance of the things which he possesseth." — pp. 52–54.

Again ;

"A spirit of extravagance and display naturally seeks for resources in daring pecuniary speculations. Industry is too slow and plodding for it. Accordingly, this is the age of reckless adventure. The spirit of the lottery is still upon us. 'Sink or swim' is the motto of numbers who are ready to stake their fortunes on a speculation ; and evil indeed must be that project, and perilous in the extreme must be that scheme, which they would hesitate to adopt, if it held out the remotest prospect of gain." — p. 68.

Again ; as to the relative amount of benevolence at the present day ;

"The truth appears to be, that, much as the benevolence of the age has increased, the spirit of trade has increased still more ; that it has far outstript the spirit of benevolence ; so that, while the spirit of benevolence has increased *absolutely*, yet *relatively*, it may be said to have declined, to have lost ground to the spirit of trade, and to be tainted and oppressed by its influence. How large a proportion of what is cast into the Christian treasury must be regarded merely as a kind of quit-rent paid to the cause of benevolence by the spirit of trade, that it might be left free to devote itself to the absorbing claims of the world. How small a proportion of it is subtracted from the vanities and indulgences of life ; how very little of it results from a settled plan of benevolence, or from that self-denial, without which, on Christian principles, there is no benevolence. Never, perhaps, was self-denial a rarer virtue than in the present age." — p. 69.

"Could we ascertain the entire amount of national excitement and emotion experienced in the course of a year, and could we then distribute it into classes, assigning each respectively to its own exciting cause, who can for a moment doubt that the amount of excitement arising from the influence and operation of money, direct and indirect, would not only exceed that of either of the others, separately considered, but would go near to surpass them altogether ? And when it is remembered that this cause is always in operation ; that it has acquired a character of permanence ; that our life is spent under the reign of wealth ; how can it be otherwise than that we should become its subjects, if not even its slaves ?" — p. 72.

Mr. Dick's Treatise, the title of which stands second in our list at the head of the article, in consequence, as he says, of some circumstances attending its transmission, did not pass under the inspection of the adjudicators, and was returned unopened. Mr. Dick is a well-known and indefatigable author. The present work is written in his usual diffuse and somewhat immethodical style, but contains some statistical information which is not without its value. Altogether, it ranks, as we think, far below that of Mr. Harris, though certainly not destitute of merit.

The other is an American production, and is written in an animated, easy, and flowing style, though not always in perfectly good taste. We do not assent to all the author's positions and reasonings. Taken as a whole, however, the book is quite creditable both to his understanding and heart, and will do good. We like the spirit in which it is written much. If Mr. Church, as we suppose, belongs to the party called orthodox, he has been very successful in divesting himself of the usual technicalities of his sect, and his views are exceedingly liberal. He speaks in terms of strong disapprobation of the sectarian spirit of the age. He thinks that the energies of Christians should be expended in something better than in the exhibition of "sectarian arrogance," in "secret heart-burning, and these vile attacks upon each other's honest peculiarities," or even in discussions on "free will, necessity, and other abstract questions," the importance of which he rates very low; he thinks that they should be directed to "raising man to the dignity of virtue and truth, and impelling him to those labors and sacrifices, by which his woes may be alleviated, his infidelity counteracted, and his conflicts healed; and by which the current of his feelings may be made to set in favor of all that can exalt, ennoble, and beautify his own condition." This, of course, we like.

In its topics and general train of remark, Mr. Church's book exhibits a striking resemblance to the other two, though, of necessity, written without any knowledge of their contents. Its object is to expose the folly and sin of a selfish, earthly, and coveting disposition; to inculcate the "true use of riches," and to bring the principles of Christianity to bear on the love of them in its ordinary manifestations; to teach the extent of the Christian doctrine of consecration and self-sacrifice. The author may push some of his views a little too far, but that he is no narrow

fanatic, will be obvious to every one who reads his chapter on the authorized uses of wealth, among which he enumerates, in addition to "the means of support," and "provision for future use and necessity," "intellectual and moral improvement," the "embellishments and luxuries of life" to a certain extent, and the "favorable regards of society." The work throughout is, in its tone, eminently Christian, and, as such a work must, breathes the spirit of a cheerful philosophy.

The subject of these volumes is highly interesting and important, and we are pleased with an opportunity of calling attention to it. It has an intimate bearing on the present condition and prospects of our country. There are certain views of it which, we think, ought to be pressed, and which cannot be pressed too earnestly. We refer to the temptations, dangers, and responsibilities of wealth. On these topics we beg leave to offer a few remarks. We begin with the dangers and temptations incident to the possession of a large measure of earthly prosperity. What are some of these? In the first place, as regards communities, nations.

Undoubtedly we are to place among them, forgetfulness of God, and our dependence on his good Providence; the gradual exclusion of him from our thoughts; a disposition to overlook his agency, to recognise in the phenomena of our being only the operation of physical causes. The tendency of the age, though not without occasionally some symptoms of a reaction, is to an essentially earthly and material philosophy. It is an age of mechanism. The results of mechanical ingenuity everywhere meet the eye. The great triumphs which are won are over matter. Mind is intensely occupied about physical agencies. And far be it from us to speak lightly of efforts to advance physical science, and especially its application to the practical purposes of life. It is one of the prerogatives of reason, that it controls blind force, and renders the most powerful instruments of nature subservient to the comfort and use of man. But a tendency to direct the attention almost exclusively to the operation of mechanical laws, to seek chiefly an outward, tangible prosperity, to regard the conquests which mind achieves over matter as its best and noblest, while the moral and religious element of our nature, its undying energies and affections, are in comparison overlooked,—a tendency nourished by the growth of wealth, and a state of society in a

high degree artificial, — may well be viewed with apprehension and alarm.

They, who gave us our homes in this new-found world, laid the foundation of our republic in a deep and pervading sense of religious obligation. A spirit of earnest and lofty piety breathed in all their acts; it animated, it sustained them; it urged them onward; it filled their hearts with courage, and nerved their arm with strength. A feeling of dependence was ever uppermost in their breasts. They were persuaded that except the Lord build the house, they labor in vain who build it; except the Lord keep the city the watchman waketh in vain; and in this persuasion they toiled, and attributed their success to God. If there ever was a community, which may be said to have been planted, and to have grown up in the recognition of an overruling Providence, such is ours, and to the religious character and virtues of its founders, we owe whatever is most precious in our institutions.

If the time ever arrives, when our chief energies, as a people, shall be directed to the outward and perishing, to the means of promoting mere physical comfort; if the sacred fire be permitted to go out on the altar; if what our fathers regarded as a spirit, we receive as a dead letter, a senseless form; if instead of honoring religion as a great and precious reality, we are satisfied to treat it with a cold and ceremonious respect, as simply a venerable tradition; if now, when the wilderness has been converted to a garden, and goodly edifices have arisen, and poverty has been exchanged for affluence, our hearts become elated, and in a spirit of pride and self-adulation, we begin to say within ourselves, our own power and the might of our hands have gotten us this prosperity and this wealth, to do with it according to our heart's desire, — thus leading the lives of practical atheists, — if this time, which heaven in mercy forbid, shall ever arrive, our doom is fixed. Our pleasant places shall become as frightful wastes; and a moral desolation, more hideous than nature's solitude, will spread over the land. In vain the fields will bloom; in vain the seasons smile; in vain the earth pour plenty into our laps, and our commerce whiten every sea; a plague-spot will be on the soul, and every joy will be tainted. We may, for a period, enjoy an overgrown and bloated prosperity, but the fabric will soon totter, and we shall be buried beneath the ruins of our own greatness.

We must remember, and the truth needs to be more and more pressed on the attention every day, that wealth is not another name for national felicity, and we must be careful that we do not overrate its importance in itself, or as furnishing the means of gratifying luxurious tastes and habits. The tendency of the age, and more especially in this country, it is said, is to attach an excessive value to it, to make it the sole, or nearly the sole ground of distinction. It is much so in England,* though, from the constitution of English society, there are some checks there, which do not exist here, and which are of a kind we do not wish to see introduced. We have here no hereditary rank or privileges, and we want none. But men are naturally fond of preëminence, and as property is here one of the few avenues that lead to it, it is easy to see that one of the great moral dangers, to which we are exposed, is that of cherishing an undue reverence for it, accompanied as a natural consequence by an intense desire, an almost insane thirst of accumulation. The effect of this spirit of gain, this sordid ambition of pelf, if not counteracted by any antagonist principle, in dwarfing the private virtues, impairing the charm of social life, in discouraging liberal pursuits, and introducing a low standard of personal merit, is too obvious to require illustration. It becomes us anxiously to guard against this species of false worship,—the pernicious idolatry of wealth. We must not accustom ourselves to think that the great end of existence is gained, when earthly treasures are multiplied. We must be ambitious to obtain for ourselves, and for our country, some higher distinction than that of a carnal, unsanctified, Carthaginian prosperity. What constitutes public felicity? What is the praise we should most covet for our now great and flourishing republic? Not that of surpassing other nations in extent of territory and overgrown wealth. Many communities have risen and perished, and left no memorial but the traditionary fame of affluence. The best prayer we can offer for our country is, that it may contain a *people* eminent for moral and intellectual wealth; that it may be the home of the free, the intelligent, the virtuous; that here human nature may exhibit not a few rare specimens of superior excellence, standing out from a surrounding mass of ignorance and depravity, but an entire nation, well educated in all that is essential to

* See Mr. Harris's chapter on the "Predominance of Covetousness in Britain," pp. 63-77.

form and elevate the individual man, and rear him up a pillar in the great and harmonious fabric of society.

Whether or not this prayer shall be accomplished, depends in no slight degree on the direction which is given to the application of wealth among us, and the prevailing ideas of its value and importance,—in other words, on the question, whether those who share most largely in the general prosperity, and who wield all the influence which their position bestows, shall, on the one hand, by their habits, and by the impulse they give to public sentiment, encourage a cold, Epicurean sensualism, that is satisfied with present and personal enjoyment, inattentive to the loathsome forms of poverty, vice, and wretchedness which exist around it, and careless of the claims founded on the ties of a common brotherhood; or whether they shall, on the other hand, regard power as a trust; keep in view the rational ends of wealth; be anxious and labor to meliorate the human condition, physical, intellectual, and moral; to extend the benefits of education, especially to rescue the children of the poor from the combined evils of ignorance and vice, and encourage, generally, among all classes, simple and frugal habits, particularly a taste for the pleasures of knowledge, and love and approbation of the true, the fit, and excellent, and above all, and as security for all, a profound sentiment of religious obligation. Wealth must be regarded not as the end, but as the means; and the well-being of communities requires correct views of the objects to be attained by it, and vigilance in guarding against the tendency, incident especially to periods attended with indications of great and rapid accumulations, to place happiness chiefly in an outward and worldly prosperity.

Again; that the possession of a large amount of earthly good constitutes a state of temptation and moral danger to the individual, would be apparent to the reflecting mind, even without the reiterated precepts and caution of our Savior on the subject. Prosperity is indeed a gift of God, though not one of the highest, and we are permitted to rejoice in it with a temperate and chastened emotion; but it is uniformly represented in the Scriptures, and as reason tells us, with truth, as presenting a condition of trial, which calls for perpetual watchfulness, and the issue of which should be contemplated with some solicitude and distrust.

To say nothing of the dangers incident to the desire and

pursuit of gain, consisting in the tendency of such desire and pursuit to rouse into undue activity the selfish passions, to narrow and chill the affections, and nourish a cold, shrewd, calculating spirit and love of accumulation, at the expense of the more generous emotions and finer sensibilities of the soul ; to say nothing of all this, there are dangers attending the possession and enjoyment of the object. We speak now, and we wish the distinction to be carefully marked, of tendencies, not of results. These tendencies are often resisted and overcome. There are, and have been, in every age since Christianity has been in the world, instances innumerable of the correct appreciation and just appropriation of wealth, as many noble monuments testify, and as the record of the feelings of many a heart, could it be inspected, would bear ample witness. Still the tendencies remain, and of these only we speak,—of dangers to be apprehended, watched, and guarded against,—and not of the actual issue.

Some of these dangers are common to the possession of wealth and every species of earthly prosperity. They are such as originate in the facilities it affords to the indulgence of pampered desires and appetites ; temptations to extravagance and excess ; a tendency to nurture a spirit of carelessness, levity, and self-exaltation,—a disposition to forget the uncertainties of a mortal condition, to trust to the world's smiles and favor, and seek happiness in unsatisfying and precarious objects, while more rational sources of enjoyment are neglected. These render the possession, in some sort, hazardous, and the effect is often such as to impress us with the truth, that man is not perfect enough to be trusted with uninterrupted prosperity, without peril to his virtue ; and the hand, which mingles disappointment and sorrow in his cup, is extended in mercy.

Suffering and trial perform an important office in moral education. They teach us a knowledge of ourselves, they stimulate the mind to action, and they favor the growth and expansion of the kind affections. May not the very exemptions of those, whose lot is cast amid abundance, the ease, the superfluities, the means of enjoyment perpetually at their command, be placed among the circumstances, which make their state one of peculiar temptation and exposure ? Their situation comparatively calls for no effort, no self-denial and sacrifices ; the wish is no sooner formed than gratified ; every want almost is anticipated ; they are conscious of few privations ; the burdens of humanity press lightly on them. Of the nu-

merous anxieties and fears, which harass other minds ; of the evils to be met and borne, and the feverish exhaustion of spirits, the consequence of care, toil, and effort, they know little, and there is less, therefore, to remind them of weakness and dependence. All conspires to produce the state of mind to which the Savior refers, when he speaks of "trust in riches," a disposition not consciously cherished, not marked by the individual, nor, perhaps, recognised by him as existing, but still real, to rely on the seeming omnipotence of wealth, and invest it with all the attributes of a Divinity.

Then the voice of adulation and flattery, with which their ears are familiar, the readiness to serve and please, and the little resistance to their will which is met in those around them, and the smiles and deference with which they are greeted wherever they move, tend to encourage some delusions which it requires a jealous attention and vigilance to correct or escape.

Immunity from suffering, too, renders sympathy with the sufferings of others an acquisition of greater difficulty. They who are conscious of no wants but such as find instant relief, who are accustomed daily to taste all the luxuries, which affluence can procure, whose condition in life seldom brings them into contact with poverty and wretchedness, who are acquainted with them only from recital, or the reports of others, are not in a situation the most favorable for exciting feelings of intense and effective commiseration. They want the touching evidence of the reality of woe ; the sight of the pale, emaciated form ; the sunken visage ; the eye eloquent with grief ; the tale of sorrow poured, in weak, quivering accents, into the attentive ear.

These dangers and obstacles may be, and as we have said, often are, surmounted. The existence of them should have the effect only of inspiring caution, diligence, and a wakeful self-distrust. All the varieties of the human condition are attended with corresponding temptations, and he who would live well, and faithfully perform his duty, should reflect that he is under obligation to search them out, and strive successfully to resist them ; and to neglect this involves, in the eye of heaven, criminality and sin. And much suffering ensues, ensues often to the individual in consequence of such neglect.

What is one of the consequences to the individual of a false estimate of the value and uses of wealth as a means of happi-

ness? An eager pursuit of enjoyment derived from one only source, from the gratification of a single propensity, or desire, and that not the most elevated, and the result is inevitable disappointment. Among the different faculties, affections, and instincts of our nature, there is a subordination of one to another viewed in themselves, and as sources of enjoyment. If, therefore, happiness is sought in the gratification of the inferior, as the desire of accumulation and others, while the superior are suffered to pine and languish from want of exercise and nutriment, the consequence must be failure, dissatisfaction, disgust, not only because the proper balance is not preserved among the several faculties, sentiments, and propensities, but because the laws of our being, intellectual and moral being, are essentially violated, and every violation of them is attended with corresponding suffering. We may have the means of the unlimited gratification of the inferior and animal instincts and desires, and all our worldly projects may be crowned with success; but our felicity is for various reasons incomplete, and chagrin and sorrow await us. The passions we are accustomed to obey are insatiable, and are constantly renewing their demands. Each gratification has the effect only of still further inflaming desire, and amid the greatest abundance there is a perpetual craving for more. Then our reflections and conscience tell us that the objects of these passions and desires are not the most worthy; they fail of satisfying our higher faculties; and are by no means deserving our sole pursuit, even were they of more certain attainment, and far more enduring than they are. An exclusive attention to our own interests renders us more and more intensely selfish, as we advance in life; the affections grow more earthly, and the mind at length becomes, as it were, wholly materialized.

A person in this condition, though he may have succeeded in obtaining the object of his wishes, and may have acquired the wealth of half the globe, is yet far from happiness. All his labor and all his feverish anxieties have not secured him that. Wealth, viewed in itself, or in its results, is only one of the elements of enjoyment, and he who consumes his days in the eager pursuit of it, neglecting in consequence to cultivate the higher faculties and sentiments of his nature, to fortify himself with friendships, to encourage and strengthen in himself feelings of benevolence, religious hope and trust, and secure the pleasing recollections arising from a consciousness

of duty performed, trusts fulfilled, and good done, will from the nature of things, gather only a few cold and scanty joys, for he infringes those conditions, the observance of which is necessary to the soul's health, and therefore to all true and lasting peace and happiness. There are wants of the spirit which have been neglected, transcending the limits of the material, and stretching out to the "immense and infinite."

So impotent is wealth. It should be sought, if sought at all, not to gratify the desire of accumulation, or pride of possession, but for its uses. The place it occupies in our affections should be subordinate to that occupied by the pleasures of intellect, and especially moral pleasures, the pleasures of benevolence. It is only when it is so sought that it becomes capable of ministering to rational enjoyment, or the pursuit of it is worthy beings possessing a thinking, feeling, ever-living essence.

But the point of the greatest moment, after all, is a deep and practical conviction that our worldly possessions are a trust, a means of influence, for the use or abuse of which we are accountable to the Supreme Giver. We are bound to honor God and do good with our substance. We should regard wealth not as a talent to be enclosed in the chest of the miser, not as a gift to be exhausted in purely selfish enjoyment, a grant designed to pamper luxury, or minister to pride and oppression. We should view it as so much power, (for wealth is power,) entrusted to us to be used wisely, beneficially, humanely. Every addition to it augments our means, our power to act with effect, and, therefore, involves additional responsibility. It is this circumstance, in part, and not merely the facilities and temptations it affords to self-indulgence, effeminacy, and kindred failings, or vices, which renders the possession of it in a moral view so ambiguous a good. It augments our responsibility. It confers power for good or for evil, and for the use of this power we must answer as strictly as for the use of any power, faculty, or talent committed to us. We are culpable not merely if we abuse it to purposes of injustice and cruelty, but if we neglect to use it, as we have said, wisely, beneficently, humanely, for so all power should be used, and every augmentation of it, if it be not so used, but exposes us to greater condemnation. Why should not a man serve God with his property, as well as in any other way? On what principle do you affirm, that this is excepted from the rule

which lays you under obligation, as good stewards, to occupy faithfully the talents entrusted to your hands? Responsibility attaches, not to a part, but to the whole; not to a few acts of our lives, but to all of them; not to one mode of influence, but to each and all. In truth, the province of religion is a wide one; its office is to regulate every feeling and habit; and the shop of the artisan, the counting-room of the merchant, the farm, the exchange, the study of the philosopher, and cell of the recluse, must acknowledge its controlling influence, as well as the temple of worship, else is it mere Pharisaic observance, idle ceremony. The true idea of Christian consecration surely includes wealth, as well as time, the affections of the soul, the bodily and intellectual faculties and senses.

This view, trite and obvious as it may seem, cannot be urged on the attention with too great frequency and earnestness. The responsibility which attaches to the possession of wealth, as a means of influence, as conferring power to act with effect, needs to be insisted on. There are few subjects on which it concerns Christians of the present day, and among ourselves especially, to reflect with more seriousness. The physical resources of our country are rapidly developing themselves; wealth and all the outward means of enjoyment are fast multiplying around us. It requires no prophet's ken to discern in this very circumstance a condition of peculiar peril, and the reflecting mind must feel some painful anxiety as to the result. May God preserve us from abuse of his gifts, from guilt, and irreligion. Our fathers were tried in the furnace of adversity; a severer trial awaits us,—the temptations of unlimited prosperity. Heaven grant that we may pass the ordeal unhurt, that we and our country perish not, and with it the hope of humanity throughout the earth.

Wealth, we have said, is power. How this power is to be exerted, in other words, in what manner precisely wealth is to be appropriated, in order to accomplish the beneficent purpose of heaven in conferring it, is a question for the individual to determine, as he alone is responsible.

There is much false and delusive benevolence in the world. The poor are in various ways dependent on the rich; not on their donations simply, but dependent for employment and shelter, and various accommodations needful for their comfort. That is not the sole charity which steps in to rescue them from a lingering death by famine. What is thus appropriated *may*

be acquired by acts, not indeed criminal in the eye of the law, but which are really hard and oppressive, and which a sound and healthful Christian morality condemns. The fruit of such acts, or a portion of them, at least, may be given in ostentatious charity, and the deed may be trumpeted to the four winds, as proof of extraordinary benevolence. But true benevolence is consistent and uniform. It does not extort in one way, to give in another, with one hand casting gifts into the treasury, while the other is extended to wring from an unfortunate fellow being the price of his last morsel, or take, it may be, the widow's only mite, which was all her living. This is a very spurious sort of benevolence.

In regard to the appropriation of wealth to objects of beneficence, it is sufficient simply to remark, that the great moral ends of existence, intelligent, spiritual existence, are not to be lost sight of. That is the noblest beneficence, which takes into view not solely man's physical condition, but the faculties and wants of his higher nature, and provides for their gratification and relief; which regards him not merely as an animal of the more perfect sort, but as containing in himself the germ of a celestial life, an immortal element, a sentiment of duty, a sensibility to the beauty and worth of truth, and particularly moral and religious truth in all its manifestations, the capacity especially of goodness, of undying growth and improvement. Whoever does not so view him, sees him but superficially, sees but the shell, the outer integument, the visible representative of the man; he discerns not the mysteries of his inner being, the diviner part, and consequently recognises only half his wants. The highest benevolence is that, which labors to accomplish the greatest good for man, viewed in his whole nature, his intellectual, moral, and religious, as well as in his physical nature and capacities; in his relation to eternity as well as in his relation to time; his relation to his fellow-beings, his God, and the invisible world of spirits. There is no more legitimate use and application of wealth, or more correspondent to the spirit of the Gospel, than the appropriation of a liberal portion of it to the accomplishment of the objects of this benevolence. As an instrument capable of being wielded with effect, as involving eminent power and ability to do good, it should be brought to bear on the great practical interests of humanity; the interests of truth, of holiness, and a sound morality, on whatever is con-

nected with the welfare and happiness of man in the mortal and immortal part of his nature.

“Go and do good,” is the great precept addressed to all of us. Engage in benevolent exertion ; engage in it as matter of self-discipline, as well as for other and more obvious reasons. Engage in benevolent exertion ; strive to relieve suffering and promote enjoyment. You are thus not only performing a duty ; you are strengthening a disposition. You are not only lighting up a smile on the faded cheek of suffering, but you are confirming habits, and invigorating principles in yourselves. You are doing something for the improvement of your own characters. This circumstance, we apprehend, is one not sufficiently attended to ; it is too often overlooked. True, this should not be our principal motive in performing acts of benevolence. We should perform them, whether benefit accrued to ourselves or not, otherwise they would not be acts of benevolence. But it is one of the innumerable evidences of the beautiful arrangements of Providence, worthy of notice, that while we are relieving the distresses of a fellow-being, and as often as we relieve them, we are using the most efficacious means of self-improvement. While we most forget ourselves, we most promote our virtue and happiness.

We are placed amid suffering and imperfection as in a school of benevolence, and the relief of suffering not only supplies a new tie, connecting us with the individual who suffers, but quickens generally our human sympathy, strengthens the chain which unites us, as by a feeling of universal brotherhood, with the whole great family of man. Were we asked to point out the process by which the benevolent character may be acquired ; were we to address those who are conscious that their affections are too cold, their sympathy too feeble, who are wrapped up, it may be, in the hard panoply of selfishness, devoted to selfish aims and selfish enjoyments, who yet acknowledge the voice of duty, and authority of conscience, who in their souls love not darkness, nor would voluntarily cherish one hurtful delusion,—if such there be,—we would say to them, go, perform some work of benevolence ; go witness and alleviate the misery you have so much power to mitigate or remove ;—your slumbering affections will soon be awakened, and your frozen hearts warmed ; a new field of labor will reveal itself to your eye, you will see new purposes in life, and discover objects of excitement more salutary than the pursuit of mere

wealth affords ; the mind will be subjected to a wholesome influence ; and the whole character will gradually assume a softened, a more affectionate, and more elevated tone. So true is it that we never do a good deed to others, without, by a sort of reflex influence of such act, essentially benefiting ourselves. We relieve a pang of the body, and we acquire a treasure of the soul, of inestimable worth.

The times call for effort, benevolent effort ; general and simultaneous, but judicious and well-directed effort. With ultra measures, extravagancies, and fanaticism, of any sort, we have no sympathy. We would have those who contend, contend lawfully, wisely, and well, remembering that most questions are mixed, and looking rather at practical results than theoretic abstractions. But we would have all strive in the right way ; all should lend a hand at the work of improvement. The field is already white unto harvest, only laborers are needed. And we should all be laborers, laborers in the field of the world, the great field of human society, that so fruit may abound to the Lord of the harvest.

A. L.

ART. VI.—1. *Song of the Bell*. Translated for the Boston Academy of Music. By S. A. ELIOT. Boston : 1837.

2. *Song of the Bell*. From SCHILLER. American Monthly Magazine for January, 1837.

THE *Song of the Bell* has had great fortune in the world. It has been cast into music by Romberg, and exhibited scenically in the speaking outlines of Retzsch. It is a perpetual requiem to its departed author in the ears of his revering countrymen. It sounds in many of the languages of the continent of Modern Europe, and a Liege professor has within no long time made it discourse with a Greek and a Roman tongue. In Great Britain it has been several times taken in hand. Among others, Lord Francis Leveson Gower has attempted by an English version to extend its reputation, without, however, adding anything to his own. And here, in these ends of the earth, appear at the same moment two metrical versions, executed with distinguished ability by townsmen of our own,

without any concert, or knowledge of each other's design. Arcadians both. One translating it in order that it might be sung, and the other singing it till he could not forbear to translate.

It is pleasant to see poetry thus united with its kindred arts of music and pictorial design. It is pleasant to see how a man may thus live on vocally and to the eye, in the creations of his genius ; presenting, in a single piece, a combination of all that is beautiful ; reaching the sympathies of the whole world through the avenues that lead most directly to its heart ; and attended and helped by the various talents of harmonizing minds, that dwell apart by the breadth of nations and seas, but yet swell in like the orchestral accompaniments of a charming melody.

The extraordinary success of this composition of Schiller is owing, we think, to its affecting pictures of human life. It appeals to feelings that are universal. It describes with distinctness and fervor the stages of our being, and the vicissitudes of mortal things. Its scenes glow. Its figures are alive. The whole is filled with a strong dramatic interest.

We are tempted to lay before our readers an account of the plan of the poem. They are, doubtless, too familiar with it to receive any new information. But the review shall be made in so few words, that we may allow ourselves the gratification of retracing the perfect symmetry of this celebrated production, without owing them any apology for so doing, either as wasting their time, or sparing our own invention. It seems to us to be composed of three trains of representation, each always clear, yet skilfully intertwined with the other two. These are, — the casting of the bell, the moral reflections that naturally arise from that manual process, and the historical associations connected with the finished instrument, when swinging in its church tower. A careful perusal, — such as every ingenious work of art requires, — will show that such is the method of construction. We shall exhibit it best, not by taking the parts separately, but by considering each in its place in the poet's own beautiful order.

The piece opens with the suddenness and clear vision of a stage scene. The master-founder and his men are surrounding the mould, into which the melted metal is to be poured, and preparing the furnace for fusion. He exhorts them to go earnestly to work, and to distinguish themselves from vulgar laborers, by mixing their handicraft with thoughtfulness and obser-

vation. The fires are then kindled ; the copper and tin having been suitably proportioned, and the purifying salts not forgotten. At the same time, the object of their toil in the finished bell is suitably described.

While the melting proceeds, the first historiette is introduced. The bell is supposed to ring merrily for the birth of a child. He reposes in his first sleep. Anon the nurseling becomes a grown boy, and the boy an impetuous young man ; for the years fly "pfeilgeschwind," arrow-swift. He returns to his home after long wanderings, and becomes enamored of a beautiful maiden. "Love's young dream" is now so exquisitely pictured, that our younger translator cannot quit it till he has given us twenty-five lines for Schiller's sixteen, confining himself faithfully, however, to the sentiments of the original.

The mixture is now proved by inserting a small rod, which becomes instantly encrusted with the shining metal, and it is pronounced time for the casting. As the different ingredients, strong and soft, combine in the seething cauldron ; so, it is moralized, should the hearts of a youthful pair be united in concord ;

"For passion's brief, repentance long."

Again is heard the sound of the clear bells ringing for the marriage festival. In a few exquisite lines are now depicted the wedding, the transition from the magic of romance to the soberness of domestic realities,—the industry of the kind, faithful mother, surrounded with her children,—and the successful labors of the father, who sees his house enlarged, and his barns filled, and his substance increased on every side. He is elated by his prosperity, and the warning voice of the song alludes to the uncertainty of all human fortunes.

The casting is next finely described. The red-hot fluid is let loose, after the divine blessing has been invoked, and pours its fiery torrent into the mould that had been strongly imbedded in the ground for its reception. The uses of fire as a servant, and its terrors when it gains the mastery, are now brought into view. There is a night storm. The lightning strikes. The horrors of a great conflagration are set before our eyes, with the succeeding desolation, when

"Through bare walls the clouds look down."

The father of the family, stripped of all the possessions he

had so lately exulted in, gives one look to the ruins, and then seizes cheerily his pilgrim staff, for he has counted all the heads of his dear ones, and there is none missing.

The mould is now successfully filled ; but what if it should have received amiss ? what if it should burst ? They have committed their work to the dark bosom of the earth, in the hope of its being raised to a nobler shape and a lasting existence, as the husbandman drops into the ground the seed of the harvest. This the poet turns into a natural and very striking type of the resurrection of the dead. The type was timely ; for the funeral bell tolls. It is for the affectionate mother, who was so lately the guide and the delight of her whole house.

The bell is left to cool, and the workmen meanwhile have a respite from their toil, though not the master from his anxious oversight. This suggests the coming on of evening, and the chiming of vespers. A charming pastoral scene is presented in the return of the peasantry with their cattle and sheep and loaded teams, and the dancing of the young reapers upon the darkening plain. The streets grow deserted ; the town-gate is shut ; the fireside becomes social. The deep night at last settles down, giving no uneasiness to the innocent, who are protected by the constant vigilance of the laws. An encomium of order and peace, and a prayer that they may never be broken, conclude this part of the poem.

The bell is next to be released from its prison. The hammers are busy, and the frame flies to pieces. But even in breaking up the model there is need of a wise caution, lest the burning brass should disengage itself with violence, and scatter destruction. This calls to mind the thought of popular tumults, when uproar prevails, and the clang of the alarm-bell startles the ear. The German bard, writing in 1799, with the atrocities of the French Revolution just behind him, goes on to describe graphically that bloody period, — with more intenseness than either of his American representatives. The terrific cry of "Liberty and Equality" sounds rather faint in the "Freedom and Equal Rights" of the two versions before us ; though we are not sure that it was possible to do better with it. But in one instance, certainly, Schiller's expression is too strong for either of our translators fully to come up with ; — perhaps his thought is too far "behind the age" to be repeated with approbation. He says, when nations free *themselves*

there can be no prosperous effect. Mr. Eliot translates more happily than literally,

“And when a mob e'en wrong assails,
The public welfare is no more.”

A similar case appears to us to occur a little further on. The Würtemberg poet, who was probably not much of a “diffusion of knowledge” man, exclaims, Woe to those, who lend the heaven-torch of light to the forever blind! — complimenting the populace, it is likely, by that last appellation. We have a very good thought, though not that one, in the following;

“Woe, woe to those who strive to light
The torch of truth by passion's fire!”

But this is digressing from our point, and anticipating what would be more in place presently.

The bell gleams forth from its casing, in full beauty. There is no spot or roughness in it. The very blazonry of the arms is distinctly defined. The goodness of God is acknowledged in it, and the name Concordia is solemnly bestowed on the work so favorably accomplished. It is then consecrated, in a very splendid passage, to the various offices which it is to fulfil, as it swings aloft, a neighbor to the thunder and to the stars, to be a voice from on high, praising the Creator, solemnizing the events of time, and counting its hours, and warning men, as its tones diminish on the ear, that so everything earthly must die away. A spirited call is made on the workmen, to lift it to its appointed height; a benediction is pronounced upon the people to whom it speaks; and its first peal is bidden to be **PEACE**.

Such is a plain account of the “Song of the Bell,” the most popular of all Schiller's minor pieces, and which, it is said, every well-taught German knows by heart as a part of his education. For this last assertion, however, we will not vouch, as it would have to be responsible for several hundreds of lines, and we can cite no better authority than the Cabinet Cyclopædia.

Both the translations now before us do honor to their authors; — one the President of the Boston Academy of Music, and filling the less harmonious office of mayor of the city; the other a young clergyman, Mr. Dwight. If we might venture to compare them, we should say that the first was the

more staid and cautious, the second the more fervid and poetical. The first is like the production of a highly cultivated mind, that has exercised its taste more than its invention ; while the second is like the rapid effort of one who is something of a bard himself, — “ *anche pittore.*” The first seems afraid of transgressing ; the second, without being at all less close to the original, indulges in a strong and spirited diction. In several instances, the imagery, that the first did not care to preserve, is reflected from the pages of the second with a bold fidelity. It should be borne in mind, however, that one, who has to study musical as well as poetical effect in his composition, lies under many restrictions. He must, for the most part, be flowing and tranquil, avoiding all words that are long, and admitting few that are rough. He must have an eye to the minstrel as well as to the author. All this Mr. Eliot has done, nowise daunted by difficulties, and even voluntarily encountering some that he might fairly have avoided.

What we have taken the liberty to say of the characteristic difference between the two versions, may be easily illustrated, by setting one or two corresponding passages of each side by side. Mr. Eliot translates, in one place ;

“ Alas ! that all life's brightest hours
Are ended with its earliest May !
That from those sacred nuptial bowers
The dear deceit should pass away.”

Mr. Dwight's lines run more literally thus ;

“ Ah ! life's fairest holiday
Closes when life's May is flown ;
The girdle loosed, the veil away,
All the sweet delusion 's gone.”

Another example may be found in the passage, that alludes to the enormities committed by the *poissardes* of Paris in the early days of the revolution. Mr. Eliot renders it,

“ E'en woman, to a fury turning,
But mocks at every dreadful deed,
Against the hated madly burning,
With horrid joy she sees them bleed.”

In the rival version, — if we may call rivals them that are only emulous without knowing each other, in performing the same good work, — we read ;

“ Women, like fierce hyenas, go
With bloody hands and hellish jests ;
They spring, like tigers, on the foe,
And pluck the heart from mangled breasts.”

All this is good on both sides ; but the peculiar manner of each is strikingly observable, — one calm, studious, restrained, — the other giving free scope to all the impulses of the scene described. Indeed, if we could object anything to the animated translation of Mr. Dwight, it would be the marks of haste that are here and there apparent. He could make it, with a little revision, much more perfect. He has succeeded admirably in transfusing the true power of the piece ; and has failed but in a single place, we think, of exhibiting its meaning clearly and justly. This is in a passage towards the close, where the union of hands for labor is supposed to be a political union in the cause of liberty. Here he has been overtaken with an inadvertence, and nodded once, as Homer is said to have done before him. He has produced a gem, that is well worth polishing with new care. We have nothing further to suggest, in paying him our thanks, but to confess that it is one of our weaknesses to be punctilious about the accuracy of rhymes, and that his, in several cases, stand in need of a little smoothing of their locks.

The translation, with which the President of the Academy has favored us, is so prominent before the public, and from its great merit can bear so well a little respectful fault-finding, that we feel tempted to point out a few instances, in which we do not think he has represented distinctly the sense of the author. We noted one or two passages, that seemed to us to be of this sort, and upon which we proposed to exhibit more acuteness than we possess. But on revising them, our comments appeared rather hypercritical ; so that we can easily dispense our readers from being informed what these were. We will venture, however, upon a few others.

In one case the German itself is equivocal, or at best none of the most lucid. When the thriving young husband looks abroad over his increasing possessions, he sees among the rest,

“ The future columns in his trees ; ”

that is, as we understand Mr. Eliot, trees good for making columns, — well-timbered land, such as we, in New-England, have lately heard too much of. Mr. Dwight, on the other

hand, supposes the poet to mean, trees ranged in rows, like a colonnade. To this latter exposition we were ready to give our assent ; when lo ! Mr. Sotheby, the celebrated translator of Wieland's Oberon, steps in, and inclines us to think that, after all, the meaning is, — columns like trees ; — or, as we have it in his version,

“ The branching columns that support
The loaded barns rang'd round the Court.”

An ingenious friend has just suggested still another interpretation of this doubtful version, of five little words,

“ Siehet der Pfosten ragende Bäume.”

We are sure, that after this, it is not for us to pronounce any absolute decision upon the matter.

When the fatal thunder-storm rises, come these lines ;

“ Dark, blood-red
Are all the skies,
But no dawning light is spread.”

The last line does not appear to us to express vividly enough, that the glare is unnatural, and not that of daylight. The words run literally thus ;

Red as blood
Is the sky ;
That is not the daylight's glow !

When the bell is fairly in the ground, and the question arises, whether it will be brought safely out, we meet the words,

“ To skill and care alone's permitted
A perfect work with toil to build.”

But the language of the poet is here interrogative ; “ Will it come beautifully to the light, rewarding our pains and skill ? ” agreeing with what follows ;

“ Is the casting right ?
Is the mould yet tight ? ”

The emblem of the resurrection is represented faintly, almost doubtfully, in the following lines ;

“ And yet more precious seed we sow
With sorrow in *the world's wide field* ;

And hope, though in the grave laid low,
A flower of heavenly hue 't will yield."

We say almost doubtfully, because they do not necessarily imply anything more than the reviving of earthly hopes and possessions, that had perished under the calamities of the world. Mr. Dwight has expressed the true thought with great beauty.

"But costlier seed we bury weeping,
While in meek faith to heaven we pray,
That from the coffin's loathsome keeping,
It may spring forth to brighter day."

We could wish to hear the vesper bell a little clearer, stealing through the shades of evening, than it is brought to our ears in Mr. Eliot's verse. Something like the following might represent the original with more life ;

At the wink of star,
Toil and care afar,
Workmen list the vesper chime ;
Masters know no resting time.

We will end this criticism of ours, not a presumptuous one, we hope, by referring to a passage which is at least very obliquely rendered ;

"Darkness hovers
O'er the earth ;
Safety still each sleeper covers
As with light,
That the deeds of crime discovers ;
For wakes the law's protecting might."

We see clearly enough the temptation that here led the translator to deviate. It was the formidable appearance of a double rhyme thrice repeated. Who would not have gone so little out of his way, to get round such an obstacle ? We apprehend the true idea to be, that the black night, which allows not the guilty to repose, has no terrors for the safely sleeping citizen, since the eye of the law is always watchful.

A good work has been wrought for the public, in thus presenting them with the "*Song of the Bell*," in such a form that it can be sung to Romberg's celebrated music. This is the first attempt of the kind, we believe, in the English tongue, and we congratulate the translator on having surmounted so

many impediments, and executed his task with such great success. The music has been censured by some of the German critics as wanting in power of expression, and betraying the style of one who produced his chief enchantments by his purely instrumental compositions. But it is always agreeable, and in some of its parts extremely beautiful and affecting. We think it will grow in the favor, with which it has so prosperously started. We are sure that it cannot be heard well performed, without interesting the heart as well as delighting the ear.

We alluded, in the beginning of this article, to a translation by Lord Leveson Gower. It is a singularly loose and inaccurate performance, though with, at rare intervals, strong and well-turned lines. We should surprise and amuse our readers, if we set before them all his strange mistakes. He makes his bell toll "like flattery's voice," and "*murmur o'er the land.*" His English is so bewildered, that he can speak of a house "rifted on the rock;" and his German is so imperfect, though he has done into English the "*Faust*," that he can translate "*speicher*," corn-barn, "*spice*," in two several instances. The fruit of the tropics would be a strange phenomenon in the fields of "*Deutschland.*" He was, perhaps, misled by the similarity of sound; but he might as well have called the "*ragende bäume*" of Schiller's same flourishing proprietor "*raging trees.*" These, however, are only offences against language. Who will believe that he has been wholly unaware of the admirable type of the resurrection, suggested by the raising of the bright bell from its broken mould and tomb in the earth? He seems to think that the only comparison is between the founder and the farmer, the fabric of bell-metal being nobler and more enduring than the fruits of harvest. After such a specimen of incapacity, one is almost ashamed to go back and tell how, in the description of the fire, he has been able to entertain us with such a delectable quartette as the following;

"Like a furnace glows the air,
Windows shiver, *kennels glare*;
Roaming like the salamander,
Children *whimper*, mothers *wander.*"

We are certain that our readers have had already enough of his lordship, and will close this article with a single word upon Mr. Sotheby's translation, to which we have incidentally al-

luded. It appears in "A Collection of Poems, chiefly manuscript, and from living authors; edited for the benefit of a friend, by Joanna Baillie." It is hardly worthy of its author's fame. It is stiff without being literal. It is often slovenly in the construction of the verse, and abounds with words of poetical common-place. It has neither the liquid flow and musical "availability" of Mr. Eliot, nor the fervid ease of Mr. Dwight,—of whom we now take leave with our best thanks.

N. L. F.

ART. VII. — *Physical Theory of Another Life.* By the AUTHOR OF NATURAL HISTORY OF ENTHUSIASM. Second Edition. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1836. 12mo. pp. 278.

WE have read this book with surprise and disappointment. It is to a great degree free both from the faults and the excellencies, which have characterized the other works of its gifted author. It is written in a less involved, less rhapsodical, and more logical style than they; but it wants their fervor and unction, their power of thought, their cogency of persuasion. It is a labored treatise, and one in the preparation of which the writer seems to have felt but little of his wonted enthusiasm, nay, to have hardly cherished that faith in his own speculations, without which it is vain for him to hope for the acquiescent suffrages of his readers. His real views and sentiments all tend towards spiritualism; but in the book under review he has taken up the gauntlet against it, and in favor of the popular notions of a corporeal future state, and a material resurrection. His text is the words of St. Paul, "There is a spiritual body;" and it is manifest that on the literal interpretation of this and a few similar passages of Scripture, he has built a "physical theory," at which his philosophy relucts.

Our author assumes, almost without the show of argument, that body is the necessary means of bringing spirit into connexion with space and time, of giving birth to the imaginative sentiments and emotions, and of circumscribing the individuality of

each separate spiritual existence. It seems to have escaped his reflection, that the Infinite Spirit, without bodily organization, retains his connexion with space and time, and has a strictly individual being; and that these are not among the attributes which he is incapable of imparting. These assumptions once made, Mr. Taylor fairly infers from them that the future life, revealed in the Scriptures, will be a corporeal state. He then proceeds to depict the "probable prerogatives" which the future *spiritual* body will enjoy over the bodies, which we now possess; and in stating these, he so completely etherealizes the idea of body, as to leave it doubtful what he means by the term. Indeed he divests it one by one of every material attribute, all the while asserting at every step its distinctness from spirit, until, at the end of the ninth and last "probable prerogative," he informs us that "the spiritual body shall be so purely the instrument of the master power, that it will barely, if at all, enter into the consciousness as a separate existence;" and that "perhaps beings who have never been subjected to the conditions of animal life may, though actually corporeal, need to be informed of their corporeity; or they may know it, rather by reflection and inference, than by immediate consciousness!" So then, this little book teaches us more of our future condition, than we shall be likely to learn when we enter upon the life to come. We, who have read it, shall be aware of our "corporeity"; as for others, their confession must be, "Whether in the body, or out of the body, we cannot tell; God knoweth." Our author grounds on these speculations the doctrine of a local hell, where material fire is let loose upon the incorruptible bodies of the reprobate, and seems impressed with the conviction that the idea of future punishment is, on any other theory, divested of all its horrors. He, however, assigns no location to the place of torment, and otherwise occupies those subterranean regions, where it is usually located.

Most of the latter part of the volume is occupied by three "conjectures concerning the material universe, viewed as the theatre of an intellectual system." The first conjecture is grounded on a literal interpretation of St. Paul's classification of the Messiah's subjects into those "in heaven, in earth, and under the earth."* According to this, "man is destined to pass through three stages of life; the first upon the surface of the

* Phil. ii. 10. Ἐπουρανίων καὶ ἐπιγείων καὶ καταχθονίων.

earth, and subject to the conditions of animal organization ; the second *under the earth*, and in a transition form, of attenuated and inactive corporeity ; and the third, and ultimate, in a region of power, incorruptibility, and full activity." Of this last and most perfect state the suns of the several systems are named as the probable theatres. With regard to the second, we are told, as the result "of a calculation of forces, that our own planet, and others, are not solid globes, but hollow spheres, or spherical shells, including a perhaps irregular, but vast cavity, and this cavity occupied by some elastic fluid or gas." We cannot say but that since our college days modern science may have "changed all this ;" but certain are we that the solidity of our own planet, nay, its increasing density towards the centre, was then considered as mathematically demonstrable.

The "second conjecture is, — That within the field occupied by the visible and ponderable universe, and on all sides of us, there is existing and moving another element, fraught with another species of life, corporeal indeed, and various in its orders, but not open to the cognizance of those who are confined to the conditions of animal organization, — not to be seen, nor to be heard, nor to be felt by man." Under this head, the reality of spectral apparitions is admitted, and accounted for by the yearning of those, who have emerged into this attenuated life, to resume their former grosser mode of being, and to reënter their wonted theatre of activity.

The third conjecture relates to the destruction by fire of the present universe, to give place for a new and more perfect creation.

We have thus given a fair, though a condensed analysis of this eccentric "*physical* theory of another life ;" and will request the attention of our readers for the residue of this article to the development and defence of that *spiritual* theory, which seems to us most in accordance with the voice of reason and of revelation.

In the first place, the Savior and his apostles, in numerous passages of the New Testament, expressly teach that man after death enters immediately upon a conscious state of retribution. It may suffice to quote the following texts. "To-day shalt thou be with me in Paradise." "Whosoever liveth and believeth in me, shall never die." "The God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, — he is not a God of the dead, but of the living, for [they] all live unto

God." "Having a desire to depart, and to be with Christ." "We are confident, and willing rather to be absent from the body, and to be present with the Lord." We cannot but regard our Savior's resurrection as illustrating and confirming the view of death, which we should derive from the above cited passages. He returned to earth, not to teach us that we shall rise, but to show us that we shall never die,—to exhibit, not the body as capable of reanimation, but the soul as incapable of dissolution. He did not return to life; but appeared again to show that he was still alive, that he had not died, that the soul could live on without the body. Death, then, is in no sense a termination, but simply a most momentous epoch in man's existence,—a starting point upon a new portion of his career. To die is to live on. The moment of bodily dissolution is the moment of birth into another state of being.

But if the soul suspends not its existence when the body dies, our next inquiry is with regard to the mode of being on which it then enters. Mr. Taylor's idea of an attenuated and etherealized body, which shall supply to the emancipated soul the place of the present animal organization, till the general resurrection, if no longer, has always been, and is still prevalent among all classes of Christians. It has its origin, not in any process of metaphysical or critical reasoning, but mainly in the difficulty to many minds of conceiving of a purely spiritual existence. We are not ourselves conscious of this difficulty; but, on the other hand, find it much more easy to conceive of spirit than of matter; and, when we attempt to form an idea of matter, we are perplexed, embarrassed, and uniformly compelled to define it as a modification of spirit. But for the satisfaction of those, to whom the idea of a strictly spiritual state is difficult of attainment, we will suggest answers to the most obvious queries on this subject, and particularly to those which are, as we think, unphilosophically answered in the "Physical Theory."

And first, we are asked, how without a bodily organization, can the soul retain its connexion with space? How can disembodied spirits witness the works of creation and mark the course of Providence? How, for example, can sights reach the soul without the eye, or sounds without the ear? Or how can locomotion take place without material organs, wherewith to overcome material resistance? We reply, that, in point of fact, the ideas of things seen, heard, and felt, do reach the

soul, without any corresponding objects in the outward universe. This is the case in optical illusions, the subject of which receives distinctly into his mind the images of things devoid of real existence. In insanity too, sights, which the eye sees not, sounds, which the ear hears not, are imagined with perfect clearness. In dreams, also, we seem to see, and hear, and feel as distinctly as when the senses are all awake, and conversant with their appropriate objects. Now, if the soul can receive these several classes of impressions without using the organs of sense, why may it not without possessing them? Or, if it be capable of seeing, hearing, and feeling things that are not, how can it be incapable of perceiving things that are? Moreover, it is not the eye, that sees, or the ear, that hears. Dissect these organs entire from the human frame, and they are powerless. Leave them unimpaired, and darken the soul by insanity; they carry it false reports. It is the soul, that looks out through the eyes, that listens through the ears. And does not its power of seeing and hearing, by means of the eyes and ears, imply and include the capacity of seeing and hearing without them? Yes. Sight and hearing, and locomotion also for similar reasons, are functions inherent in the soul; and the bodily organization is less the means of their exercise, than a temporary clog and limit to their extent and power. While in the body, we are "spirits in prison," and the eye is the prison window, through which the soul enjoys a little portion of its native range of vision, the ear an aperture in the prison wall, through which we catch a few of the sounds, which, if set at large, we might take in through a vast extent of space, while the feet, so far from being the means of motion, but measure the length and direction of the spirit's chain. When the dungeon walls decay, when we quit our house of bondage, our disembodied souls will doubtless acquire at once a keenness of vision, of which we cannot now conceive, hear the full diapason of nature's harmony, and move unchecked and free, wherever love and duty call us.

It is again asked, how can society be cemented, and familiar converse exist among bodiless spirits? This question may best be answered by referring to the communion, that actually takes place between God and man in the exercises of prayer and devotion. In these we address with confidence an unseen Spirit; nor does the supplication return to us void. The response is shed into our souls, inaudibly, yet surely. We

realize God's presence, receive of his fulness, are conscious of an inward light, peace, and joy, which we can trace to no earthly fountain. In this communion there is on one side no outward sign of intercourse; and such signs are often wanting on the other side also, "the spirit making intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered." Now, this silent prayer, and its unheard but recognised answer, may furnish us a specimen of the universal language of spirits, and indicate to us the mode in which, in the life to come, we may hold converse not only with the Father-Spirit, but with all our fellow-spirits. In our apprehension, the body, so far from being the essential medium of social intercourse, is the means of circumscribing our familiar intercourse to that portion of the Creator's family, that like ourselves tenant houses of clay. We are doubtless surrounded by a cloud of witnesses. Heaven is no remote or inaccessible region; but embraces the air we breathe, the ground we tread. Jesus is with us; but our eyes are holden that we cannot see him. The spirits of the unfallen and the ransomed no doubt compass our path and our lying down. The minstrelsy of the heavenly host, once heard by the Jewish shepherds, floats over all our hill-tops, and all our valleys;

"And angels with their sparkling lyres,
Make music in the air."

The holy dead, who were translated from our homes, are with us; our every prayer is upborne by their pure intercessions; our every song of praise echoed from their golden harps. But though this spiritual world thus encompass and envelope us, the dungeon walls of sense exclude our converse with it, while disembodiment is all that we need to enable us to see as we are seen, and know as we are known.

We perceive, then, that in a purely spiritual life, the soul can enjoy not only the exercise, but the freer and fuller exercise of the functions, which it now discharges through the organs of sense. We may at least, then, suppose the intermediate state from death to the general resurrection to be a strictly spiritual state. But will there be a resurrection? Are these bodies to be raised from the grave, and to be reunited to the spirits, that now tenant them? We answer this question in the negative, first, because the soul has no need of the body, and will have shown its independence of it, by having lived without it from the moment of death to the supposed moment

of resurrection. Then again, our bodies are perfectly adapted to the vicissitudes, the laws, and the discipline of this world ; and are, therefore, unfitted for any other state. We infer that the mind will live elsewhere from its spurning the bounds of earth, from its earnest aspirations after a larger sphere, and a higher good. Why should we not in like manner infer, from the clod-like acquiescence of the body in its present state, from the full supply which it here finds for all its cravings, that this is its final and its only home ? Moreover, the resurrection of the body, of the same identical body, is physically impossible. It can be satisfactorily proved that the cannibal often dies with the flesh of his fellow-man incorporated into his own. Every particle in our bodies has most probably formed a portion of hundreds of bodies before us, and after our decease will be owned by thousands more. In the resurrection, whose shall these particles be ? It is indeed within the scope of omnipotence to raise from the dust a *fac simile* of the body in which every man died ; but this would be a new creation, not a resurrection.

The Scriptures concur with the plain dictates of common sense, in teaching us that the body will not rise. "Flesh and blood," says St. Paul, "cannot inherit the kingdom of God ; neither doth corruption inherit incorruption." "We shall all be changed." "That which thou sowest, thou sowest not the body which shall be." "As we have borne the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly." The same apostle indeed speaks of a "*spiritual body* ;" but it is very certain that he cannot designate by this title our present or any similar bodies, and he most probably used the word body as synonymous with *existence*, otherwise the phrase in question would seem to be a contradiction in terms.

But how, we are again asked, how are we to explain the passages of Scripture, which are commonly understood as referring to a general resurrection and day of judgment ? These passages, we reply, are figurative representations, founded on the analogy of human tribunals, where the judge, instead of remaining perpetually in session, appoints certain days of general assizes, when the criminals, committed to prison at various intervals, are arraigned together before him. Or if it be insisted that these passages must needs denote some definite and momentous epoch, we would then refer them to the consummation of the present state of the material universe, — a period

when nature will be shaken with the most tremendous convulsions, when the recesses of the earth and the caverns of ocean will cast forth their long buried treasures, and, among other things, will "give up the dead that are in them," yet not give them up alive. Then, too, we may suppose that "the books will be opened," that the judgment passed upon every human spirit at the moment of death will be exhibited to every other, that there will be a rehearsal, before the congregated universe of mind, of the grand moral results of the drama of existence just closing.

If the future life of the blessed be a purely spiritual state, that of the reprobate must be so too. We are compelled, therefore, to give up the idea of a material hell; and to regard the language of Scripture, which depicts the corporeal torment of the subjects of the second death, as figurative. But there seems to be, on the part of many excellent Christians, a strong clinging to the theory of a literal lake of fire and brimstone, in the fear that by denying it they shall weaken the sanctions of the divine law, and hold forth the dread of but a slight penalty to the workers of iniquity. In our apprehension, however, we only render the penalty of sin the more dreadful by supposing it entirely spiritual in its nature. For what are flames to the righteous soul? Ask the three holy children, whom Nebuchadnezzar's wrath cast into the furnace, and with whom a fourth like unto the Son of man walked in the midst of the fire. Ask the martyr of old, literally burning in a lake of fire and brimstone, his countenance serene and happy, his eye beaming with rapture, his parched lips raising a song of thanksgiving. The ungodly rich man in the parable was tormented in the fire; but the holy Lazarus would with willing feet have crossed the burning lake, were this possible, and breathed the fiery air, and stood as an angel of mercy at the sufferer's side; and he would have been happy in a physical hell. No physical torture can equal that of ungratified desires, inflamed passions, unholy affections, malice, hatred, envy, remorse, despair. And how often have men, to obtain a momentary relief from this inward hell, rushed out of life through the most appalling and painful of the gates of death! Nay, there remains on record the dying testimony of a profligate, who, it seems, thought of hell only as a scene of physical burning and suffering, who, after in vain essaying to describe the intensity of his remorse and despair, exclaimed, "Hell itself would be a relief from my anguish."

The future life, then, both of the righteous and the wicked, is to be a spiritual state. Why, then, are we trained for this state by a mode of existence so widely different from it? Why are we educated in the body, if there be nothing corporeal in the conditions of our permanent being? For this arrangement we can trace many wise and good reasons, and doubtless there are many more beyond our ken. We shall at present indicate but two of the most important, and perhaps the least frequently remembered, uses of our bodily organization and enthrallment.

One prime object of our temporary confinement in houses of clay doubtless is, that, when we emerge from them, we may cherish the more lofty and grateful sense of the privileges of our heavenly birth. Prerogatives, which we originally possess, we appreciate much less highly than those, of which we have known the want. Suppose that we had been born with only one of our five senses, and that the others had come to us one by one, each after an interval of years; with what rapturous gratitude the acquisition of each would have been hailed, those only could tell, to whom, blind or deaf from birth, Jesus opened the world of sights or sounds. Suppose that we had been born with bodily organization similar to that of the oyster, and had after many years emerged into the possession of our present powers and faculties, with the full remembrance of our former state, what emotions could we cherish other than a thankfulness, to which words could give no utterance, and which to feel would burst these heart-strings! Thus it may be that God has seen fit to withhold from us for a while our spiritual birth-right, and to educate us in this chrysalis state, that, when we leave our house of bondage, and put forth our latent powers, we may prize the more highly, enjoy the more keenly, and own the more gratefully the immunities and glories of heaven. Perhaps God may have educated his whole spiritual family in a similar way. Perhaps the angels, that rejoiced before him at the dawn of his present creation, may have been nurtured in bodies like ours in antecedent worlds and systems. Or if they have stood from the first in their present dignity and glory, though in knowledge, power, and purity, they may vastly surpass ransomed man, in earnest and humble gratitude they must yield him the precedence; and earth-born angels will be recognised in heaven by the intensity of their thankfulness, so that it shall be said of them throughout eternity by

all, who listen to their songs of praise, "These are they which came out of great tribulation,—these are they, which were redeemed unto God from among men."

Another purpose, doubtless, of our temporary confinement in the body, is the cultivation of sympathy, fellow-feeling, friendship, and love. Common wants and woes, mutual dependence and aid, constitute the strongest of social bonds. Were we born at once into the possession of all those high prerogatives, which we hope to assume in a better world, there would be no room for the development of that charity, which suffereth long, beareth all things, endureth all things, and never faileth. Had heaven been our birth-place, we should have found ourselves isolated, independent spirits; there would have been nothing to cast us upon the benevolence, or to drive us to the embrace of others; and thus, with a general love for all our fellow-spirits, we should have cherished a peculiar affection or friendship for none. It may be that the company of angels formed their intimacies when they were, as we are, "spirits in prison,"—that the squadrons, which move together in the service of their God, are made up of those, who were once bound soul to soul by common wants, infirmities, and sorrows. Or, if not, man will constitute a distinct order of the heavenly hierarchy, marked by the strength and permanence of the elective affinities formed in houses of clay.

A. P. P.

ART. VIII.—*History of Worcester, Massachusetts, from its Earliest Settlement to September, 1836; with various Notices, relating to the History of Worcester County.* By WILLIAM LINCOLN. Worcester: Moses D. Phillips & Co. 1837. 8vo. pp. 392.

It may be truly said of these local histories, that they "show the very age and body of the time, his form and pressure." In the general historian we have events and results; but here may be traced the causes that have combined to produce them,—the secret workings of those "vital ener-

gies " which have quickened and still pervade the whole. The former may be compared to one who presents us with the fair and stately proportions of some majestic and imposing edifice ; and the latter, to another who gives us a *section* of the same. The one " hath the greater comeliness and delight to the beholder," while the other serves, if the less grateful, not the less important, purpose of making us acquainted with the internal structure of the edifice. Of the two, the architect, who wished to erect a similar building, would probably prefer the latter. It is from sources like these, that the general historian, the poet, and the novelist must draw for materials with which to enrich the future literature of our country. They are furnishing the themes by which our hill-tops, our valleys, and riversides will be rendered classic ground. " There is hardly one of our ancient towns," says one of our writers, " that has not its local tradition or romantic legend, its tale of Indian massacre or revolutionary heroism." And we regard it as a matter of congratulation for our country, — for posterity, who, through the dim light of ages shall seek to trace the causes of this nation's greatness, — that so much talent has been thus seasonably enlisted in exploring the minutiae of her early history, continually gathering fresh interest as time throws its thickening shadows over the actors and events of the past.

The volume before us is a model of what we deem a local history should be ; scrupulously accurate, minute, presenting a faithful picture of the town from its first settlement to the present time, around which many events of the general history of the county are thrown. Every part is well executed ; a fact for which the name of the author is, with every antiquary of New England, alone a sufficient warrant.

The annals of Worcester date from the year 1664, when grants of land, previously made to Mr. Increase Nowell, to the church in Malden, and Ensign Thomas Noyes, who had served under Captain Hugh Mason, were located in the vicinity of *Quinsigamond*, or *Quonsigamoag*, the Indian name of the place. Various causes conspired, however, to hinder effectual measures for the settlement of the place until the year 1673, when a company of thirty persons were engaged to commence the plantation, and in the following spring, thirty house-lots were laid out, and they began to build and cultivate. One of the early cares of the committee having charge of the enterprize was to extinguish the title of the Indian occupants.

"A deed of eight miles square, for the consideration 'of twelve pounds in lawful money of New England, or the full value thereof in other specie to the content of the grantees, within three months after the date to be paid and satisfied,' was executed, with great formality, on the 13th of July, 1674, by Solomon, alias Woonaskochu, sagamore of Tataesit, and John, alias Hoorrawannonit, sagamore of Packachoag. The receipt of part of the purchase, viz., two coats and four yards of trucking-cloth, valued at twenty-six shillings, as earnest, in hand, was acknowledged." — pp. 9, 10.

The settlement was prosperously advancing, and the inhabitants, in the language of the record, "had built after the manner of a town," when the war with Philip of Mount Hope breaking out, they were compelled, in 1675, to abandon it and fall back upon the stronger settlements.

Worcester contained within its limits, at the commencement of its settlement, between two and three hundred Indians. These were of the Nipmuck tribe, and were ranked, the majority of them, with the Praying Indians. Their principal settlement was on a hill rising in the south part of the town, and extending into Ward, called by them Pakahoag, now known as Bogachoag. It is thus described, by Gookin, in his "Historical Collections of the Indians in New England," written in December, 1764. "This village lyeth about three miles south from the new road-way that leadeth from Boston to Connecticut; about eighteen miles, west southerly, from Marlborough; and from Boston, about forty-four miles. It consists of about twenty families, and hath about one hundred souls therein. This town is seated upon a fertile hill, and is denominated from a delicate spring of water that is there." Their chiefs were John, alias Horowanninit, and Solomon, alias Wooanakochu, and their minister, ordained by the "Apostle" Eliot, James Speen. During the period of the war some of the Christian Indians repaired to Marlborough; but most of them, urged by the persuasions or the threats of Philip, attached themselves to his cause. The next year sagamore John, alarmed at the dangerous aspect of affairs, prudently sought safety by submission. In the early part of July, he opened a negotiation for peace with the government of Boston, and soon came with a hundred and eight of his followers, and surrendered to the English.

"With the death of Philip, the animating spirit of the hostile

confederacy, August 12, 1676, the war ended. Its progress arrested the earliest efforts for settlement, and destroyed the little village beginning to rise in Quinsigamond; its termination left the soil almost without a relic of the aboriginal population. When the white settlers commenced building here, there were between two and three hundred of the natives. They possessed extensive planting fields, and had set apple-trees obtained from the English. The light of Christianity had dawned upon them, and some advance had been made in civilization. By the sword, by famine, by violent removal, and by flight, they were nearly exterminated. When the second plantation was attempted, only superannuated old men, women, and children, remained of the red people; those able to bear arms had been slain, or dispersed, seeking refuge in Canada among the French, or migrating far westward beyond the reach of the power they had too much provoked for their own safety. The whole nation perished, leaving no monuments of their existence on our lands, and no remains except little articles of ornament, rude utensils of culinary art, and rough weapons of stone, discovered in their former dominion." — pp. 27, 28.

Peace having been reëstablished, the committee used every exertion to induce the former settlers to return, as well as others to join them. In 1678, they directed the planters to return before 1680, and build together so as to defend themselves; but, to use their own words, "there was no going by any of them, or hope that they would do so; for divers of them being importuned to go, would not." The storm of war had passed over, but its visitation was still too fresh in the recollection of the settlers, to allow them hastily to trust themselves again in a situation so remote and exposed. A general survey, however, was made in May, 1683, and the work of settlement soon after recommenced. But the cloud, which, from the first, had hung over this infant town, again lowered.

"On the commencement of the eighteenth century, the peace of the country was again disturbed by renewed outrages of the savages, always capricious in friendship, treacherous in alliance, and unrelenting in enmity. Although Worcester suffered less in Queen Anne's war, which began in 1702, by loss of life than many towns, it shared in the alarm and participated in the miseries of the final struggles of the red men to reclaim their possessions, and avenge the wrongs inflicted by our ancestors.

"When the same danger which had once before pressed on the planters became extreme, and the Indians again kindled the slumbering flame of murderous hostility, the second attempt to

build a town here was abandoned. The inhabitants fled; the place of their residence was delivered up to decay; the traces of cultivation were effaced; and the silence of ruin was again over the forsaken farms and deserted homes." — p. 35.

Among those who attempted the second settlement of the town was Digory Serjent, who had built his house on "Sagatabscot Hill," southeastward of the present town. He was a native of Sudbury, and had been a carpenter by occupation before his removal. On the approach of hostilities, when the other planters had sought safety in flight, he with his children alone remained, the sole occupants of the town, resolving with fearless but desperate intrepidity to defend from the savage the fields his industry had redeemed from the waste. The history of his fate gives a graphic picture of those disastrous times.

"During the summer of 1702, his residence was unmolested. As winter approached, the committee, alarmed by his situation on the frontier of danger, sent messengers to advise his removal to a place of security. As their admonitions were disregarded, they at length despatched an armed force of twelve men, under Captain Howe, to compel compliance with the order. At the close of day the party arrived at a garrison near the mills. Here they halted for the night, which grew dark with storm and snow, and kindling their fires, laid down to rest, while one of the band watched the slumbers of his comrades. In the morning they went onward, and reached the house of Serjent on Sagatabscot, at the distance of nearly two miles from the post where they had halted. They found the door broken down, the owner stretched in blood on the floor, and the dwelling desolate. The prints of many moccasins leading westward, still visible through the snow, indicated that they had been anticipated by a short time only in the object of their mission. Having pursued the trail of the murderers a little way, they returned and buried Serjent at the foot of an oak, long since decayed. On retracing their course to the spot of their repose, they found the prints of feet going from the fort towards Wachuset. After the war was ended, the Indians, when they revisited the settlers, declared that six of them had entered the building for shelter from the tempest, when the near advance of the English was discovered, too late to permit escape from a force so considerable, and they secreted themselves in the cellar. The soldiers had spread their blankets and laid down over the trap-door, thus securing their foes, until the morning march gave opportunity for flight.

"It was soon found that the children of Serjent were living in Canada. On the release of the eldest, she related the particulars

of the fearful catastrophe they had witnessed. When the Indians, headed by sagamore John, as is said, surrounded the house, Serjent seized his gun to defend his life, and was fired on. As he retreated to the stairway, a ball took effect and he fell.* The savages rushed in, with their tomahawks completed the work of death, and tore off the scalp from his head, as the trophy of victory. They seized the mother and her children, John, Daniel, Thomas, Martha, and Mary, and having discovered the neighborhood of the white men, commenced a rapid retreat westward. The wife of Serjent, fainting with grief and fear, and in feeble circumstances, faltered, and impeded their progress. The apprehension of pursuit induced the Indian to forego the terrible pleasure of torturing his victim. As they ascended the hills of Tataasset, a chief stepped out from the file, and looking around among the leafless forests as if for game, excited no alarm in the exhausted and sinking captive, and awoke no cry of horror to betray their course. When she had passed by, one merciful blow from the strong arm of the sachem removed the obstruction of their flight. The children, they carried away, reached the northern frontier in safety, and were a long time in Canada. Daniel and Mary, preferring the wild freedom of their captors to the restraints of civilized life, adopted the habits and manners of the Indians. They never again resided with their relatives, although they once made them a visit, when Miss Williams, taken at Deerfield, was restored.

"In 1715, Thomas was at Boston. John had been liberated in 1721. Martha was probably redeemed earlier than her brothers. She married Daniel Shattuck, and returned to dwell on the spot so fatal to her family." * * * — pp 36, 37.

Brighter prospects having opened in 1713, the proprietors made a third and successful attempt to plant a town at Quinsigamond. The first permanent settler was Jonas Rice, one of the planters in the second enterprize, who returned October 21, 1713. From this day is dated the permanent settlement of Worcester. Rice, however, with his family, remained the solitary inhabitant of the spot, until the spring of 1715, when he was joined by his brother, Gershom Rice, and several other planters. The work of settlement now steadily progressed, and the town is estimated by the historian to have contained, in 1718, "about two hundred souls."

"There were in Worcester in 1718, if the evidence of the proprietary records is to be credited, fifty-eight dwelling-houses. Tradition says they were humble edifices, principally of logs, one story high, with ample stone chimneys. Some were furnished with windows of diamond glass, where the resources of the propri-

etor afforded means for procuring such luxury; the light was admitted, in many, through the dim transparency of oiled paper. It is hardly necessary to add, that all have long since sunk in decay, or been removed to give place to the more splendid habitations of modern times." — p. 45.

During Lovel's war and the French wars, the settlement suffered much by frequent alarms from the Indians, though no attack was actually made; and the demands for men and service were frequent and pressing. The number of men furnished by the town during the French wars, from the year 1748 to 1762, inclusive, exceeds 450. This number does not embrace those who enlisted into the regular army; nor, except in 1748 and 1757, the occasional service of the militia companies. Worcester furnished to the provincial service during this period, one colonel, one lieutenant-colonel, two majors, six captains, eight lieutenants, seven ensigns, twenty-seven serjeants, two surgeons, a chaplain, and an adjutant.

The act erecting the county of Worcester passed April 2, 1731, to take effect from the tenth of July following, and Worcester was made the shire town. The first Court of Probate was held in the meetinghouse, July 13, 1731; the Common Pleas and General Sessions of the Peace, the tenth of August; and the Supreme Court of Judicature, on the twenty-second of September, following.

During the period of the Revolution, to which, in our rapid survey of the town we are now brought, Worcester was the immediate scene of no important public event connected with the war; but its history, as exhibiting the feelings of the people at large, and disclosing the secret but powerful workings of that spirit which achieved our independence, is deeply interesting. Much of the spirit of those times may indeed be learned from a general survey of the country; but its secret workings in the minds of the people can be best traced in minute histories of the particular towns. We cease to wonder at what the united strength of the colonies achieved, when we contemplate the determined zeal which pervaded the breasts of the smaller communities and of individuals. A single paragraph from the instructions given by the town of Worcester to their representative in the General Court, in 1774, may serve to give the reader some idea of the spirit of those days. Say these instructions,

“ If all infractions of our rights, by acts of the British Parliament, be not redressed, and we restored to the full enjoyment of all our privileges, contained in the charter of this province, granted by their late majesties, King William and Queen Mary, *to a punctilio*, before the day of your meeting, then, and in that case, you are to consider the people of this province as absolved, on their part, from the obligation therein contained, and to all intents and purposes reduced to a state of nature; and you are to exert yourself in devising ways and means to raise from the dissolution of the old constitution, as from the ashes of the phenix, a new form, wherein all officers shall be dependent on the suffrages of the people for their existence as such, whatever unfavorable constructions our enemies may put upon such a procedure. The exigency of our public affairs leaves us no other alternative from a state of anarchy or slavery.” — p. 101.

A more explicit declaration of independence can scarcely be found in the noble document, which in 1776 proclaimed the dissolution of all ties of colonial relation.

The same spirit may be seen, too, in the resolves of the little convention of blacksmiths, who met at Worcester in 1774; and who, with humble but sincere devotion to their country, agreed “ not to do or perform any blacksmith’s work or business of any kind whatever, for any person or persons, whom they esteemed enemies to this country, commonly known by the name of tories”; and, “ in particular,” resolved not to do any work for “ Tim Ruggles of Hardwick, John Murray of Rutland, and James Putman of Worcester, Esq’s; nor for any person or persons cultivating, tilling, improving, dressing, hiring, or occupying any of their lands or tenements.”

In the troubled and perilous times which succeeded the Revolution, bringing the Commonwealth to the very verge of ruin, Worcester became a conspicuous theatre of action. The narrative of the events of that period will probably prove more interesting to the general reader than any other part of the volume; and we would that our limits permitted us to transfer many of the scenes to our pages. The more obvious causes of the rebellion of 1786, and those which may palliate, though they do not justify, the conduct of the men who took up arms against a government of their own establishment, are thus briefly but clearly stated by the author.

“ After eight years of war, Massachusetts stood, with the splendor of triumph, in republican poverty, bankrupt in resources, with no revenue but of an expiring currency, and no

metal in her treasury more precious than the continental copper, bearing the devices of union and freedom. The country had been drained by taxation for the support of the army of independence, to the utmost limit of its means; public credit was extinct, manners had become relaxed, trade decayed, manufactures languishing, paper money depreciated to worthlessness, claims on the nation accumulated by the commutation of the pay of officers for securities, and a heavy and increasing pressure of debt rested on commonwealth, corporations, and citizens. The first reviving efforts of commerce overstocked the markets with foreign luxuries and superfluities, sold to those who trusted to the future to supply the ability of payment. The temporary act of 1782, making property a tender in discharge of pecuniary contracts, instead of the designed remedial effect, enhanced the evils of general insolvency, by postponing collections. The outstanding demands of the royalist refugees, who had been driven from large estates and extensive business, enforced with no lenient forbearance, came in to increase the embarrassments of the deferred pay-day. At length a flood of suits broke out. In 1784, more than 2000 actions were entered in the county of Worcester, then having a population less than 50,000, and in 1785, about 1700. Lands and goods were seized and sacrificed on sale, when the general difficulties drove away purchasers. Amid the universal distress, artful and designing persons discerned prospect for advancement, and fomented the discontent by inflammatory publications and seditious appeals to every excitable prejudice. The constitution was misrepresented as defective, the administration as corrupt, the laws as unequal and unjust. The celebrated papers of Honestus directed jealousy towards the judicial tribunals, and thundered anathemas against the lawyers, unfortunately for them, the immediate agents and ministers of creditors. Driven to despair by the actual evil of enormous debt, and irritated to madness by the increasing clamor about supposed grievances, it is scarcely surprising that a suffering and deluded people should have attempted relief, without considering that the misery they endured was the necessary result from the confusion of years of warfare." — pp. 131, 132.

"Could we," adds the author in a note to the above, "roll back the tide of time, till its retiring wave left bare the rocks on which the commonwealth was so nearly wrecked, it is not improbable, we should discover, that a loftier and more dangerous ambition, and wider, deeper, and more unhallowed purposes, urged on and sustained the men who were pushed into the front rank of rebellion, than came from the limited capacity of their own minds. We might find that the accredited leaders of 1786 were only humble instruments of stronger spirits, waiting in their conceal-

ments the results of the tempest they had roused. Fortunately, the energy of government gave to rising revolution the harmless character of crushed insurrection, saved to after years the inquiry for the Catilines of the young republic, and left to us the happy privilege of receiving the coin impressed with the mark of patriotism at its stamped value, without testing its deficiency of weight, or assaying the metal to determine the mixture of alloy."

As the Courts of Common Pleas, in which we have seen so many actions had been entered in the two preceding years, were to the people the immediate instruments of their distresses, the spirit of rebellion first manifested itself in overt acts, in attempting to suspend the operations of these tribunals. The first attempt was made in Worcester, at the commencement of the September session of 1786. On Monday night of the first week in the month, a body of eighty armed men, under Captain Wheeler of Hubbardston, entered the town, and took possession of the Court-house. Early the next morning their numbers were augmented to nearly one hundred, and as many more collected without fire-arms. At the usual hour, the Judges, with the Justices of the Sessions and the members of the bar, attended by the clerk and sheriff, moved towards the Court-house. There the following scene took place between Chief Justice Artemas Ward, who had also been a general in the revolution, and the insurgents, which we will give in the words of the author, and with it close our brief allusion to Shays's rebellion.

"On the verge of the crowd thronging the hill, a sentinel was pacing on his round, who challenged the procession as it approached his post. General Ward sternly ordered the soldier, formerly a subaltern of his own particular regiment, to recover his levelled musket. The man, awed by the voice he had been accustomed to obey, instantly complied, and presented his piece, in military salute, to his old commander. The Court, having received the honors of war from him who was planted to oppose their advance, went on. The multitude, receding to the right and left, made way in sullen silence, till the judicial officers reached the court-house. On the steps was stationed a file of men with fixed bayonets; on the front, stood Captain Wheeler, with his drawn sword. The crier was directed to open the doors, and permitted to throw them back, displaying a party of infantry with their guns levelled, as if ready to fire. Judge Ward then advanced, and the bayonets were turned against his breast. He demanded repeatedly, who commanded the people there; by what

authority, and for what purpose, they had met in hostile array. Wheeler at length replied : after disclaiming the rank of leader, he stated, that they had come to relieve the distresses of the country, by preventing the sittings of Courts until they could obtain redress of grievances. The Chief Justice answered, that he would satisfy them their complaints were without just foundation. He was told by Captain Smith of Barre, that any communication he had to make must be reduced to writing. Judge Ward indignantly refused to do this; he said he 'did not value their bayonets; they might plunge them to his heart; but while that heart beat he would do his duty; when opposed to it, his life was of little consequence; if they would take away their bayonets, and give him some position where he could be heard by his fellow-citizens, and not by the leaders alone who had deceived and deluded them, he would speak, but not otherwise.' The insurgent officers, fearful of the effect of his determined manner on the minds of their followers, interrupted. They did not come there, they said, to listen to long speeches, but to resist oppression; they had the power to compel submission; and they demanded an adjournment without day. Judge Ward peremptorily refused to answer any proposition, unless it was accompanied by the name of him by whom it was made. They then desired him to fall back; the drum was beat and the guard ordered to charge. The soldiers advanced, until the points of their bayonets pressed hard upon the breast of the Chief Justice, who stood as immovable as a statue, without stirring a limb, or yielding an inch, although the steel in the hands of desperate men penetrated his dress. Struck with admiration by his intrepidity, and shrinking from the sacrifice of life, the guns were removed, and Judge Ward, ascending the steps, addressed the assembly."

* * * * *

"He spoke nearly two hours, not without frequent interruption. But admonition and argument were unavailing; the insurgents declared they would maintain their ground until satisfaction was obtained. Judge Ward, addressing himself to Wheeler, advised him to suffer the troops to disperse; 'they were waging war, which was treason, and its end would be,' he added after a momentary pause, 'the gallows.' The judges then retired, unmolested, through armed files." — pp. 135, 136.

The remaining portions of the volume, including the ecclesiastical, biographical, and statistical history of the town, like those we have already examined, attest the ability, faithfulness, and industry of the historian; and, if less general in their interest, are equally valuable as parts of the history of an

enterprising, intelligent, and self-governed people, and will richly repay an attentive perusal. The biographical sketches, in particular, are very full and complete, and show that Worcester has contributed her full share of the men, whose lives have blessed and honored their country, and whose names already hold a distinguished place in her annals.

L. B.

NOTICES AND INTELLIGENCE.

A Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament, including the Biblical Chaldee. Translated from the Latin of WILLIAM GESENIUS, Doct. and Prof. of Theology in the University of Halle, Wittemberg. By EDWARD ROBINSON, D. D., late Prof. Extraord. of Sac. Lit. in the Theol. Sem. at Andover. Boston; Crocker & Brewster. New York; Leavitt, Lord, & Co. 1836. Svo. pp. viii. and 1092.—It is matter of just surprise, that while there have long been in use tolerable Lexicons of the Greek and Latin tongues, a good, copious, and methodical Hebrew Lexicon continued to be a desideratum until the appearance of the works of Dr. Gesenius. The study of the Hebrew, though doubtless less difficult than that of the Greek, the Latin, or the German, has its many peculiar discouragements, apart from the want of a good Lexicon in the mother tongue. Still this latter difficulty has been powerful to prevent students from cultivating it extensively and with profit, in this country and England, even if it has not deterred many from making a beginning. This last difficulty is now entirely removed; for the work above named combines all which can reasonably be demanded of a dictionary. Those unfortunates, who, like ourselves, attempted the "dreadful Hebrew" with only Pike's Lexicon, and Buxtorf's, will fully realize the blessing of the present work.

Dr. Gesenius is well known, both in this country and in Europe, as the first Hebrew scholar of the age. His example, his lectures, and his publications have created an enthusiasm which marks a new era in the annals of Hebrew literature. At the age of twenty-four, he published a Hebrew and German Lexicon, with the title of *Hebräisch-deutsches Handwörterbuch des Alten Testaments*, (2 vols. Svo. Leipzig, 1810, 12,) which has since been translated into English by Christopher Leo. A second work, for the use of Schools, appeared a few years later, under the title of *Neues Hebräisch-deutsches Handwörterbuch, &c*, (1 vol. Svo. 1815,) well known amongst us by the translation of J. W. Gibbs. It

had reached three editions in 1828, each being an improvement upon its predecessor, and nearly *ten thousand* copies of it have been circulated. Gesenius has likewise commenced a more extensive work, with the title *Thesaurus philologicus criticus Linguae Hebraeae et Chaldaeae Vet. Test.*, which he promises to complete during the present year.

The work which Dr. Robinson has here translated was begun in 1827. At first, the author intended merely to clothe his German Manual in a Latin dress, for the convenience of such as were not familiar with the language in which it was originally written. But about this time a new impulse was given to his studies, by the profound researches of his contemporaries in oriental literature, and comparative philology, (a science, we regret to add, almost peculiar to Germany,) which induced him to change the character of his Latin manual. Accordingly, it became a new and independent work, but with the addition of new material, and distinguished by his more extended views of the Hebrew, in connexion with other languages. It bears this title; *Lexicon Manuale Hebraicum et Chaldaicum in V. T. Libros*: Leips. 1833. This work is everywhere distinguished by a profound and accurate research, not only into the meaning of each word in the Hebrew language, but, as auxiliary thereto, in the various cognate dialects. He uniformly endeavors to point out the primary meaning of each word, and then to deduce from it the various metaphorical significations it is made to bear, as well as the different *senses* in which it appears. He does not appear to mistake the *sense* of a term for its legitimate *signification*, as some lexicographers have done, thus inflicting a great book upon the public, and burdening the learner by an huge mass of heterogeneous materials, of no use but to perplex and mislead.

The corresponding words in various tongues are pointed out when the similarity is obvious. Thus, not only the oriental languages are laid under contribution, but French, German, Danish, Russian, Greek, Latin, and English, furnish their quota to aid in illustrating some obscure passage in the Sacred volume.

The prepositions and particles are fully explained, their various significations and senses pointed out, so that in this respect the work is singularly complete. The word *ל*, e. g., with its various senses, occupies no less than ten columns, or five entire pages. The same remark applies generally to the explanation of idioms, and phrases of the language. Authorities are given for the meaning of words, passages of the Scripture referred to, and many difficult texts cleared up. As an example of this latter, we might cite the word *בִּרְא*. In this article he gives the various meanings,

as usual referring to passages which justify them, and explains

several "vexed texts," e. g. Job ii, 9; where he makes Job's wife say, "*Bless God and die*," regarding it still as the speech of an impious woman, who wished to say, You may bless God as much as you will, still all your piety will do you no good, for you must die!

We regret to say that entire confidence cannot be placed in the accuracy of the present translation. It seems to have been made in too great haste. A distinguished Hebrew scholar has sent us a list of a few mistranslations, which have occurred to him in using the work a short time.

Page 81, under *אֶנֶשׁ כַּמֶּלֶךְ*, *one like the Son of man came with the clouds of heaven*. It should be, *one like a son of man*, as the definition immediately preceding evidently requires. That the Messiah is referred to was probably the opinion of Gesenius. But there is not the slightest probability that the phrase son of man is here an appellative of the Messiah. The meaning is, that one like a son of man, i. e., like a man, having the appearance of a man, was seen, &c.

Page 225, under *יָרָם*, which Professor Robinson renders, *to take away, to withhold from*; and subsequently, "*withholdest prayer from before God*." The word "*withhold*" is not authorized by Gesenius, and does not suit the meaning of the passage, which is, that Job diminished or destroyed piety in general by the language which he used; not that he himself withheld or neglected prayer before God.

Page 243, under *בָּרִי*; *the nations labor for the fire, in pabulum ignis*, i. e., says the translator, *they only become food for the fire*. It should be, for that which shall become food for the fire.

Page 766, under *עַל־כֶּהָן*. Here, "*quovis pretio, pr. ob quicquid est*," is rendered, "*at what price, pp. on account of what*." It should be, "*for any price whatever*," literally, "*for any thing whatever it is*," i. e. for any consideration, however slight. Here, too, we are at a loss to know what English word the initials pp. stand for. If he meant them for the Latin *proprie*, we see not why *pr.* should be changed into pp.

Page 992, under *שׂוֹא* "*ne confidat malo (sceleri) fallitur, nam malum (calamitas) ejus præmium erit*," is rendered "*let him not trust in evil*, (i. e. in the wicked) for evil (i. e. calamity) shall be his recompense." Surely the professor more than nodded, when he rendered "*sceleri*" "*the wicked*," instead of "*wickedness*," as the sense of the passage requires.

Page 1057, under *תּוֹכַחַת*, "*Semel de reprehensione (Dei)*,

queremonia" is rendered "once of reproof *from* God." It should be "once, of reproof *of* God," i. e. finding fault with God. The word refers to the prophet's expostulation with God, or the complaint concerning God's dealings, in Hab. ch. I. As Professor Robinson translates it, it is not distinguished from the definitions, which precede.

Page 805, under *vy*, he renders "quod ursam majorem, arcton, curram vocamus," &c., "which we call *the Great Bear, Ursa Major, Arcturus, the Wain.*" Instead of Arcturus, he should have said *Arctos*, or have omitted the word. Arcturus was a star, or constellation, near Ursa Major, and denotes "the Bearkeeper."

We cannot fail to regret that the able Preface prefixed to the German Manual, comprising as it does an able Essay upon the sources of Hebrew Lexicography, does not appear in the present volume. An alphabet of the various languages alluded to in the work, would likewise be of no small aid to the student.

Still we commend this work to our readers, and trust that both its Editor, and the enterprising publishers, will receive the just recompense of their labors, and that Sacred Literature will gain new friends and admirers through their means. What nobler reward than the latter can any one wish!

The True Believer's Defence, against Charges preferred by Trinitarians, for not believing in the Divinity of Christ, the Deity of Christ, the Trinity, &c. By CHARLES MORGRIDGE, Minister of the First Christian Church in New Bedford. Boston: Benjamin H. Greene. 1837. 12mo. pp. 168. — The author of this little book is an active and intelligent minister of the Christian denomination. The nature of the subject, the leading object of the writer, and the circumstances under which he prepared the copy for the press were such as to preclude, for the most part, any attempt at originality, either of investigation or argument. Still the various reading, sound sense, and logical acumen evinced in the work, as well as the excellent spirit pervading it, abundantly vindicate his claim to the high rank he holds among his brethren. It is precisely such a "Defence" as was wanted at this time, and will do much more, we doubt not, to settle and confirm the convictions of the members of his own connexion, and to convert the wavering or inquiring among the Orthodox, than either of the more elaborate and voluminous treatises from which it is in a great measure professedly derived. We hope and trust that many among the "true believers," who are not in want of this book for themselves, will assist nevertheless in promoting its circulation.

Mr. Morgridge refers repeatedly to a "Discourse on the Doctrine of the Trinity, in three Sermons," by the Rev. Mr. Robbins of Rochester, printed not long ago at New Bedford, and industriously circulated in that region. We never heard of the publication before, and probably we shall never hear of it again. A writer, who at this day makes the spurious text of the "Three Heavenly Witnesses," the basis of his argument, and finds a proof of the Trinity in the plural termination of some of the Hebrew names or titles of God, and can say among other things, in sober earnest, "The learned Professor [H. Ware, Jr.] will probably admit that no editions of the Greek Testament have been published with so much care and labor as those of Robert Stephens and John Mill," must have been asleep for the last half-century. One difficulty, however, under which our friend Robbins's mind seems to labor, we think we can do something to remove. He says: "It is hard to believe that intelligent men, who reject this passage of Scripture, [1. John v. 7,] are fully satisfied with what they do. They usually exhibit an excitement of feeling on the subject which hardly comports with a full conviction of the understanding." Let him suppose himself to be assured that an important document in circulation is a gross and palpable forgery; still let him find that there are those who are abusing the public confidence, consciously or unconsciously, by trying to give it currency. In such a case would he not, in exposing the fraud, and the delusion by which it is perpetuated, be likely to grow a little warm; and would not his warmth not only "comport with," but be in exact proportion to, the fullness and certainty of his knowledge?

Unitarianism in England. — We learn from the London Unitarian periodicals, that the case of the Trustees of Lady Hewley's charity has been carried up to the House of Lords, by appeal, for final adjudication, but with little expectation on the part of the appellants, that the unrighteous decision in Chancery will be reversed. Until the Lords pronounce thereon, proceedings in the Wolverhampton case, involving the same or similar questions, have been stayed in the courts below.

The withdrawal of the English Presbyterians, who are Unitarian, from the Independent and Baptist Boards, and the consequent dissolution of the General Body of Protestant Dissenting Ministers of the Three Denominations, residing in and about the cities of London and Westminster, has given rise to a controversy which is conducted with great asperity on both sides. The Independents and Baptists, it would seem, deny that the Presbyterians have a right to withdraw, as a body. They main-

tain, therefore, that the still adhering minority, consisting, we believe, of one English Presbyterian, and three members of the Scotch Secession Church, who belong to the denomination by courtesy only, are the legal representatives of the whole Presbyterian body, and consequently that the General Body of the Three Denominations is still entire. The three Scotch ministers have even had the effrontery, as we understand, to follow out this idea, by instituting against the seceders a legal demand for the records and property belonging to the Presbyterians.

Meanwhile Unitarianism is making progress among the laboring classes, particularly in Derbyshire and Lancashire. The following is an extract from the report of one of the missionaries.

"Nov. 8, Tuesday evening. I went with some of our Padiham friends to preach at Burnley. Mrs. Mary Marquis, a widow, strong in the faith, had procured for us a good sized room, in an old warehouse, not at present occupied. She had cleaned it up, set forms in it, and lighted a large fire. The room was about one third part full when we entered it, at the commencement of the service, it was half filled. During the first hymn many others crowded in, and by the time the sermon commenced, it was full to overflowing — part of the audience standing up to my very elbows. When the door was closed, a number at the outside had to go away, being unable to get in. The object of my discourse was to prove 'that Christ derived all the power and authority he possessed from the Father. The people were very silent and attentive; they joined heartily in the singing, and when the service was over, they dispersed in great order and quietness. One man laying his hand on the shoulder of another, was heard to say, 'Now, I tow'd thee they did'nt deny Jesus.' 'Noa, noa,' replied the other, 'they do'nt.' Another thus addressed his neighbor, 'What thinks th'a to this?' 'Why mon,' the respondent said, 'we can't get ower this ony fashion.' Mary told us after service, as we were sitting by her blazing fire, and partaking of her hospitable entertainment, that, 'if I came and preached every night for a week, she believed the room would be as crowded as it had been that evening. It was calculated there were about 200 hearers. Mrs. Mary Marquis and her two daughters are full of zeal in the good cause — willing to entertain any Unitarian Preacher, and very anxious that Ministers should be sent frequently to Burnley. These good women are regular attendants at Padiham chapel on the Sunday. I and my long train of Padiham attendants returned much delighted with the events of the evening; such a train of honest and pious Christians is better than an armed band of soldiers, and the clattering of their clogs, as they tramp beside or after you, more grateful to the ear of the missionary than the clash of cymbals, or the sound of trumpets. We reached Padiham about eleven o'clock."

The Church of England. — It is common for the members of the Church of England, and its daughter, the Episcopal Church

in this country, to recommend their communion as a haven of rest in these unquiet times. Why, we never could see. Perhaps in point of fact it has not condescended so frequently as some others, to enter into controversy with those who are without; but if history is to be trusted, who does not know that from the beginning to the present hour, and far beyond any other denomination, it has been torn by intestine broils? Our readers are aware of the war which has been raging for some time between "the Oxford Malignants," as they are called, and Dr. Hampden. Nor is that all. We copy the following from the Christian Teacher, for February.

"The Episcopal Church is convulsed by internal divisions throughout the length and breadth of the land. The Archbishop of Dublin is in conflict with clergymen under his own control on questions of authority; the Bishop of London is assailed by Messrs. Bowles and Sydney Smith as the great Ecclesiastical Autocrat, a sort of Church of England in small; and the old high church party with the British Critic for their mouth piece, are making approximations to Catholicism; while their fellows of the Evangelical school are shaking the coherence of the rotten old fabric, by the bustling and anomalous activity to which their ardor compels them. The bishop of Exeter denounces the *Ecclesiastical Commission* as 'a machinery of the most formidable and portentous nature, threatening series of chappes in our ecclesiastical constitution, so often as the convenience of any government which may be dependent on the will or caprice of a faction hostile to the church shall dictate such changes,' (so much for the stability of the church of Christ as resting on an establishment.) But the fiercest strife is between the Bishops and the Chapters, the said Bishops wishing to take to themselves, or rather my Lord of London grasping to his own aggrandizement, the trifles of patronage enjoyed by the Chapters. Hereafter, let no naughty Dissenter, Infidel, Papist, or Socinian be accused of calumniating Anglican Episcopacy, for we defy its worst enemy to bring against it severer charges than the meek Mr. Bowles and the witty Mr. Smith have alleged. The Chapters, Mr. Bowles affirms, have to resist 'the most cruel injustice, the most opprobrious insult, insane persecution' of their superiors (the Bishops) 'insult and robbery;' 'the taking of the poor man's ewe lamb under the color of making a sacrifice and a reform.' In the same strain but richly garnished with his own racy wit, Sydney Smith's pamphlet charges home against the Bishops 'gross spoliation accompanied with ignominy and degradation,' and among other *slight* inuendos, the attempt to 'combine the sweets of rapine with the odor of sanctity.'

Specimens of Foreign Standard Literature. — Hilliard, Gray, & Co. propose to publish, under this title, a series of translations from the works of several of the most celebrated writers in the higher departments of German and French Literature, to be

edited by the Rev. Mr. Ripley of this city. No literary enterprise is now before the public which we are disposed to greet with a heartier welcome. A judicious and well-assorted importation of foreign learning and thought will doubtless do much to improve and enrich what is of native growth, as well as gratify a natural and commendable curiosity, and teach us a more just appreciation of ourselves and others. The singular fitness of the Editor for the undertaking, all who are acquainted with his qualifications will be ready to admit; and we are glad to learn that he has already so far secured the coöperation of some of the best scholars of the country, without regard to political or theological distinctions, as to place the accomplishment of his purpose beyond a doubt. We learn from the Prospectus, that—

Among the writers from whom it is proposed to give translations, are Cousin, Benjamin Constant, Jouffroy, and Guizot, in French; and Herder, Schiller, Goethe, Jacobi, Lessing, Fichte, Schelling, Richter, Novalis, Uhland, Körner, Höltz, Menzel, Neander, Schleiermacher, De Wette, Olshausen, Hase, and Twisten, in German.

“The first two volumes, containing “Philosophical Miscellanies, from the French of Cousin, Constant, and Jouffroy, with Introductory and Critical Notices,” by the Editor, will be put to press in October next.

“These will be followed by the “Select Minor Poems of Goethe and Schiller,” translated by Rev. J. S. Dwight, assisted by Professor Felton and Professor Longfellow, of Harvard University, Rev. N. L. Frothingham, and others.”

New Publications.—The first volume of Mr. Norton's great work on the “*Evidences of the Genuineness of the Gospels.*” Boston: American Stationers' Company. John B. Russell. 1837. 8vo. pp. 248 and ccxc.

The same Company have in press, and will shortly publish a *History of the Reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, the Catholic, of Spain.* By William Hickling Prescott. In Three Volumes Royal 8vo.

We are glad to learn that an edition of the Commentary on the Bible and the Apocrapha by Patrick, Lowth, Arnold, and Whitby, in seven or eight large volumes, is to be published in New York, under the superintendence of the Rev. Dr. Schroeder.

We have received several valuable communications. The articles on “Clerical Studies,” “The Miracles of Jesus,” “The Word” and “The Writings and Opinions of Clement of Alexandria,” will appear in our next number, or as soon as may be.

JAMES MUNROE AND COMPANY
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The Reviewer of Vol. I. of this work says,

"We conceive that Mr. Noyes has made the Christian public much his debtor by the portion now before us of a version of that difficult and strongly interesting part of Scripture, the Hebrew prophecies. — We have little to do but repeat the testimony which we have borne, on the two previous occasions of his coming before the public, to the exceeding value of his labors. Three things are especially to be spoken of in his praise; his learning, his cautious and sound judgment, and his beautiful taste. In the two last qualities, particularly, he is very advantageously distinguished from Lowth and Newcome, with whose works the present volume is most likely to be compared."

Christian Examiner.

J. M. & Co. will shortly put to press a new and revised edition of Noyes's Amended Version of Job, to correspond in size and style with the translations of the Psalms and Prophets by the same author.

"No translation has appeared in England, since that of Isaiah by Lowth, which can sustain a comparison with that of the book of Job, by Mr. Noyes. With some slight exceptions, this latter is very much what we could wish it to be."

Spirit of the Pilgrims.

"We have not seen any translation of the book of Job, with which the public ought to be satisfied, unless it be this."

Christian Examiner.

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